Thematic Papers Based on the Conference
Migration, Social Transformation, and Education for Democratic Citizenship

2nd InZentIM Conference
InZentIM - Interdisciplinary Center for Integration and Migration Research

&

6th EARLI SIG 13 Conference
EARLI SIG 13 - Special Interest Group on Moral and Democratic Education
Thematic Papers Based on the Conference

*Migration, Social Transformation, and Education for Democratic Citizenship*

Editors

Prof. Dr. Eveline Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger
*University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany*
eveline.gutzwiller-helfenfinger@uni-due.de

Prof. Dr. Hermann J. Abs
*University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany*
h.j.abs@uni-due.de

Paulena Müller
*University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany*
paulena.mueller@uni-due.de

Co-Funded by

German Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth

Conference Organisation

UDE - Interdisciplinary Center for Integration and Migration Research (InZentIM)
EARLI Special Interest Group Moral and Democratic Education (EARLI-SIG 13)

In Cooperation with

World Education Research Association (WERA)
German Educational Research Association (GERA / DGfE)
German Youth Institute (DJI)

This publication can be used under Creative Commons Attribution - NC – ND 4.0 International License.
Introduction

Migration causes and necessitates societal change. Insofar as the change affects individual mind-sets, we can observe processes of acculturation. For both new arrivals and individuals who have been living for a longer time in a given society, the question arises to what degree life together is or should be oriented towards integration, assimilation, segregation, or even marginalisation. To date, processes of acculturation have been insufficiently addressed as a context for civic and citizenship education. Also, specific measures of civic and citizenship education purposely targeting societal change as caused by migration, as well as their potential effects, have been investigated too seldom so far.

Some of the issues that are relevant in this context are: 1. How can new challenges of civic and citizenship education that arise in the context of migration and integration be described in more detail? 2. In what ways can these challenges be addressed pragmatically? What might be adequate educational policies? 3. What can we learn from the evaluation of policies measures and interventions?

These issues were raised and discussed at the SIG 13 and InZentIM Conference 2018 on Migration, Social Transformation, and Education for Democratic Citizenship, held at the University of Duisburg-Essen, August 27-29 2018. To make the fruits of the scientific exchange available to a broader scientific and non-scientific audience quickly, without the delay involved in publishing conference proceedings or edited volumes, we publish this open access thematic documentation. It is based on the scientific contributions at the intersection of migration, (civic and citizenship) education, social in/exclusion, and violence/extremism.

Moreover, there has been a paucity of empirical, internationally compatible research in Germany addressing the impact of migration and associated societal change (as conceptualised for instance, as integration, assimilation, segregation, or marginalisation) on the conditions and processes of civic and citizenship education. Migration reinforces the effects of relevant, known factors influencing the outcomes of both civic and citizenship education in particular and education in general. Such factors include for example socially and culturally determined proximity to or alienation from education, access to resources, or equality of opportunities in accessing formal education, etc. Due to the insufficient research base, we do not know at this time in what way institutionalised educational processes can contribute to (a) meeting the challenges of educating for democratic citizenship inherent in changing societies; and (b) influencing the relevant factors in favourable ways. What also remains unclear is the related issue of identifying the (relevant) conditions and prerequisites necessary to bring about success.
in the respective educational settings. It is also unclear how these conditions and prerequisites can be realised. Accordingly, there is a lack of publications which are based on current research, are accessible to a broader audience, and address these issues across subjects and disciplines to inform both scientific and additional professional stakeholders in the educational and social sectors. The present focused documentation is a first step towards filling this gap.

We thank the authors for their cooperation and support in publishing the documentation. Their papers offer in-depth insights into current, innovative research from a multitude of theoretical and empirical perspectives bringing together qualitative, quantitative, and multi-methods approaches to capture relevant phenomena and processes. We also thank the German Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women, and Youth (BMFSFJ) for supporting both the conference and the publication of this documentation.

Essen (Germany), January 2019

Eveline Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger
Hermann Josef Abs
Paulena Müller
# Table of Contents

**Contested Spaces–Shared Places:**  
Negotiating the Contours of Democratic Citizenship  
Vandeyar, S. .................................................................................................................. 7

**Social Diversity, Migration and Social Innovation:**  
A New Vision of Society Constructed by Grassroots Movements in Germany  
Bacia, E. ....................................................................................................................... 25

‘Captives of a Lost Time’ –  
Space-Making in the Everyday Life of Refugees in Germany’s Rural Areas  
Baumann, J. N. ........................................................................................................... 43

Cross-Border Political Orientations of Migrants of Turkish Descent in Germany  
Halm, D., Sauer, M. ...................................................................................................... 59

Fostering Democratic Learning Experiences with Intercultural Virtual Problem-based Learning  
Dähling, C., Weinberger, A., Standop, J. ........................................................................ 69

‘ICT Guides’ Project as an Example of Educational Support of Young Immigrants Through Intergenerational Learning and ICT Tools  
Leek, J., Rojek, M. ....................................................................................................... 87

Intercultural Competences of Fourth Graders in Germany  
Azad, K., Wendt, H. ...................................................................................................... 107

Interpersonal Citizenship Skills of Primary School Students:  
The Role of Class Composition  
De Schaepmeester, L., Dewulf, L., Aesaert, K., van Braak, J. ...................................... 119

The Effects of Linguistic Competencies and Civic Literacy on Political Decision-making in School – First Results of the Interdisciplinary Project, “SchriFT II”  
Manzel, S., Luft, C. ........................................................................................................ 137

Indicators of (In)Tolerance Among European Young People:  
An Assessment of Measurement Invariance in ICCS 2016  
Isac, M. M., Palmerio, L., van der Werf, G. ................................................................. 151

Upstream With Tiny Oars:  
Promoting Citizenship Education Within a Non-democratic Culture and in Low-cognitive-demand School Settings  
Guadalupe, C. ............................................................................................................. 161

Value as a Component of Teacher Ethos in Times of Migration  
Drahmann, M., Merk, S., Cramer, C. ............................................................................. 177
VaKE Intervention Method:
Education for Democratic Citizenship for Female Refugees
Patry, J.-L., Weyringer, S., Diekmann, N. .................................................................191

Religion and Normativity in Pedagogical Situations
Knauth, T. .....................................................................................................................207

Religion as a Challenge in Preventing Radicalization?
Empirical Insights from Germany
Figlesthaler, C., Langner, J. ...........................................................................................219

The Role of Religion for Countering Violent Islamist Extremism —
The Situation in France
Uhlmann, M. ..................................................................................................................233

The Jihadist Social Actors in Europe
Khosrokhavar, F. ..........................................................................................................243
Contested Spaces–Shared Places: Negotiating the Contours of Democratic Citizenship

Saloshna Vandeyar

Department of Humanities Education, Faculty of Education, University of Pretoria, Groenkloof Campus, Leyds Street. Pretoria, 0001, South Africa
Saloshna.Vandeyar@up.ac.za
www.up.ac.za

Keywords

contested spaces; shared places; democratic citizenship; pedagogy of compassion; polarised thinking; hope
Abstract

Utilising the theoretical framework of pedagogy of compassion, a single embedded case study, and narrative inquiry, this paper explores how a teacher negotiates the contours of migration and social transformation to promote education for democratic citizenship. Data capture comprised a mix of semi-structured interviews, observations and field notes. Data was analysed by means of the content analysis method. The teacher anticipated and fulfilled requirements not only to raise the critical consciousness of learners but to espouse an ‘epistemology of compassion’ and to implement a ‘pedagogy of compassion’ which enabled learners to become active, critical, and democratic citizens, imbued with a sense of common humanity and compassion.

German Synopsis

Unter Benutzung des theoretischen Rahmens der sogenannten Pädagogik der Anteilnahme sowie einer einzelnen eingebetteten Fallstudie und narrativer Untersuchungen, erforscht dieser Beitrag, wie eine Lehrerin die Umrisse von Wanderungsbewegungen und sozialem Wandel erstellt, um die Entwicklung demokratischer Bürger zu unterstützen. Daten wurden durch teilstrukturierte Interviews, Beobachtung und Aufzeichnungen im Feld erfasst und durch die Methode der Inhaltsanalyse ausgewertet. Die Lehrerin war auf die Erfüllung der Anforderung eingestellt, das kritische Bewusstsein der Lerner zu erhöhen sowie die Erkenntnistheorie der Anteilnahme zu unterstützen und die Pädagogik der Anteilnahme umzusetzen. Dieser Ansatz ermöglichte es den Lernern, sich zu aktiven, kritischen und demokratisch orientierten Bürgern zu entwickeln, die von einem Empfinden der geteilten Menschlichkeit und Anteilnahme durchdrungen sind.
Introduction

Only when a nation state is unified around a set of democratic values such as human rights, justice, and equality can it secure the liberties of cultural, ethnic, language, and religious groups and enable them to experience freedom, justice, and peace. Citizens who understand this unity-diversity tension and act accordingly do not materialize from thin air; they are educated for it. (Banks et al., 2005, p. 7).

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how citizens can be ‘educated for it’. The inception of democracy in South Africa brought with it a change in the hues and contours that once defined the educational landscape. The South African education system has been reformed to become ‘a key allocator of life chances as an important vehicle for achieving equity in the distribution of opportunity and achievement among South African citizens’ (South African Schools Act, 1996, p. 1). Prior to 1994, an apartheid ideology regulated the South African education system. In an attempt to dismantle this system, a barrage of educational reform efforts, driven by legislative polices that promoted democracy and human rights for all citizens, was introduced in South African schools.

Contested spaces between Black and White\(^1\) South African students were a defining feature of the early years of democracy. However, over the past two decades, the South African schooling system, while unravelling its shape and form, has witnessed the mass entry of ‘Black immigrant students’\(^2\), which added a new, complicated dynamic to this already contested space in shared places. Given the changing historical, political, social and educational context of South Africa, this study asks, how can teachers negotiate the contours of migration and social transformation to promote education for democratic citizenship?

The paper begins by briefly sketching out the background context. I then present a review of the literature on education for democratic citizenship, followed by a brief outline of the theoretical framework. The paper concludes by critically engaging findings of this study with the literature review and the theoretical framework in order to unpack how an exemplary teacher negotiates the contours of migration and social transformation to promote education for democratic citizenship.

---

\(^1\) The terms Black, White, Indian and Coloured derive from the apartheid racial classifications of the different peoples of South Africa. The use of these terms, although problematic, has continued through the post-apartheid era in the country. In this paper, these terms are used grudgingly for clarification of the context.

\(^2\) Black immigrant students: Referencing the apartheid era solidarity of all non-whites as ‘black’, Black immigrant students refers to both non-white immigrants who come from African countries, to descendants of any of the people of Africa, and to Indian immigrants who hail from India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Exploring the Terrain: Education for Democratic Citizenship

A review of the voluminous literature reveals six key contextual factors that help explain the considerable growth in interest in citizenship education over the past decade. *Global injustice and inequality* (Banks et.al 2005; Moellendorf, 2009; Reese, et.al, 2014). *Globalisation and migration* (Petersen & Schramm, 2017; Rapoport, 2016; Czaika & deHaas, 2014). *Concerns about civic and political engagement* (Galston, 2001; Xenus et.al, 2014). *Youth deficit tendency* (Griffin, 1993; Osler & Vincent, 2003). Citizenship education is often seen as a means of addressing a perceived deficit among the young (Osler & Starkey, 2003), whether this deficit relates to low levels of voting (usually interpreted as political apathy), violence, or anti-social behaviour. *The end of the Cold War* was an enormous boost for democracy and, consequently, education for democracy in Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America and Africa (Giddens, 2013) and the *growth of anti-democratic movements with racist agendas* (Fekete, 2018).

The focus of this paper is on globalisation and migration. Globalisation can perhaps best be defined as the widening, deepening, and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life (Held et.al, 1999, p. 2). Globalisation should be simultaneously seen as a technological and political process (Czaika & de Haas, 2014). Migration patterns have also become more complex. Globalisation and migration present new and encompassing challenges to the imagination and representation as well as challenging the creation of images, which is so essential to both individual and collective world-making (Petersen & Schramm, 2017).

The processes of globalisation and the migration movements resulting from globalisation are having a direct impact on communities and schools and are increasing levels of diversity in local communities. Within multicultural democracies, there are perceived tensions between the need to promote national unity or cohesion and the need to accommodate, and indeed support, a diverse range of cultural communities within the nation state (Taylor, 1994). These tensions demand an educational response. Citizenship education in schools is recognised as a means of addressing both unity and diversity. There is a need to rethink the aims and processes of citizenship education in schools; increased diversity and increased recognition of diversity require a vigorous re-examination of the ends and means of citizenship education.

Some key themes have been identified in education for democratic citizenship, namely: diversity and unity; global and cosmopolitan citizenship (Osler & Starkey, 2003); children as

citizens; democratic schooling; students’ understanding of citizenship; and democracy and the complementary roles of schools and communities (Figueroa, 2000).

Education for citizenship in schools does not take place in a vacuum. Learners bring their experiences of daily life into the classroom; experiences which are often strongly influenced by their families and experiences in their communities. Figueroa (2000, p. 54) does not see diversity as ‘disintegrative or a fault to be overcome’. Instead, he draws our attention to the fact that ‘all present-day societies are plural’ to some degree and that difference is a primary and rich resource. Arguing that the encounter with the different other is at the heart of human experience, he presents cultural pluralism as an ideal, and one which sets equity as a central goal. For Figueroa, citizenship involves commitment to society in all its diversity; openness to, solidarity with, and respect for the different other; acceptance of the basic worth of all people; and rejection of any form of exploitation, inequitable treatment or racism. (Figueroa, 2000, p. 57). Acknowledging the power relations between groups is, for Figueroa, an essential task in addressing the tensions between unity and diversity.

Theoretical Moorings: Pedagogy of Compassion

The concept of a pedagogy of compassion3 builds on the work of Jansen (2009) and Freire (1998) and proposes the following tenets (Vandeyar & Swart, 2018):

1. Dismantling polarised thinking and questioning one’s ingrained belief system.

Educational settings are almost genetically stereotyped (Keet, Zinn & Porteurs 2009, p. 110). The lingering legacies of apartheid have ensured that educational spaces in South Africa are still stereotyped according to racial or genetic compositions. For this reason, Jansen (2009, p. 153) calls for the disruption of knowledge so that all South Africans can confront each other with their respective memories of trauma, tragedies, and triumph in the classroom. According to Jansen (2009), polite silences and hidden resentments should be exposed, indirect knowledge should be made explicit, and its potential and real harm discussed openly. Dialogue between ‘opposing parties’ should be encouraged because conflict not only promotes engagement but also harbours the inherent potential to dismantle polarised thinking. Vandeyar and Swart (2018) expand on this tenet by arguing that it should go beyond simply unsettling or dismantling polarised thinking to questioning one’s ingrained belief system.


Jansen (2009, p. 154) claims that pedagogic dissonance happens when one’s stereotypes are shattered. This does not happen overnight. ‘One incident of pedagogic dissonance does not, of course, lead to personal change, but it can begin to erode sure knowledge’ (Jansen 2009, p. 154). Linked to the notion of pedagogic dissonance as argued by Jansen is the work of Zembylas (2010; 2017), who emphasises the proactive and transformative potential of discomfort. Zembylas (2010, p. 703) argues that teachers experience immense discomfort when having to confront diversity and multiculturalism. Drawing on Foucault (1994) who introduced an ethic of discomfort, he claims,

An ethic of discomfort, therefore, invites teachers and students to critique their deeply held assumptions about themselves and others by positioning themselves as witnesses (as opposed to spectators) to social injustices and structurally limiting practices such that they see and act as ambiguous rather than dualistic subjects (e.g., ‘us’ and ‘them’). (Boler & Zembylas, 2003)

Freire (1992, p. 95) claims that teachers should have a critical democratic outlook on the prescribed teaching content and never allow themselves to succumb to the naive temptation to look on content as something magical. If teachers treat content as neutral, thereby ignoring what Jansen calls pedagogic dissonance, then the content has power of its own accord, and the teacher can only ‘deposit’ it in learners, which means that the content loses its power to effect the desired change. All of the above plays out in educational spaces which, according to Postma (2016, p. 5),

…are political spaces of a particular kind. They are spaces of reflection, of relative safety and reduced risks; courage is not assumed, but fostered; opportunities are provided to experiment with new beginnings and imaginations, and to develop judgement; forgiveness could be cultivated and hope fostered.

‘Fusing a set of different horizons’ or views, namely those of ‘pedagogic dissonance’ (Jansen, 2009); ‘ethic of discomfort’ (Foucault, 1994; Zembylas, 2003); critical democratic outlook and ‘knowledge of living experience’ (Freire 1992, 57); and ‘educational spaces’ (Postma, 2016), Vandeyar and Swart (2018) propose a proactive commitment to engage compassionately with diversity in educational spaces. Educational spaces have to be opened up to the multitude of student voices. Compassionately responding to student voices entails not only warmth and care, but also a feeling of deep sympathy and sorrow for another individual, who may be stricken by misfortune, accompanied by a strong desire to alleviate the suffering.
3. Instilling hope and sustainable peace.

‘A post-conflict pedagogy is founded on hope’ (Jansen 2009, p. 154). Freire (1992, p. 77) claims that there is no change without a dream, and that there is no dream without hope. The hope that Jansen and Freire refer to is achievable in practice. It is insufficient to simply pronounce hope; hope should be acted upon. There is no room for utopia in post-conflict pedagogy. In a post-conflict society, the former oppressor and the oppressed do not get caught up in a blaming game. Jansen (2009, p. 154) refers to post-conflict pedagogy as follows: ‘This kind of critical pedagogy recognizes the power and the pain at play in school and society and their effects on young people, and then asks “how things could be better”’. Similarly, Freire argues that as an individual and as a class, the oppressor can neither liberate nor be liberated. This is why, through self-liberation and through the required, just struggle, the oppressed— as an individual and as a class—liberate the oppressor through the simple act of forbidding him or her to keep on oppressing. ‘The liberation of individuals acquires profound meaning only when the transformation of society is achieved’ (Freire 1992, 85). Vandeyar and Swart (2018) argue that such transformation not only instils hope but also holds the promise of sustainable peace.

Research Strategy

Social constructivism and a qualitative case study approach (Silverman, 2006) were utilised in this study. The aim of this study was to gain in-depth, thick descriptions and understanding of a specific social context or phenomenon, and to identify teachers who were negotiating the contours of migration and social transformation to promote education for democratic citizenship. Snowball sampling (Baltar & Brunet, 2012; Rubin & Babbie, 1993) fulfilled this requirement, as headteachers were asked to recommend teachers who were bringing about change in their schools.

While capturing data for the broader study, I came across Rina, an exceptional female Indian teacher who espoused an ‘epistemology of compassion’ (Vandeyar, 2010, 2016). Classroom observations of this teacher revealed some criteria that made her exceptional. She seemed to have extensive knowledge about each of her learners; she knew and understood each of their lives; she incorporated their life-worlds in her teaching; and she enabled learners to attach meaning to real life experiences. I acknowledge that, in my role as a reactive observer, I was part of the social setting being studied. Reactive observations are contexts in which participants are mindful of being observed and are ‘amenable to interacting with the researcher’
(Angrosino, 2005, p. 732). I purposefully chose this role because of the useful source of data that this approach could provide during observations.

Semi-structured interviews with Rina designed to determine her perspectives about the way in which the process of desegregation was unfolding in her classroom yielded a set of criteria used in observations. These interviews coincided with the three-week period of observations. Field notes were written based on informal classroom observations. Attention was also given to the physical environment of the classroom, which included observations of artefacts such as paintings, decor, photographs, portraits and school magazines. As in the broader study, observation was the main data gathering technique used in this study. Observed lessons were videotaped, and interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed.

Data garnered from the broader study supported a sub-analysis that focused on how a teacher brought about meaningful change in her classroom. Using content analysis methods (Mayring, 2000; Sandelowski, 2000), data was re-coded a priori (Charmaz, 2005) to accommodate ‘new insights’ (Sandelowski, 2000, p. 338). The data was coded to make sense of emergent categories that expressed the experiential knowledge of the participant, and presented as rich and thick analysis.

To ensure research rigour, the following quality criteria were considered: transferability, credibility, dependability, confirmability, and authenticity. Transferability refers to the scope and the restrictions to which findings of this research can be applied. Credibility of the research findings included the purposeful sampling of the research participant, the sampling of the research site, and the application of appropriate data-gathering strategies (Butler-Kisber, 2010). Dependability was achieved through a process known as auditing. The audit trail procedure can also be valuable when verifying confirmability (Seale, 2002). The authenticity of this study rests in the ‘faithful reconstruction of the participant’s multiple perceptions’ (McMillan & Schumacher, 2001, p. 415).

I obtained ethical approval to conduct this study from the Ethics Committee at the Faculty of Education. The ethics application went through a rigorous blind peer review process. Pseudonyms were assigned to the research site and participants to ensure anonymity and confidentiality.
Findings: The Context

Rina was an Indian English-speaking female in her late thirties and held a Bachelor in Education degree. She taught at Broadacres Primary School, a former ‘white’ school. Because of the repeal of the Group Areas Act in 1991 and the desegregation of schools in 1995, there had been a strong influx of Black South African learners into this school since the inception of democracy, as well as Black immigrant learners over the past decade. The catchment area of the school thus comprised a diverse community. The White learners came from the suburb of Broadacres. The majority of Black (indigenous and immigrant) learners commuted to the school from the surrounding black townships and informal settlements.

Rina taught the subjects English and Life Orientation to learners in Year 7. Her classes comprised 40 learners per class and were gender- and race-sensitive. Learners were arranged in groups of five across gender and race. Learners in her classes, on average, comprised a mix of approximately ten White learners, four Indian learners, and one Coloured learner; the rest were African and some Black immigrant learners (SADC region, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka).

Rina had proactively set out to attend to first and second order changes in terms of diversity by applying what I term the metaphors of the mirror and windows\(^4\). She attempted to create an educational space that would give all learners a sense of belonging and a feeling at home. Projects and posters that reflected the diverse backgrounds and cultures of all learners adorned the classroom walls. The physical appearance, classroom climate, and atmosphere were conducive to teaching a class of diverse learners. I observed lessons delivered by Rina over a three-week period. All her lessons were unique and exceptional, indicative of her passion and her commitment to her calling. In delivering the curriculum, Rina choose an inclusive teaching strategy. Although she was unaware of the concept of pedagogy of compassion, she nevertheless unknowingly implemented this pedagogy in her classroom.

---

\(^4\) The metaphor of the mirror is about validating the identity of every student in the class. The student should see him/herself reflected in the classroom. In this way, his/her identity is affirmed. The metaphor of windows relates to the fact that even if you do not have a particular cultural group represented in the classroom, you need to open the ‘window’ and allow your students to look out and learn about other cultures.
Dismantling polarised thinking and questioning one’s ingrained beliefs

During one of her Life Orientation lessons about valued citizenship, Rina was confronted with an incident of racial stereotyping. Some students expressed strong opinions about ‘Black immigrants’ in South Africa. The climate was ripe for this discussion as, during the preceding weekend, the stalls and small shops of some Black immigrant hawkers in the township had been burnt and looted. Some South African students expressed strong nationalist sentiments:

Sipho: This is our country’ ma’am, we suffered during apartheid, and they were not here then. Now they come to take everything from us.

Rina: Who is this ‘they’ that you are talking about, Sipho?

Sipho: The immigrants, Ma’am, the ones with all the funny names like Omidire, Elufisan and Adebani. They are not South African, we are! They just come and take everything. They must go back to where they came from.

Kevin (Coloured male) joined in: And, Ma’am, the Nigerians, they are everywhere. They are the criminals, and they are killing our people. They do bad crimes.

Annelise (White female): These Black immigrants are also very shrewd. They are taking jobs off our people. Now South Africans are jobless. They are also the ones who do drugs.

Kola (a Nigerian student) came to the defence of immigrants: We don’t take jobs. We are businessmen. We can’t help it if we are cleverer than South Africans. If we see an opportunity, we take it.

Priya: But, Ma’am, also where I live, we suffer with all these Paki’s and people who come from India. They are doing the same thing in the Indian suburbs. Why can’t they just go back to their countries?

Rina allowed for a multitude of her student voices to be heard. Then she said:

To have a different viewpoint or opinion is not wrong. Let us discuss this and come to some understanding of whether you are saying is the only truth.

Robust discussion and debate ensued in the class. As an observer in this class, I was awestruck by the opinions of learners, who were not even born during the apartheid era. What was the source of all this prejudice and discrimination? We are currently experiencing the Fourth Industrial Revolution in terms of technology; the world has become a global village. One would have thought that this generation of students would have been more tolerant. Rina, on the other hand, calmly set about challenging each of these viewpoints, allowing for the multitude of learner voices to contribute to the discussion and effectively illustrating that there should be no
‘our’, ‘them’, ‘they’ and ‘us’. The ‘other’ is as much a global citizen of the world as he or she is any one of us.

She also tried to impress upon her students that we are not born into an identity, but that identity is fluid and context-based. She asked some Black immigrant students with what cultural background they identified. Responses included: ‘Rwandan’; Congolese-South African; Indian–South African; African; South African-Nigerian. She then used these responses to validate her argument. She also outlined the value and benefits of having Black immigrants in South Africa. By the end of the lesson, some learners expressed some misgivings, others were still a bit dubious. Understandably so: it could not be expected that after only one lesson, all students’ thinking would have changed. However, Rina certainly planted the seed of doubt and created the opportunity for students to question their beliefs. What was admirable was that Rina presented her students with many truths and also challenged them to think critically. She did not impose her views on the students but created an educational space that set out to disrupt their received knowledge. She consolidated the lesson by reinforcing what they had learnt with the following task:

_The President of South Africa announced today that all Black immigrants who came to South Africa since the advent of democracy will be deported to their countries of origin._

_Write a letter to the President in which you respond to this announcement. Justify your standpoint._

The due date for this task was a week later, which gave her students time for introspection and self-reflection.

**Changing mindsets: compassionately engaging with diversity in educational spaces**

Rina opted for a system of discipline that requested silence before commencing the lesson. She would stand in front of the class and would only greet the learners once they were silent. Then the lesson would proceed. During group activity, she moved from group to group. Learners were involved in the lesson, and noise was related to discussion and activities. In order to make the learners feel part of the group, Rina ensured that no learner was excluded from group discussions. She moved around the group to ensure that all members of the group participated.

_If we do activities they won’t, like, leave you out and let other children do it, they make everybody do it together (Mpumi, female African learner)._
If a learner became unruly, Rina immediately raised the tone of her voice and requested that the learner continue with the task. All learners would immediately settle down and continue working.

Ms R, when you make her angry, she does not shout, keep quiet or anything, she tells you properly, do this, and do not do this, and you understand what to do (Jafta, male Black immigrant learner).

If you do something wrong, she talks to you nicely (Liesel, female White learner).

If you make a mistake, she will not scream at you, she just tells you stop that. She is not rude to you (Moosa, male Indian learner).

It would seem that Rina opted for a rational and reasonable approach to discipline. She spoke to her learners about their misdemeanours and refrained from becoming hysterical or shouting at them.

Rina knew all her learners and called upon them by name to respond to questions. The fact that she called on them using their names was indicative of her respect for her learners. She also integrated everyone and fostered a sense of working together. She randomly asked learners of different races and genders to read out aloud to the class. In this way, all learners were valued and made to feel a sense of belonging. Learners related well to each other and to Rina. There was a sense of mutual respect between learners and between the teacher and learners. ‘The teacher respects you and the way you are’ (Nelson, Male Black learner).

They do not push you away from the group. You feel a part of the class, and you are encouraged to participate. They [teacher and other students] actually make you part of the class (Funke, female Black immigrant learner).

When she asks, you put up your hand, and she will not just leave you and ask someone else. She always gives you a chance (Zama, female Black learner).

The teacher is not racist. Just because I am White, it does not mean that I have to get away with everything (Johan, male White learner).

Rina promoted active participation and allowed learners to ‘do stuff’ to learn from each other. She initially made use of external motivation to invite learner participation. For example, ‘the group with the best idea will a win a prize.’ However, she mentioned that as lessons progressed, she hoped that learners would become internally motivated. The supportive manner in which she provided feedback to learners also served to motivate them.
If you have corrections and you say, ‘but I wrote the word correctly’, she would say, ‘look closely, you made a mistake over there’ (Neha, female Indian learner).

When you do not understand, you ask her, and then she explains it to you properly (Tawanda, male Black learner).

She also allowed learners to learn about the backgrounds and cultures of other learners, thus exposing them to differences as well as similarities. One such practice was allowing learners to take turns to lead prayers from their cultural backgrounds on a rotational basis. This observance of prayer in the classroom created an atmosphere in which diverse learners felt a sense of acceptance. It also created an opportunity for learners to learn about other religions.

Rina also tried to relate diverse, cultural and socio-economic issues to learners’ backgrounds; for example, in one of her lessons, she drew the learners’ attention to the fact that ‘pocket money’ differs according to learners’ home backgrounds. She also posed questions such as: ‘Is there something that we can do about it?’ In all her lessons, she attempted to promote a community of enquiry by providing a stimulus that required learners to pose questions, to engage critically in discussions, and to solve problems. Rina posed many ‘why’ questions and counteracted the negativity she encountered with positive thoughts and actions. She intentionally set out to find ways to instil a sense of hope in her learners.

Voting for the class representative was another example. Learners elected their class representative. In a class of diverse learners, the class representative was bound to be of a different race than some of the other class members. Thus, it was of crucial importance to teach learners about the importance of respect regardless of race and gender. This would ensure that students would respect the class representative irrespective of his or her race or gender. Rina instilled a sense of democratic values and responsibility in her learners.

Ma’am makes me give points because I am class representative (Simphiwe, female Black learner).

She shares out the duties; one child will close the windows and one child pushes the chairs (Jane, female White learner).

Rina’s compassion as a teacher and her acute awareness of the socioeconomic status of her learners came through, as is evident from the comments of her learners:
She has concern for others, like, if one person does not have lunch, she asks the others to share with that person (Bheki, male Black learner).

Ms R is always fair, and she always asks the learner if she/he is okay and equally important, she will not neglect you (Annuarite, female Black immigrant learner).

She does not shout, she really cares about us (Vani, female Indian learner).

**Analysis and Discussion of Findings**

It comes as no surprise that South Africa has become a magnetic force in ‘widening, deepening and speeding up worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life’ (Held et.al, 1999, p. 2). On the one hand, the political, social, educational and economic viability of South Africa makes it an attractive destination for Black immigrants, especially from Third World countries. South Africa is seen to offer opportunities for better life chances. On the other hand, globalisation and migration present new and encompassing challenges to imagination and representation. These allow individuals to challenge the creation of images, which is so essential for collective world-making (Petersen & Schramm, 2017). The processes of globalisation and consequent migration, enacted on the classroom floor and in the school playground, demand an educational response.

In an attempt to diffuse tensions between the need to promote national unity and the need to accommodate, and indeed support, a diverse range of cultural communities within the nation state, Rina provided an admirable educational response. She attempted to inculcate critical thinking skills in her learners, created opportunities for them to engage compassionately with diversity in educational spaces, and effectively illustrated that difference is a primary and a rich resource and resides at the heart of human experience (Figueroa, 2000).

Education does not occur in a vacuum. Each learner enters an educational space with an invisible knapsack that contains his or her entire lifeworld. It is the duty of the teacher to build scaffolds between the lifeworld of the learner and new knowledge. The daily life experiences of learners are strongly influenced by their families and their experiences in the community. This was evident in the incident that learners shared about Black immigrants. It would seem that learners in Rina’s class were merely echoing and reflecting the social mirror of South African society. What they had heard from their families and their respective communities seemed to be imbied as ‘the truth’ and seemed to run as deep as knowledge in the blood (Jansen, 2009). It is therefore imperative that teachers disrupt such received knowledge and expose learners to opportunities for pedagogic dissonance, so that their stereotypical views are shattered, they experience a sense of discomfort and they begin to question their ingrained beliefs.
In attempting to negotiate the contours of democratic citizenship, Rina, in her capacity as the agent of curriculum delivery, educated her students in a manner that prepared them for the type of citizenship espoused by Figueroa (2000, p. 57),

Citizenship involves commitment to the society in its diversity; openness to, solidarity with, and respect for the different other; acceptance of the basic worth of all people and rejection of any form of exploitation, inequitable treatment or racism.

Learning was not only about the content but also about the relationship that Rina forged between herself, the learner(s), and the learning experience. She was open to the idea that she might not have all the answers all of the time, as was evident from her comment: ‘To have a different viewpoint or opinion is not wrong.’ Sanzerbacher (1991) interprets Freire’s view on knowledge construction to mean that all knowledge is mediated and that no one has the truth. Learners in Rina’s class were actively involved in learning and developing their own knowledge with the guidance of the teacher. The teacher should not only be an expert on the subject knowledge that is taught in the classroom, but the teacher and the learners should also share each other’s knowledge and this, in turn, shifts power in the classroom. Rina tried to diffuse tensions between groups in her class by addressing power relations. Learners were empowered to take responsibility for their own learning by applying critical thought. Critical thinking skills that learners develop become life skills. These skills will be crucial in enabling learners to transform their world after they have left school. By focusing on positive aspects and nurturing critical thinking skills, Rina not only instilled a sense of hope in her learners but also mapped the route for sustainable peace.

**Conclusion**

The increasing diversity in South African schools requires an increased recognition of, and engagement with, diversity, and robust and critical re-examination of the role of education in negotiating the contours for a democratic citizenship. Effective citizenship education in schools as a means for addressing both unity and diversity could be achieved through the implementation of a ‘pedagogy of compassion’. Pedagogy of compassion as implemented by a teacher who is a ‘transformative intellectual’ (Freire, 1992) brings with it the potential to dismantle polarised thinking; to shatter the polite silence of post-apartheid South African society; and to foster citizenship education. Teachers not only need to be able to raise the critical consciousness of learners, but they need to adopt an ‘epistemology of compassion’ (Vandeyar, 2016) and to implement a ‘pedagogy of compassion’ in order to enable learners to become active critical and democratic
citizens, imbued with a sense of common humanity and compassion. Becoming an agent of transformative change may challenge the very premise of teachers’ identities and practices, but by empowering learners to exert influence on their world, contested spaces in schools and broader society can become shared places of hope and peace.

References


New York: Routledge.


Fekete, L. (2018). The far right is a growing danger to tolerance and democracy. The Guardian.


Freire, P. (1998). Teachers as Cultural Workers: Letters to Those Who Dare to Teach. Colorado:


Social Diversity, Migration and Social Innovation: A New Vision of Society Constructed by Grassroots Movements in Germany

Ewa Bacia

Technische Universität Berlin
ewa.m.bacia@gmail.com
https://www.paedpsy.tu-berlin.de/ueber_uns/team/wissenschaftliche_mitarbeitende/dr_ewa_bacia/

Keywords

social diversity, inclusion, post-migrant society, social innovation, Germany, grassroots movements
Abstract

This article analyses inclusion activities directed at migrants and refugees undertaken by members of German civic society. The context for analysis is a debate linking social inclusion and post-migrant society with the concept of social integration. The article provides examples of actions that take the form of social innovation. These examples highlight a change in the German vision of society. Hierarchical social systems in which incomers needed to adjust to existing conditions are increasingly being replaced by horizontal, open structures. Their common denominator is an acceptance of social diversity, horizontal, communication and mutual exchange.

German Synopsis

Dieser Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit den zivilgesellschaftlichen Aktivitäten, die auf die Inklusion von Migrantinnen, Migranten und Geflüchteten in Deutschland abzielen. Die Analyse wird im Kontext der aktuellen sozial- und bildungswissenschaftlichen Debatten über Inklusion und postmigrantische Gesellschaft geführt. Wenn Heterogenität, gesteigert durch Mobilität und Migration, zur gesellschaftlichen Normalität wird (vgl. Bade und Oltmer, 2004; Vertovec, 2007), verändern sich soziale Strukturen, worauf die Gesellschaft schnell reagiert. Bürgerinnen und Bürger initiieren Programme, individuell, in kleinen Gruppen, formell oder informell, die nicht nur an Migrantinnen und Migranten gerichtet sind, sondern an die ganze Gesellschaft, die sich als offene Gesellschaft verwandelt und postmigrantische Strukturen entwickelt (Foroutan, 2015). Neue Rahmenbedingungen schaffen soziale Herausforderungen, die zu sozialen Innovationen führen. In diesem Beitrag werden Beispiele von sozialen Innovationen präsentiert, die eine neue Vision der Gesellschaft vorstellen. Hierarchische Ordnungen, in denen sich die Migrantinnen und Migranten an die bestehenden Strukturen anpassen mussten, werden immer häufiger durch horizontale, offene Strukturen ersetzt. Ihr gemeinsamer Nenner ist die Anerkennung der sozialen Heterogenität (Diversity), die horizontale Kommunikation und der gegenseitige Austausch. Die sozialen Innovationen, die in diesem Beitrag präsentiert werden, zeigen, dass die soziale Integration in einer postmigrantischen Gesellschaft als offener, inklusiver Prozess durchgeführt werden kann. Es ist bekannt, dass zur pluralistischen deutschen Gesellschaft nicht nur auf Inklusion eingestellte Gruppen gehören, sondern auch Bewegungen, die sich gegen Migrantinnen und Migranten wenden. Die sozialen Innovationen, die auf offenen, demokratischen Strukturen beruhen, sind jedoch in Deutschland so stark sichtbar, dass sie hier als Analysegegenstand aus bildungswissenschaftlicher Perspektive betrachtet werden.
It is estimated that in 2015, net migration was positive in Germany, amounting to around 1.1 million people (https://www.destatis.de). Determining the exact number is impossible as the scale and type of migration to the Federal Republic of Germany has reached an unprecedented level. Asylum applications are filed mainly by refugees from Syria, Albania, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. The majority of asylum applicants are young people under the age of 40. Children and young people under the age of 15 are the largest group. Two out of three incomers are male (http://www.bamf.de). A majority of the incomers does not speak German and does not have the competence required to integrate socially or vocationally into their new condition and circumstances. The existing situation presents a huge challenge not only to German state institutions and existing social structures; it also requires a shift in the perspective towards migration policy and presents new challenges to civic society. Moreover, it forces reflection on a new vision of civic society. In Germany, as in other European countries, animated debates have been taking place regarding the issue of refugees and their prospects of successful integration. Some German citizens adamantly reject Chancellor Angela Merkel’s policy of taking in refugees. Strong anti-immigrant and nationalist leanings are observed in the environment connected with the PEGIDA movement, whose aim it is to combat the Islamisation of Germany. At the same time, grassroots civic movements which advocate a new approach to migration, social diversity and social integration are also very strong.

The migration phenomenon in Germany is not new; what is new is the scale and the pace of the influx of incomers. While the theme of refugees is a worldwide political issue, Germany is the European country that accepts the highest number of refugees. Here, migrant policy has been a key issue influencing the country’s functioning for some time. For years, migrants have been co-creating German society. In 2014, 16.4 million people from migrant families were living in Germany, making up 20.3% of the country’s population (https://www.destatis.de). A majority of these people (56%) had German citizenship. Between 2011 and 2014, the number of people with migrant origins increased by 1.5 million. One in three German children is raised in a family where at least one parent comes from a different country. In cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants, the ratio of these families amounts to 46%. Migration experiences and social mobility are nothing special in Germany—on the contrary, they are a normal state of being.

This article analyses inclusion activities undertaken by members of civic society in Germany towards migrants and refugees. The context for analysis is a debate linking social inclusion and
post-migrant society with the concept of social integration as it is currently held among social researchers in Germany. The article offers examples of actions that take the form of social innovation. These examples highlight a change in the German vision of society. Structures of a more open nature, whose common denominator is an acknowledgement of the social diversity of citizens, are being formed at a grassroots level. This process is supported by the development of horizontal communication and by enhancing social interactions. At the same time, we observe a decline of the hierarchical social systems in which incomers needed to adjust to existing conditions.

The emergence of open social structures stands in contrast with the presence of anti-immigrant, nationalist movements, such as the PEGIDA association. These movements are developing in a parallel manner, inspired by a highly different system of values. It would be difficult to expect members of the PEGIDA association to acknowledge that social diversity is a positive social factor and to support the formation and enhancement of structures based on diversity. However, the social actions that support and develop open structures in Germany are strong and visible enough to merit an in-depth analysis, which will be the focus of this work.

**Integration in a post-migrant society**

For years, the concept of integration has been a key word in the German migration debate in its political, vocational and social dimensions. Debates regarding the integration of refugees who may hail from cultures that are very different to the German one have been taking place both in politics and society. While many politicians call for more extensive integration actions, others claim that integration is impossible because of various cultural differences and differing levels of education.

In the summer of 2016, the German Parliament passed the integration law (https://www.bundesregierung.de). This provides refugees with quicker access to language and integration courses and facilitates their entry into the labour market. Hence, politics defines integration in the context of education and work, both of which are intended to enable migrants to become part of German society.

German social scientists who explore issues of integration and migration criticise such a limited approach to the topic of integration. Professor Naika Foroutan of the Berlin Institute for Integration and Migration Research labelled the integration law *Lex Refugee*—that is, a law regulating actions towards refugees, which is not equivalent to an integration law. Moreover,
she alleges that the legislator unduly (i.e., irrelevantly to the contemporary situation) limits integration to migrants’ problems (http://www.wissenschaft-im-dialog.de). This conceptualisation was shaped in Germany in the 1970s, when there was a very strong distinction between incomers (‘foreign ones’) and the host society, which was stable and perceived its task largely in terms of integrating migrants—that is, teaching and adjusting them to living in the existing conditions in the host country. In this view, migrants are considered a foreign element which should be shaped and changed in order to fit in with the majority. Integration is then a coordinated process designed to facilitate the achievement of this outcome efficiently. Based on such a definition, we focus on migrants’ individual traits which prove their level of maladjustment with the dominant society. If integration is unsuccessful, the reasons for the lack of success are sought in migrants’ individual and cultural profiles.

Naika Foroutan points out a mistake in this mode of thinking. The current German society, as the author argues, is a post-migrant one. The ‘post-’ prefix does not indicate the end of migration but refers instead to processes of social change taking place as a result of intensified levels of migration. Post-migrant societies are societies where (Foroutan 2015):

- due to social changes, diversity is politically acknowledged as a distinctive feature of the social structure. The statement that ‘Germany is a country of immigration’ pronounces a fact which cannot be called into question, regardless of one’s positive or negative attitude towards it;
- migration is assumed to be a phenomenon that significantly influences the shape of society and, as such, is the subject of debates, discussions, and regulations in numerous domains of social life;
- social structures, institutions, and culture are gradually shaped and adjusted to the realities of post-migrant society. On the one hand, this promotes an increasing availability of structures and enhanced social advancement. On the other hand, it brings about reactions of opposition as well as attempts to protect the previous structures.

One in three German citizens has migrant origins. Although migrants’ identity has been partly shaped in a different culture, many migrants possess German citizenship and feel German. In 2012, three journalists proposed labelling this group ‘the new Germans’ instead of ‘migrants’ (Bota, Pham, Topçu 2012).

At the beginning of 2015, the first Congress of New German Organisations (Bundeskongress Neuer Deutscher Organisationen) took place in Berlin. ‘We are German and
we want to co-decide’ was the message that its participants formulated (http://neue-deutsche-organisationen.de). People originating from immigrant families become politicians, journalists and doctors; however, their participation in these vocational groups is less common than that of people originating from families with no migrant past.

Eradicating this underrepresentation requires extending the concept of integration so that reasons for the existing state of affairs are attributed not only to people with a migrant past but also to social structures. In post-migrant times, the whole society changes, requiring the elites to open up to new social groups that sometimes represent different cultures and values. In this way, cultural systems are subject to slow change.

According to the new social model, integration is not only an instrument for differentiation and exclusion, as a part of which the incomers—the ‘others’—are contrasted with the German majority. In the new approach to society, ‘integration’ means that sharing in the social goods has been secured for all people who live in a given society, irrespective of their social or ethnic background (Georgi 2015, p. 10). Therefore, integration is based on participation; equal access to the labour market, education, and healthcare system; and legal and social protection. Its success depends on both parties’ openness to change because integration is a dynamic process concerning every individual who lives in a society that hosts migrants. Accepting such a viewpoint opens up the possibility to shape a social reality which ensures benefits for all parties involved (http://www.wissenschaft-im-dialog.de).

**From integration through social diversity to inclusion**

When migration and mobility are treated as a normal state of affairs (Bade, Olmer 2004), migration policy becomes a social policy that is important for the whole of society. The post-migrant society is at least as diverse as the migrant one, which should be analysed along numerous dimensions, such as: the reasons for migration; a migrant’s legal status, religious affiliation, age, education and vocational qualifications; or relationships with their country of origin. Ethnic characteristics are only one element of the heterogeneity within migrant groups, in the same way that ethno-cultural identity is merely one aspect of the ‘multidimensional diversity’ of Germany as the host society (Vertovec 2007). In a diverse society, attempts to organise reality along the lines of the distinction between ‘ethnic majority–migrants’ become pointless. In the face of the enhanced phenomenon of transnational bios, common mobility, or the recent refugee wave, an understanding of integration that is restricted to thinking in national terms becomes irrelevant to reality (Riegel 2009).
In 2004, the Board for Migration proposed a definition of integration which was later adopted by the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration:

Integration is a measurable participation of people with and without migration experiences in the main domains of social life, such as pre-school education, school and vocational education, access to the labour market, to legal assistance and social security, as well as participation in the political life (Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration 2010, p. 13).

In line with this definition, it is difficult to deal with integration in all domains. Integration actions carried out by a given institution or organisation are usually focused on integration in one or two domains of social life, or they focus on the recipients’ particular characteristics, for example vocational competences, age or sexual orientation.

This is where the concept of integration meets the concept of social diversity. The English concept of diversity refers to various overlapping levels of belonging to diverse groups in terms of characteristics such as gender, ethnic and religious affiliation, citizenship, sexual orientation, physical and mental health, social background, and age. Pluralistic identities and belonging to numerous coexisting groups are a natural phenomenon from the perspective of diversity. The very concept of diversity has positive connotations; it is imbued with respect for the pluralism of models and life situations that treats diversity as a resource for society (Georgi 2015, p. 11).

The term ‘diversity’ combines integration as previously defined with the concept of inclusion, which—similarly to the concept of integration—initially possessed a very narrow meaning. Following the adoption of the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Journal of Laws 2012, Item 1169) in 2006, debates on inclusion took place mostly with reference to people with disabilities. However, inclusion is, as a matter of fact, each individual’s human right; hence, it is not limited to the issue of disability. Conceptualised more broadly, inclusion means eradicating barriers and forms of excluding people who find themselves in different starting positions depending on individual differences that result from social diversity. An individual’s social starting position may, for example, depend on their socioeconomic status, ethnic background, or sexual orientation (Georgi 2015, p. 12).

The aim of inclusion is to form social structures and to bring about a legal state in which the discrimination between starting points is eliminated and participation is enabled. The concept of inclusion also entails acceptance and acknowledgement of, and appreciation for, social diversity. The starting point and driving force for inclusive actions are individuals’ needs.
and their participation in various spheres of societal life. Hence, the central point is not connected with the people and groups who are to be integrated with the majority, but rather with structural and institutional changes in important domains of social life. In order to enable participation and self-determination on the individual’s part, these structures need to be opened up and become sensitive to diversity (Merx 2013). Inclusion requires the state to be active and to adjust its structures and legal system so that each individual gains the chance to participate. Inclusive policy means shaping activities aimed at carrying out the ban on discrimination included in the first chapter of the German constitution, where article 3 announces that ‘[n]o person shall be favoured or disfavoured because of sex, parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political opinions.’

When interpreted through the lens of social diversity, integration has a lot to do with inclusion policy, which is increasingly a central point in the debate on issues of migrant movements in Germany. As a result of acknowledging the value of social diversity, the implementation of integration actions leads to inclusion policy, which is underpinned by a certain vision of society. According to this vision, the multitude of life models and combinations of individual members of society’s characteristics are a resource which can be leveraged. In order to make this possible, society needs to develop its structures and open them up to individuals and groups.

**Social innovation as a grassroots response to the refugee issue**

Since 2015, the issue of refugees in Germany has been labelled as a crisis by many commentators. It is unclear what is at the core of this crisis; whether the crisis is the number of people seeking support in Germany, the overburdening of public institutions, or the efforts required to address the challenges they are presented with. Accepting and integrating socially such numerous groups of refugees and migrants requires a mobilisation of forces. Restricting these actions to the domain of standard public tasks does not suffice. The scale and sociocultural scope of this phenomenon require new ideas and unconventional solutions—that is, innovation both in the technical and social spheres (if this distinction still makes any sense). Each technical innovation needs to be embedded in social practice and thus acquire a social dimension (http://www.changex.de). It is particularly visible with regard to the refugee issue, where the differences between groups who enter into relationships are not only concerned with

cultural and social issues but also with technical competences. Social innovation for refugees is an example of a broad approach to social integration and innovation.

Social innovation is a [...] configuration of social practices in certain fields of action [...], initiated by a certain group of social actors [...], deliberately reconceptualised [...] [and] carried out in order to solve problems and satisfy needs better [...] than it would be possible based on the existing practices. [...] Innovation is not limited to the medium of technological artefacts— it is carried out on the level of social practices (Howaldt, Schwarz 2010, p. 54).

German researchers who analyse social innovation in various countries and regions of the world have formulated the hypothesis that alongside the transition from industrial society to a society of knowledge and services, a change takes place in the innovation system paradigm (ibid. p. 8), as a result of which the relationship between technological and social innovation changes significantly.

The significance of institutional and social networks is increasing in the new paradigm. Linear solutions are replaced with interactive models. The interwoven institutions’ representatives and social actors continuously interact and develop, test and diffuse new modes of acting. Another distinctive feature of the new paradigm is the increasing role of individuals. Formerly science was the driving force for innovation: political programmes of social development were constructed based on scientific diagnoses and recommendations. Nowadays, a new model is beginning to emerge in which society is becoming the focal point of innovation.

In the European Union, social innovation is treated as a mode of empowering people and driving change.

Social innovations are innovations that are social in both their ends and their means. [...] [these are] new ideas (products, services and models) that simultaneously meet social needs (more effectively than alternatives) and create new social relationships or collaborations. They are innovations that are not only good for society but also enhance society’s capacity to act (European Commission 2010, p. 9).

In Germany, actions aimed at the social integration of refugees are taken by numerous diverse institutions and organisations. The state strives to construct the so-called Willkommenskultur, that is, to create conditions in which incomers will feel welcome in Germany. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees supports projects that offer refugees help with adjusting to their new conditions. Federal offices encourage social work for refugees and offer free training and courses for volunteers as a part of integration actions. Both Germans and migrants who came to the country earlier may engage in volunteering activities (http://www.bamf.de). Church
organisations such as the German Protestant Churches’ Diakonie actively provide help (http://www.diakonie.de). Many initiatives originate from German schools and academic institutions. State institutions collaborate with major non-governmental organizations, including foundations with significant financial capabilities and political influence, such as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the Robert Bosch Foundation, or the Bertelsmann Foundation.

However, the analyses which will follow focus on initiatives inspired by individuals or small groups of people who notice the need to introduce certain changes to existing structures. Five exemplary initiatives are described. They differ in their origins, subject areas, target groups, and the methods employed, scope, organisation and funding. The shared themes in these initiatives are: including the social needs connected with the influx of refugees to Germany; introducing social innovation in a grassroots manner; and the underpinning vision of the society.

**First example: Summer academy for young people**

The Leuphana University of Lüneburg, in collaboration with the Vodafone Foundation, carries out three-week summer camps during which young people receive an all-day educational and coaching programme connected with both vocational preparation and sports activities; in addition, they prepare and stage a musical. The work is organised like a project. It is aimed at combining theory with practice and at developing competences as a result of taking actions supported by professional teachers and trainers.

The camps have been organised for the past 10 years; a total of 1,800 people have participated so far. The original concept of the programme was targeted at young people facing various problems with completing their school education. ‘We have a colourful mixture of young people: both very shy and withdrawn as well as ones with aggressive inclinations,’ explains Maren Voßhage-Zehnder, the programme coordinator. ‘Children from difficult families, children with learning problems and [those] motivated to learn, children who, for various reasons, found themselves in a dead-end street and, as a result of that, need robust support and coaching.’

In 2015, young refugees joined this group. Along with young people from German schools, they underwent a three-week educational and coaching programme as well as an intensive German language course. ‘Refugee children are mostly very ambitious and incredibly eager for knowledge,’ the coordinator adds. The projects are carried out in international groups, and the collaboration between German young people and refugees is very close.

Source: http://www.leuphana.de/sommerakademie.html; http://www.changex.de/Article/ideen_fuer_gefluechtete_17_sommerakademie

**Where does social innovation directed at refugees originate?**

Some of the social programmes originate from the initiative of individuals who notice the problem of refugees’ integration in Germany and wonder how they might help. The initiators
of new solutions, such as Malte Bedürftig (third example) or Thomas Batsching (fifth example), frequently come up with innovative ideas rooted in their own competences, experiences, and contacts that can be utilised to help. Malte Bedürftig and Thomas Batsching are professionals with many years of professional experience and extensive contacts. By making use of their contacts and their own competences, they developed initiatives connecting people in need of help with individuals who may offer professional help.

In the second example, the prime originators of the new programme were students—that is, people motivated by a willingness to help, yet without any work experience. The starting capital which the students had at their disposal was only their willingness to help, their inventiveness, and their organisational skills. The students proved to be effective and convincing in their actions, as a result of which their actions were formalised, and, shortly after, the university became involved in organising the programme.

The activity of educational institutions is frequently the result of social innovation directed at refugees. This is the case in the following examples, where possibilities for action were created at a university (first example) and in a school (fourth example). In the case of programmes organised by public institutions, it is important for the institutional framework to serve as a support rather than a limitation and to leave opportunities for individuals and groups to develop innovative ideas.

---

**Second example: tun.starthilfe für flüchtlinge**

‘tun.starthilfe für flüchtlinge’ is the name of a students’ initiative which gave rise to an association that organises numerous activities for refugees. Members of the initiative hold the view that refugees’ rights to take part in social life can be realised only when actions at the political level are accompanied by actions from within civic society. The initiative involves activities such as: organising German language courses in refugee camps; carrying out educational workshops for various target groups (e.g., refugees, pupils, and students); supporting the development of the competences of volunteers who are willing to help refugees; running information and social campaigns aimed at combating stereotypes; increasing the awareness and transcultural acceptance of refugees in German society; and holding workshops on art, crafts, music and acrobatics in collaboration with refugees. The highlight of the programme is the summer festival organised and held by the local community and refugees in collaboration with non-governmental organisations, student groups, and employees of the Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt. Since the academic year 2013/2014, students of this university have had the possibility to receive credits for activity within the programme as a part of the EduCulture module, which includes a series of lectures, an internship, and an accompanying seminar.

Source: Information materials of the *tun.starthilfe für flüchtlinge initiative* are presented on the following website: [http://www.tun-starthilfe.de](http://www.tun-starthilfe.de).
What are the domains in which innovation is implemented?

Social innovation directed at refugees appears in all domains in which demand for new solutions exists. Incomers from other countries and cultures initially need comprehensive support: from formal and administrative issues (fourth example), through learning the language (first, second and forth example), to vocational integration (fifth example). While refugees need help with determining who they may turn to for support and for what matters (third example), in order to achieve full social integration, it is also necessary for refugees to participate in social life in all its various dimensions. Hence, initiatives appear in which concerts, exhibitions or other cultural and sporting events are organised in collaboration with refugees. These events have an open nature and integrate people (also newcomers) in the local community (first and fourth example).

Third example: GoVolunteer online platform

The GoVolunteer online platform was founded by Malte Bedürftig, a McKinsey consultant who had wanted to help refugees for a long time, and who had been asking his friends and family if they would also be willing to help. When he found that many were willing to help, Malte Bedürftig created an online platform for coordinating the actions of numerous volunteers. In November 2015, he founded the GoVolunteer public benefit organisation in collaboration with Henryk Seeger, another entrepreneur who had been socially active for years. The platform connects volunteers with helping organisations. Social organisations use the website to seek potential volunteers in the local environment. These potential volunteers may later gain access to the actions coordinated by these organisations with just one click. ‘We want to offer easy access to information for anyone who wants to help. At the same time, we reduce the coordination effort for the organisers, who, as a result, may focus on their main task: helping refugees,’ the initiative’s founder explains.

Two months after the platform’s launch, there were a hundred initiatives for volunteers to join. The originators have been developing the platform and plan to reach hundreds of organisations and thousands of volunteers in all regions of Germany as well as other German-speaking countries. ‘We want GoVolunteer to become a central platform for communicating in the domain of helping refugees in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Our software allows fitting the actions perfectly to the organisation’s needs. The platform is founded on the crowdfunding formula. Introducing solutions arising from the community into the structure and development of the initiative is intended to ensure its longevity. The aim is to “make helping a community experience”,’ Malte Bedürftig explains. ‘Not only for a few months, but for years!’

Who do the actions target?

An important distinctive aspect of the examples presented in this article is the fact that they are not targeted solely at refugees. The programme targeted at young people who are experiencing various school problems that has been carried out for a decade (see the first example) is of particular interest in this respect. The reasons of failure at school might be highly diverse—ranging from family problems, through health problems, to psychosocial maladjustment. Migrant origin and traumatic experiences connected with a refugee past might be factors that undermine educational success. As the number of people with such deficiencies is growing in German society, the summer academy for young people with problems has been extended to include the refugee children. However, they are not the only recipients of the benefits of the camp, and educational benefits are also derived by children from German families.

As a result of the robust refugee influx into Germany, German society is changing. Members of German society who have been living in the country for a long time also need support in adjusting to the changes. For this reason, many actions within the innovations discussed here are targeted at German citizens, for example: students (second example), pupils (first and fourth example), volunteers (second and third example), job counsellors (fifth example), or non-governmental organisations that intend to learn about the most efficient modes of providing support in the new social situation (third example). Local communities are the recipients of many programmes as they are being targeted by information and social campaigns that present the importance of the question and issues connected with it (second and fourth example).
Fourth example: Service Learning at the Albrecht-Thaer School in Hamburg

Pupils at this Hamburg school acquire knowledge on refugees’ circumstances in Germany and in their particular district during their lessons (learning) and, at the same time, become involved in teams that act on the needs of refugees in their area (service).

Ikra and Shirin wanted to provide support for refugees who struggle with the language barrier. They understand the problem as they originate from families with Turkish and Arabic roots. Their mother tongue was useful in their initial contacts with refugees, which were facilitated by collaborating with non-governmental organisations that had long been active in the domain of helping migrants. Initially, the girls did minor translations and supported the refugees in running administrative errands. Then, through one of the organisations, they got to meet two refugee families. As a result, they helped these families to learn German and assisted their children with doing homework for six months. ‘We will probably continue to do so even when the school obligation is no longer in place. This help is not an obligation to us—to us, the issue is very close,’ one of the pupils explains.

Another group of pupils takes interest in refugees’ housing conditions. Young activists visited refugee centres and took part in debates with the mayor and in workshops organised by the local organisation. They held a fundraiser in order to finance further equipment for the refugee centres and are now planning to organise a tournament and summer concert in collaboration with refugees.

Source: Materials of the Netzwerk Lernen durch Engagement network; LdE-Projekbeispiele zum Thema ‘Flucht und Willkommenskultur’.

How are the actions carried out?

The actions are carried out through various methods and with the use of various tools. While some of them take more traditional educational forms, such as courses or training (second example), active working methods such as workshops and coaching are frequently used (first and fifth example). Many of the initiatives are based on modern technological solutions. For instance, specially-designed online platforms (third and fifth example) are used to establish contacts and provide counselling.

Various social actors are involved in these actions, namely: public institutions, non-governmental organisations, educational institutions, businesses and many individuals, including individuals with migrant origins. The actions bring about visible results due to the collaboration between numerous representatives of civic society. The emergence of a new issue that is salient for civic society initiates the development of new networks of contacts and enhances existing ones.

Based on the refugees’ position and role in these activities, three types of initiatives can be distinguished, namely: activities carried out for refugees (e.g., language courses, collecting clothing, job counselling); activities prepared for and carried out in collaboration with refugees
Where does the money come from?

Involving numerous environments and undertaking actions in the system of links between individuals, groups, institutions and organisations creates various possibilities for funding these social initiatives. Some of them are funded by large foundations (first example); some are based on *crowdfunding*, which is an innovative mode of obtaining financial resources through the use of social networking websites (third example). Some funds may be acquired through fundraisers and holding cultural and social events. While these events are already a part of actions for and with refugees, the sale of items may generate money for further actions (fourth example).

Many of the initiatives initially rely on volunteer work (second, third and fifth examples). However, as their actions extend, initiatives often manage to secure sponsorship. Companies support social initiatives directed at refugees through their corporate social responsibility mechanisms (fifth example).

---

**Fifth example: HR Integrate**

Through its website, HR Integrate enables refugees who seek employment in Germany to contact professional job counsellors. As a result, refugees can easily receive individual support for entering the German labour market. Contact is established online; however, further collaboration includes face-to-face meetings and lasts until an individual successfully integrates into a workplace.

The initiator of this programme was Thomas Batsching, a job counsellor from Munich. Like many others, he wanted to help in the summer of 2015 when the wave of people coming to Germany was increasing. He arrived at the conclusion that he would accomplish the most through making use of his competences, contacts, and thirty-five years of experience of job counselling. ‘The idea is that a professional counsellor takes a refugee by the hand and guides the individual as a mentor into the German labour market.’ Help involves creating a qualifications profile, identifying potential employers, writing application letters, preparing for job interviews, and providing support at the initial stages of employment. An individual may participate in the project for three or even up to five years, even though it is organised in a manner that aims to provide extensive help over a short period of time. In order to make this possible, Thomas Batsching collaborates with numerous vocational and help-giving organisations. The aim is to establish a national network in order to provide help for refugees in the sites where they stay. The programme has some sponsors. Some small companies have decided to implement the idea of corporate social responsibility by allowing their employees to spend two hours per week providing counselling help for refugees.

*Source: [http://changex.de/Article/ideen_fuer_gefluechtete_13_hr_integrate](http://changex.de/Article/ideen_fuer_gefluechtete_13_hr_integrate).*
The mechanisms described here relating to German grassroot social initiatives provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that German society is transforming into a post-migrant society. The ratio of families with migrant origins and the robust influx of refugees enhance social diversity (which had already been high regardless of this phenomenon). This diversity is not restricted to ethnic characteristics or religious affiliation. When diversity, enhanced by mobility and migration, becomes a social every-day reality and a normal state of matters, social structures undergo a modification which is followed by a rapid reaction on the part of civic society. Individuals, small groups, and non-governmental organisations initiate programmes directed not only at refugees, but also at the remainder of society, which, as a result of accepting refugees, is evolving into a post-migrant society.

A post-migrant society is a dynamically changing society in which new communication structures, relationships and possibilities for life development emerge. The new conditions present people with a social challenge and promote the emergence of social innovation. The social innovation presented in this analysis reveals the broad and inclusive manner in which social integration can be grasped in a post-migrant society.

References
Foroutan Naika, 2015, Die postmigrantische Gesellschaft, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn.
Legislation and documents


Online sources


http://www.neue-deutsche-organisationen.de/de/ [accessed 13 November 2016].

http://www.tun-starthilfe.de/ [accessed 14 November 2016].


‘Captives of a Lost Time’ – *Space-Making* in the Everyday Life of Refugees in Germany’s Rural Areas\(^5\)

Julia Nina Baumann

*Freie Universität Berlin*

j.n.baumann@fu-berlin.de

**Keywords**

refugee accommodation rural/suburban/peripheral, anthropology of space and place, gated spaces, spaces of stigmatisation, Brandenburg, Germany, activist research, engaged anthropology, migration regime, exclusion, disintegration

---

\(^5\) I would like to thank all those involved who have contributed to the success of my research and this contribution. In particular, I want to thank Prof. Andrea Behrends and Prof. Thomas Stodulka for their consistently professional support as well as Prof. Eveline Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger and Prof. Hermann Josef Abs, representing the conference team of the EARLI SIG 13/InZentIM Conference 2018. However, I would especially like to thank my research participants from Brandenburg, for whose openness and friendship I am eternally grateful.
Abstract

Due to allocation quotas, a substantial portion of refugees are accommodated in rural areas in Germany. As a result of legal requirements and restrictions as well as the challenges posed by the surrounding areas, refugees often have no place to go other than the shelter. Based on my activist anthropological research, this paper will uncover the place- and space-making activities conducted by and around refugees accommodated in shelters in rural areas in Brandenburg. I will show that the German migration regime consciously uses the many dimensions of place- and space-making to stigmatise and structurally relegate refugees to the periphery: with strategies ranging from physical exclusion to refugee marginalisation within shelters and including the very asylum process itself, refugees’ space is constantly (re)constructed, (re)occupied and (re)interpreted.

German Synopsis

Introduction

‘The refugee*, that apparently marginalised figure, (must) be regarded as a central figure in our political history.’ (Agamben 2001, translated: JB),

the philosopher Giorgio Agamben wrote at the beginning of this century. He was forecasting a debate that had its eventual starting point in the so-called ‘long summer of migration’ in 2015 and the ‘refugee crisis’. Never since the 1990s have so many refugees* reached Germany. German administration, politics and society found themselves quite unprepared, as was vividly shown in the lack of state preparation and accommodation arrangements for refugees* and in the change of the social and political mood. Since 2015, a tough discussion about (national) identity/identities, open and closed borders, the foreign and the own, and the (non-)obligation to humanitarian services and empathy has raged. This discussion, which promoted an alarming radicalisation in public discourse, was also followed by a tightening of asylum laws (such as Asylpaket I & II or Integrationsgesetz). Unfortunately, some often went unnoticed and unheard in this debate, namely the voices of those who were at stake, those who fled. The ‘subalternisation’ and the ensuing absence of representation of the subaltern in academia, as already lamented by Gyatri Spivak (1988), transfers social marginalisation into professional discourse. In this essay, following Spivak’s claim, I would like to literally give space to these individual perspectives.

In what places or spaces refugees* find themselves plays a prominent role in whether and how they have access to social participation and integrative processes (BMAS 2017). Until now, the type and locality of housing has been prescribed by the German migration regime*. In accordance with allocation quotas, a substantial proportion of refugees* is, for example, accommodated in shelters in rural areas in Germany. Initially, those collective living quarters

---

6 I will use the Gender Star in the following essay, to include all genders in language. This follows the practice of the Writing Centre of the University of North Carolina and Chapel Hill (2018).
7 I am following the UN Refugee Convention/Geneva Convention (1951/1967) in defining a refugee as a person, who ‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it’ (UN Refugee Convention 1951). Even if the German migration regime only recognises a person as refugee once the asylum application has been justified, I also designate asylum-seekers and people in temporary suspension of deportation as refugees if they use this term to describe themselves. A further distinction is only made if speaking of legal status.
8 In my definition of the German migration regime, I am following Giuseppe Sciortino (2004), who defined it as a ‘mix of implicit conceptual frames, generations of turf wars among bureaucracies, and wave after waves of ‘quick fix’ to emergencies, triggered by changing political constellations of actors.’ The term is an attempt to make it possible to analyse elements, patterns, and effects of social negotiation processes on the basis of the assumption that social structures are basically fluid (Pott, Rass, Wolff 2018).
were meant to be temporarily solutions—the so-called *Übergangswohnheime*, transition or temporary shelters, an interim home to live in until authorities decide on the status of asylum cases. Because of the way German migration system works in practice, living in shelters and in uncertain conditions and with uncertain status has now unfortunately become the permanent status quo. In addition, rural areas in particular hold special challenges for refugees.

Places and spaces in their different dimensions immensely shape the everyday experience of their inhabitants—and conversely are also shaped by them. This interaction of space-making according to Lefebvre (1991, 1996), the total social construction and (re)interpretation of space in relation to refugees in rural areas, shall be the focus of this essay. My research results show that those spatial dimensions have a mostly exclusionary impact on refugees: Accommodation in difficult locations and the resulting peripheralisation are consciously used as spheres of exclusion, thus creating a system that clearly defines entry and exit possibilities and stigmatises through the use of spaces. Therefore, I will—based on individual views—illustrate the place-/space-making (in its multiple dimensions) of shelters and rural areas in Brandenburg which will be discovered to be gated spaces, symbols of an extreme social exclusion and stigmatisation of refugees with precarious legal status. In order to achieve this goal, I will first describe space as category of anthropological analysis and explain my theoretical framework as well as my research setting. Next, a contextualisation will be provided by describing the background of the accommodation, i.e. the requirements of the German migration regime as well as the special spatial structures of rural areas in Brandenburg. Finally, the third section will report from the field. In addition to my own observations, I will relate the experiences of two research participants. In the following section, these descriptions will be theorised, elevated to a macro level, and the individual dimensions of social exclusion and stigmatisation through space will be elaborated on. I will end with a short conclusion and a forward-looking perspective in the last section.
Using Anthropology of Space and Place to examine
Mechanisms of Exclusion

Spaces and places can be anthropologically investigated in many ways and can hardly be thought of as singular since they are always present in various overlapping dimensions that are socially constructed but also construct social aspects: they are newly-created, designed, occupied and (re)interpreted, and they also contain the power to shape societies and influence lifestyles. Their boundaries are fluid and movable. They can be brought into materialistic forms or remain spherical. In them, people and their environments are reflected and yet spaces and places are also reflected in both. They are the centre, beginning, and end of a perpetual process of negotiation and interaction. Therefore, their investigation is so meaningful as it reveals an insight into ‘hidden’ systems and the everyday, individual way of dealing with them. As Setha Low aptly puts it, the anthropological examination of space ‘provides a powerful tool for uncovering material and representational injustice and forms of social exclusion. At the same time, it facilitates an important form of engagement because such spatial analyses offer people and their communities a way to understand the everyday places where they live, work, shop, and socialise […]’ (Low 2011: 390, emphasis by author).

In my work, following Low’s statement above, the investigation of the everyday shaping of spatial dimensions has revealed them above all as powerful exclusionary spheres. They can define physical entry or exit possibilities through, for instance, their specific location or spatial access, and their use can be limited socially for socioeconomic, legal, or racist reasons. Such exclusions can be reinforced by material aids—such as fences or other demarcations—or supported by deterrent and surveillance strategies, such as cameras, security services, etc. They can be shaped by certain discursive strategies, such as warning notices, media coverage and social discussions, and legally consolidated by certain political decisions. All in all, spaces therefore can easily become ‘gated spaces’ (Low 2011: 391).

However, spatial (exclusionary) structures can vary considerably from place to place, which is why Glick-Schiller and Çaglar (2010) call for a ‘local turn’, especially in the scientific debate on migration movements. Rural areas, for example, have special (spatial) prerequisites and

---

9 I would like to emphasise here the conceptual difference between certain local places and spaces, which can take on variable forms and dimensions as described above.
contain special places, but are also strongly shaped as spaces. However, most scientific studies worldwide and in Germany, especially in the field of refugee and migration research, concentrate on urban areas (see for example Huschke 2014 and 2015, Castañeda 2008, Glick-Schiller/Çaglar 2010, Jacobsen 2006; Breckner 2014); the rural is unfortunately rather disregarded and marginalised. Counteracting this trend, I would like to concentrate specifically on rural areas. I think the strength of anthropology lies in grounding its theory in concrete findings from the field. I would therefore like to base my argument and theory-building on my research findings and the everyday individual experiences and space-making of refugees accommodated in shelters in rural Brandenburg, Germany.

‘Unexpected Groups in Unexpected Places’—Refugee accommodation in rural Brandenburg under the German Migration Regime

The conditions for determining in which places and spaces refugees are accommodated depend to a large extent on the provisions of the German migration regime. Thus, refugees are allocated according to certain distribution quotas (Königsteiner Schlüssel) among the individual federal states and subsequently among municipalities and cities (EASY) (BAMF 2018, §50(1) AsylG). Neither the refugee-individual nor German residents have any decision-making power in this process, as the German Asylum Law (Asylgesetz AsylG) prescribes:

‘A hearing of the foreigner is not necessary’ (§50(4) AsylG, translated by author).

As Camarero and Oliva describe it, this leads to ‘unexpected groups at [sic] unexpected places’ (2016: 93). The exact form of an asylum seeker’s accommodation is defined by two German laws, the Asylgesetz (AsylG §44-54) and the Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz (AsylbLG), alongside individual laws of the federal states/municipalities, which enjoy a lot of freedom. There are no nationwide regulations concerning, among other things, the shelters’ equipment. For example, residents in Baden-Württemberg are legally entitled only to 4.5 square metres

---

10 What exactly ‘rural’ means is difficult to define and has been filling scientific discussions for years. The diversity of countryside/suburban/rural/peripheral areas is immense, and individual places are often not comparable. In my definition of rural—keeping the scientific discussion in mind—I have focused on the descriptions of my research partners, who see the rural as being represented above all by a lack of infrastructure and city centre accessibility. I am aware that this definition, like all others, can never include the full range of rural regions.

11 The data presented derives from my anthropological activist research with male refugees in Brandenburg, Germany (2016-2018).

12 Original: ‘Einer Anhörung des Ausländers bedarf es nicht.’
of living space, but in Brandenburg they are entitled to five to six square metres, depending on
the municipality, and in Saxony-Anhalt as much as seven square metres are usual. However,
all community housing units have one thing in common: several residents share a room, a
bathroom and a kitchen in an impersonal atmosphere under a special system of surveillance and
order, which interferes deeply with the everyday life of the residents* (going forward, referred
to as the characteristics of a total institution (Goffman 1961)).

But living in a shelter is almost inevitable for refugees* in general since German legal
requirements may dictate a refugee’s* place of residence. Germany is therefore one of the few
countries in the European Union, along with Switzerland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg,
which prescribes an asylum seeker’s* residence from their very first step onwards. In addition,
there are other residence requirements, like Residenzpflicht or Wohnsitzauflage (often limited
to only one municipality), which may also apply to people with residence permits. Furthermore,
there is an opaque web of many other regulations concerning aspects such as the asylum-
process, work permits, or residence status that are practically impenetrable and often depend
on the discretionary decisions of individual officials*.

Here it becomes clear that a high level of specific knowledge is necessary to navigate
safely in this system. In actual discourse, however, the refugee-individual is driven into a
determined and dehumanised victim’s perspective due to a lack of knowledge transfer. Michael
Achhammer and Sören Herbst (2014) therefore compare the state of refugees* in the German
asylum system with Franz Kafka’s novel ‘The Trial’ and emphasise the ‘institutional foreign
control over an individual’ resulting from a ‘practice of organised embezzlement’
(Achhammer/Herbst 2014: 213 and 218, translated by author). It also becomes clear that space
and place are not a matter of choice but an imposed requirement that must be fulfilled if one
wishes to continue applying for asylum. But as we saw, different spaces also hold different
local obstacles. Many refugees* are accommodated in rural areas in accordance with the above-
mentioned distribution quotas. The resulting decentralised imposed living conditions have a
considerable impact on the refugees'* daily lives and their opportunities for social participation.
Above all, structural factors in rural areas, such as the often-difficult situation in the labour and
housing markets, play an important role here as well (Weidinger/Kordel/Pohl 2017).

Brandenburg—one of Germany’s largest states in terms of area—is quite a special case
as immigration has been rare there since GDR times: the former Eastern German states in
general had fallen sharply below average regarding the proportion of foreigners before 2015,
with about 4% (in comparison, the average in Western German states was between 18% to 27%) (MASFG 2017, Vertovec). This changed dramatically in 2015, when Brandenburg took in over 25,000 refugees at once. But the state also faces a lot of socioeconomic problems. Unemployment rates and churn rates are far above German average; election results mainly favour the left and right political margins; right-wing extremist, xenophobic attacks on refugees and shelters are sadly overrepresented (DIW 2018, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2006, Weiss 2018). In addition, infrastructure development, i.e., hospitals, public transport, leisure opportunities, digital development, etc., is low or sometimes even non-existent. However, the bureaucratic processes of the total institution asylum system (Achhammer/Herbst 2014) require of the refugee permanent participation and personal appearances in different institutions, most of which are located in larger cities. In addition, there is the everyday life in the shelter, aptly described by Vicky Täubig (2006), which is designed entirely like Goffman’s total institution (1961) in the manner of an ‘asylum’ that leaves the individual hardly any scope for personal development.

Voices from the Field: Captives of a Lost time – Zereshki’s and Nili’s stories

What does living in shelters in rural areas in Brandenburg look and feel like for an individual? To answer this question, in addition to my own observations, I will present the experiences of two participants in my fieldwork, Zereshki and Nili, who will be introduced shortly. Their stories are typical of a group of people who—as a research participant once described it to me—are ‘trapped in a lost time’.

Imagine that, after driving through quite a romantic landscape of canola fields, avenues, and meadows, you end up in a dark pine forest. The next human settlement, Kiefernhausen, is a small town with 3,600 inhabitants, and it and the next train station are about five kilometres away. At the end of a dark and muddy road, somewhere in the woods, simple houses surrounded by fences appear. The still operational military barrack actually also provided accommodation for over 500 soldiers and a home for over 180 male refugees from several countries.

Visiting people inside this barracks involves passing several army checkpoints and gates, the shelter’s security staff, a memorial for men killed in action, and, frequently, troops of

---

14 To ensure the protection of the participants, all names, identities, and places of residence (Waldstadt, Feldnitz...), have been anonymised by the author. I adhered to the moral codes of DGVS/DA (2009) and AAA (1998).
soldiers doing their physical training. It involves dealing with weak or no phone signal on top of the state’s ban on equipping shelters with Wi-Fi. It involves journeys of four to five hours to reach the next district centre in order to attend to the required bureaucratic processes (e.g. visiting the immigration authority to extend a stay).

The shared space inside the shelter is separated by a camouflage fence bearing warnings not to enter the military side. Next to them, entire walls are festooned with illustrated instructions. *No open fire. No photography. Nightly curfew at ten pm.* Schematic drawings of how to separate domestic refuse, wash dishes, perform personal hygiene.

By the beginning of 2016, the shelter is overcrowded. Up to five people share a room, total strangers who often do not even share a language. Bunk beds are squeezed into small spaces, obscuring the windows so that hardly any light enters the otherwise barely furnished room. A stranger seldom arrives in such remote places—and so contact with German people also remains absent, since volunteers often concentrate on shelters in their (urban) neighbourhoods.

Most of the time, I was the only German person to see the residents, alongside the social workers and officials. Even today I remember feeling an excessive desire to integrate these people, who were then—and for the most part still are now, even two years later—bound by the asylum procedure which only guarantees them a participation in a language or integration course after a positive decision from the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (*BAMF*).

It was here that I first met Nili, a bright young man from Afghanistan, twenty-three years old when we met, who had left his family and small child in a war region. When this shelter was closed, Nili was transferred overnight to another shelter in Feldnitz, a very small collection of houses between fields and meadows with around 150 German inhabitants and around 100 refugees* in a shelter that used to be a former LPG. He told me that everything got even worse there. Because of where the shelter was, with very poor connections, and the usual legal requirements—already described above—he faced, Nili was condemned to stay in the shelter all times. In between coping with the boredom and the haunting memories of traumatic events he underwent whilst fleeing and in his homeland, he tried to find work and to study German. In the following interview excerpt, he describes how much this situation weighed him down:

‘I can’t think, I feel bad, too… I am really feeling bad, have been for two weeks, I couldn’t go to school because I am not well. […] I think about everything, not only Afghanistan, but

---

15 An LPG was a collective farm in the former German Democratic Republic.
everything, here, what shall I do here? Why do I live? I don’t have any energy. I am only staying at home […] Sometimes I open the window, then close it; looking outside at the street, and all I see is three horses, nothing else.’ (Interview with the author, April 2018, translated by author)

Whereas Zereshki’s despair stemmed from a different set of factors. Zereshki was an ambitious young Kurdish man from Iran (he was twenty-five when we met), who for about two years lived with another 300 refugees* in a shelter in Waldstadt, a little municipality of around 10,000 inhabitants. He was most afflicted by the continual heteronomy he faced in his everyday life as an asylum seeker and later, when his request was rejected. He always desperately tried to be ‘a good human being’ and a ‘good refugee’, as he described it, which to him meant learning German very fast, volunteering in community service, trying to find work to earn money so as not to be dependent on state support, as well as establishing contacts with German people and trying to move from the shelter. During these attempts he had to accept setbacks over and over again, which often threw him far back in his motivation and led to high levels of frustration and resignation. He often complained that he felt that whenever refugees* made a special effort to meet governmental and social demands, to ‘integrate themselves’, the German system would not reward them but instead treat them more harshly than the ‘lazy’ others. What usually remained for him was the unattainable longing for the city; a paradisiacal place where everything would be better:

‘To be in the shelter […] well, for me it is very difficult to live in that tiny village, there is nothing like restaurants or cinema […] and then it is very expensive. That’s one thing; the other thing is all the eyes… How they look at me strangely. I can’t go there, I don’t want to be there […] And in the shelter, I can’t sleep, there are a lot of people, some are awake the whole night, and I can’t sleep, not even with earphones […]. Only sometimes we go to the city, sometimes even to Brandenburg an der Havel, to shop or just to watch people on the streets, just another human being… and see how people are here (in Germany). What are their cities like? I can remember that one of us had a German friend from Düsseldorf, they met in Cos, Greece […]. He invited our mate to Berlin for one day […] and he came back and told us about Berlin. He said, he saw so many people on the street […]. We listened and thought: This can only be a dream!’ (Interview with the author, February 2018, translated by author).

16 All interview excerpts were linguistically slightly revised for better legibility.
Living on the Edge - Spatial Dimensions of Exclusion and Stigmatisation

What becomes clear in my research is the variety of feelings of anger, resignation, loneliness, grief and fear experienced by the refugees* as ‘captives of a lost time’ living on the edge. One feels the deep lack of social recognition and contact. The refugees* I interviewed feel stuck in in-between-states and part of a self-fulfilling prophecy. While the deeply desire a stage of affiliation, they feel that the authorities are actively preventing them from reaching it. This leads not only to tremendous frustration but also to deep feelings of being useless, powerless, and meaningless, as well as a sense of self-estrangement. They experience a strong feeling of alienation or anomie (after Durkheim 1897), a loss of connectedness to their surroundings. The shelters and the rural areas become an image of these feelings; they become a surreal place trapped in a lost time, like its inhabitants, and they become spaces of mutual negotiation and elaboration of those same feelings.

In addition, different dimensions of spatial exclusion arise. On the first level, it is the physical boundaries that define entry and exit possibilities: the forest, the fence, the decentralisation and lack of accessibility in the area in general, the surveillance by security services.

On the second level are the precise rules in the homes themselves, which have an exclusionary impact constructed as a typical ‘asylum’ (after Goffman 1961) and thus as total institutions in which a strict set of rules structures everyday life—vividly symbolised by the plethora of signs on the wall. The permanent monitoring of compliance with these rules (and punishment for non-compliance) leaves little room for individual scope. All surveys show that it is not only a feeling of foreign control, but a system of hierarchies and power relations that is clearly visible in the structure of daily life (Täubig 2006). Giorgio Agamben, already quoted at the beginning of this essay, therefore called shelters the ‘most absolute biopolitical spaces’ (Agamben 2006: 40), developing Foucault’s theory of biopower (Foucault 1977).

On a third level, refugees* struggle with the requirements of the German migration regime in general, such as being banned from language or integration classes, the residence requirements, and not being allowed to work on top of having to comply with the time-consuming bureaucratic asylum process and to fight with authorities, which are mostly perceived as unfair and biased. Just the simple fact of not being a resident of this country limits their social access to the extreme. As studies show, the total institution ‘migration regime’ also

directly intervenes in individual life (see for example Achhammer/Herbst 2014). Based on these provisions, refugees* are forced to languish permanently in the first two dimensions.

All three dimensions also affect refugees* in urban areas to varying degrees. The challenges of rural areas, however, have an unpleasant interaction with the first three dimensions. The rural area reinforces this alienation through sheer space. Remoteness becomes a driving factor, as the shelter becomes the only place to be because of the poor infrastructure and housing market, the mood against refugees* and so on. However, this system also works the other way around as the migration regime, for example by means of residence requirement, keeps refugees* in their assigned place of residence even after they have received asylum. There is hardly any escape from this vicious circle consisting of various spatial spheres of oppression.

In the case of Brandenburg’s rural areas, however, a fourth dimension of exclusion must be added. As it has been emphasised to me by the authorities in several informal talks, the remote, poorly-equipped accommodation that ‘shelters’ refugees* was also used as a ‘punishment’. To the regret of the shelter administration, the so-called ‘problem cases’, such as refugees* with ‘bad prospects of staying’ (*schlechte Bleibeperspektive*), refugees* who had been refused, or refugees* who had become ‘conspicuous’, were sent specifically to shelters like the one in Feldnitz. Behind this move is the idea and the political ambition to make it as uncomfortable as possible for refugees*, who will probably soon be rejected and may have to leave the country. No investment of any kind is planned for them, and they should even be instilled with the wish to leave the country voluntarily before the end of the proceedings. This is also evident, for example, from the fact that the refugees* with whom I spoke were presented with a multi-page document on ‘voluntary return’ every time they extended their stay at the Immigration Office (*Ausländerbehörde*). This marginalisation and non-investment are symbolised by spatial marginalisation which is achieved by accommodating people in shelters in rural areas, complete with the known barriers to social participation. The fourth and last dimension thus consists of ‘gated spaces’, spaces of stigmatisation through place. This stigmatisation begins with the ascription of the label ‘refugee’ (Behrends 2018), which marks the human being as an ‘asylum inmate’ (Goffman 1961) and part of a *total institution*, or after Agamben (2002) as ‘homo sacer’, the rightless person in a system of exclusion. In the current situation, this designation functions as a ‘scarlet letter’ since it clearly marks ‘the other and the foreign’ and ascribes fewer rights (such as denial of freedom of movement or the right to vote) and special obligations (such as residence requirements, work permits, etc.) to it. According to Agamben, shelters are turning into the epitome of this designation and the concomitant absence
of rights. But this organised stigmatisation reaches its peak when deliberate unequal treatment through accommodation in rural areas is accepted and even used as a systematic push factor.

Conclusion

I have shown that accommodation in shelters in rural areas becomes a symbol of stigmatisation through space. However, it should be stressed that it is not the rural areas per se that represent barriers to integration. Such a generalisation would be impossible to make, simply because of the diversity of barriers to integration. But made visible in Brandenburg’s case, the challenges that rural areas in general face have a particularly unfortunate effect in combination with the exclusionary measures of the German migration regime. They play a particularly oppressive role as they are deliberately used as punishment and push factors for refugees* who are obviously not welcome. Furthermore, it is also important to note that a system not only shapes individuals and their experiences, but that people always have power to act within the system. Thus, refugees* are developing different strategies for resistance and coping. These strategies can range from complete denial and insurrection to resignation and frustration. Among other things, I experienced a very ‘spatial’ form of resistance when a refugee meticulously painted the walls and ceiling of his room which were supposed to stay pure brilliant white….

Nevertheless, this ‘organised disintegration’ (Täubig: 2006) through space not only structurally limits social access but also determines the future chances of human beings. We must be aware that for most refugees*, this kind of treatment is the first response they receive from a country that might become their new home and in which they should integrate. Because as the current situation shows, the fugitives in Feldnitz have not yet been deported, as was originally assumed by the state: they are still there, Nili, Zereshki, and my other research acquaintances. Most of them are in court appeals against the decision by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), and they will probably stay there for at least for the next few years until their cases are closed.

In my view and learning from my findings, an end must be put to systemic (spatial) marginalisation. What are we afraid of? Migration and integration always cause and require social change. In my opinion, integration therefore means giving refugees* the opportunity for social participation. It also means enabling and empowering German society to let refugees* participate. Integration, participation and inclusion are processes that require effort from both sides.
References


Cross-Border Political Orientations of Migrants of Turkish Descent in Germany

Dirk Halm

Centre for Studies on Turkey and Integration Research
halm@zfti.de
www.zfti.de

Martina Sauer

Centre for Studies on Turkey and Integration Research
sauer@zfti.de
www.zfti.de

Keywords

transnationalism - political participation - Turkish immigration - assimilation - Germany
Abstract

Transnational political orientations and participation of immigrants are often distrusted, being interpreted as the result of a lack of loyalty towards the host society and a sign of failed assimilation. We present results from a representative survey which we conducted in 2017 among immigrants from Turkey and their descendants in Germany to examine the relationship between social integration and transnational political orientation. Our analyses show that those who are socially and politically well integrated actually tend to have a greater interest in Turkish politics than those who are less well integrated.

German Synopsis

Introduction

Currently 2.8 million people of Turkish descent are living in Germany. In terms of national origin, they are still the largest immigrant group in this country. Accordingly – and due to their relatively large cultural distance to German people – people of Turkish descent have been a subject of public debate for many years, especially with regard to their ‘social integration’. Moreover, no other immigrant group has been researched to a comparable extent by the domestic social sciences. The perception that this group constitutes a social problem and social sciences research have been closely interrelated, with issues addressed by research including social integration (in particular educational success and this group’s relationship to its host society), value orientation, deviance, and the inclination of people of Turkish descent towards naturalisation. At the beginning of the new millennium, the focus of public debate seemed to have shifted away to Muslims – a group defined not on a national but on a religious basis, which was seen as a particular challenge in view of Islamist terror activity.

Recently, however, people of Turkish descent have once again become the focus of debates on the success of immigrant integration. Reasons for this renewed focus include the increasingly authoritarian behaviour of the Turkish government and the resulting deepening of the social division between denominations (Alevis vs Sunnis), ethnic groups (Turks vs Kurds), and worldviews (secularist vs religious), which also became apparent among the population of Turkish descent in Germany and which was intensified by the suppression of the Gezi Park protests in 2013, the end of the Turkish-Kurdish peace process in 2015, and the dispute over the introduction of the presidential system in Turkey in 2017. At the same time, political participation in Turkey from abroad has recently been made considerably easier. Whereas from 1961 onwards, people of Turkish descent who are living abroad could only vote in elections at border crossings, since 2012 it has also been possible for them to vote in Turkish consulates. Turkey is thus following a global trend. The number of countries that allow their citizens living abroad to vote in domestic elections is growing steadily (IDEA 2007, p. III).

Immigrants’ transnational political orientation and participation are often met with suspicion and are considered as stemming from a lack of political commitment to the immigrants’ host society. This is particularly true of Turkish immigrants in Germany, as reflected in the recent public discourse about their interest in politics outside of Germany and especially their sympathies for the Erdoğan regime, both of which are taken as evidence of poor social integration and a failure or an unwillingness to adhere to democratic principles.
In the context of Bloemrad (2015, p. 76), the narrative of a German national identity seems to have been particularly challenged by a combination of religious-cultural differences and a supposed lack of loyalty on the part of the population of Turkish descent. Even where this is not the case, a transnational political orientation is often thought to result from an absence of political opportunities for immigrants in the host country (see e.g. Koopmans/Statham 2003).

However, research on particular immigrant groups in specific institutional settings challenges such general assumptions. For example, assimilation might prove to be a prerequisite for cross-border political action (see e.g. Guarnizo et al. 2003).

Public debates on the integration of immigrants continue to adhere to nation state-centred paradigms. The potential for integration or disintegration, related to migration as an originally cross-border process, is largely overlooked by the general public, while migration research has been addressing issues concerning the relationship between migration, de-bordering, and integration since the ‘transnational turn’ in the 1990s. However, early research on the transnational activities of immigrants focused on remittances to their country of origin, which were interpreted as a strategy for ensuring that they would have the option to return if they chose to do so.17 Only later (see, e.g., Sana 2005) – initially for the United States – were remittances considered in relation to a wide variety of possible functions and motives that might reflect immigrants’ long-term cross-border commitment to their country of origin, which then resulted in a change of perspective.

Consequently, this text, too, is based on the assumption that social action, especially by immigrants, can take on a permanent cross-border character. The focus is then no longer on the question of whether immigrants are orienting themselves towards their country of origin or towards their host country, but on hybrid forms of affiliation whose consequences for (national) social integration – for example, in the dimensions of acculturation, placement, interaction, and identification (Esser 2001) – cannot be modelled conclusively. This corresponds with Hans’ view (2010, pp. 69-70) that different dimensions of social integration permit varying degrees of multiple integration: a simultaneous labour market orientation towards Germany and Turkey.

---

17 See, for example, Oser (1995) on people of Turkish descent in Germany, among other groups.
is not very realistic, whereas an identification with Germany and Turkey can be achieved ‘additively’.

Few studies have been conducted on the transnational political orientation of immigrants in general, and of people of Turkish descent in Germany in particular, in contrast to studies on participation, party preferences, and electoral behaviour in host countries (most recently, Wüst/Faas 2018; Goerres et al. 2018).

We draw on a representative survey that we conducted among immigrants from Turkey and their descendants to examine the relationship between social integration and the degree and quality of transnational political orientation.18

Our data stems from a computer-assisted, bilingual, multi-topic telephone survey that the Centre for Studies on Turkey and Integration Research (ZfTI) conducted among 1,500 people of Turkish descent aged 18 and over throughout Germany in 2017. The survey measured indicators of the integration-related dimensions of acculturation, placement, interaction, and identification with the host society and the society of origin, as well as indicators of cross-border orientation, political integration into the host country, and party preference in Turkey.

We assume that different arrangements of assimilation, identity, residence, citizenship, and political participation in the host society lead to different forms of cross-border orientation, but that there is no linearity between these orientations and inclusion in the receiving society.

Our analyses show that this is true for the Turkish community in Germany and that those who are socially and politically well integrated actually do not display lower levels of interest in Turkish politics than those who are less well integrated.

Results

The majority of respondents (49%) considered only Turkey to be their homeland, whereas 33% considered both Germany and Turkey to be their homelands. Correlations between levels of identification and social integration, if they exist at all, are extremely weak (identification and interaction: Cramér’s $V = 0.122^{***}$; identification and acculturation: Cramér’s $V = 0.079^{**}$). The response behaviour of second-generation immigrants is not significantly different from that of first-generation immigrants, which suggests that the country of origin will continue to be a major emotional point of reference in the future.

---

18 This text is an abridged version of Sauer/Halm (2018, in German).
Table 1: Degree of interest in Turkish politics by immigrant generation (not including marriage migrants, row percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of interest in Turkish politics</th>
<th>low</th>
<th>moderate</th>
<th>high</th>
<th>mean*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First generation</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following generations</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamma</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>1,095</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Means on a 3-point scale ranging from 0 = low degree to 2 = high degree of interest. Significance levels: *** < 0.001; ** < 0.01; * < 0.05; n.s. = not significant.

34% of the respondents had a strong interest in Turkish politics, 35% had some interest, and 31% had little or no interest.

Bivariate analysis shows a significantly positive but weak correlation between this cross-border political orientation and the dimensions of social integration (acculturation: gamma = 0.194***; placement: gamma = 0.166***; interaction: gamma = 0.150***). Thus, with increasing social integration, interest in Turkish politics tends to increase as well. Respondents who are highly educated and well integrated in the labour market, who work in higher-level positions, have a relatively high income, and have close ties with the majority society often have a cross-border political orientation. Interest in German and Turkish politics also correlates strongly (gamma = 0.704***).

Many people of Turkish descent in Germany believed that they have few opportunities for political participation (38%). 31% thought that there are few such opportunities, 24% thought that there were quite a few, and only 8% thought that there were plenty of opportunities. However, this perception is not related to the participants’ interest in Turkish politics. Of those who thought that there were few opportunities for their political participation in Germany, 42% stated that they were very interested in Turkish politics, while the percentage of those who thought that they had quite a few or plenty of opportunities was 41.

Multivariate analysis does not provide a comprehensive explanation for the respondents’ interest in Turkish politics on the basis of the influence of dimensions such as social integration, generation, actual commitment and other indicators of political participation (e.g. citizenship, involvement in migrant organisations).
Multivariate analysis shows that only the low degree of social placement has a significant effect, in that the probability of a pronounced cross-border political orientation is then significantly lower than it is for a high degree of placement.

Overall, the bivariate and multivariate analyses of the data show that the extent to which people of Turkish descent in Germany are socially and politically integrated is only weakly correlated with having a cross-border political orientation and also proves to be largely independent of a respondent’s generation.

Those highly interested in Turkish politics make up a very heterogeneous group in which those who are politically and socially well integrated in Germany are overrepresented. This suggests that, at least in part, this is the result of additive or multiple integration, which seems to contradict the assumption that country-of-origin orientation is due primarily to social and political marginalisation.

A cluster analysis of those highly interested in Turkish politics finds a group with clearly below-average sympathies for the Turkish ruling party, AKP. This group accounts for as much as one third of the cases included in the cluster analysis.

Major factors that distinguish this group from the other two are German citizenship, frequent (though not constant) involvement in political matters in Germany, and a below-average level of exclusive identification with Turkey despite a marked interest in that country’s politics. These factors may also explain why people of Turkish descent in Germany are less susceptible to the autocratic Turkish leader Erdoğan and his AKP’s claims that people of Turkish descent in Germany are socially and politically marginalised. However, it should be noted that such susceptibility is not correlated with the immigrants’ objective degree of social integration.
Discussion

The study of people of Turkish descent presented here shows that there is not necessarily a direct correlation between levels of interest or involvement in political issues in the country of origin and processes of social and political integration in the country of arrival. Nor did our analysis show that the degree of political interest in the country of origin diminishes in the course of intergenerational change, nor when there are opportunities for participation in Germany that are perceived as good, nor for those among our interviewees who have German citizenship.

Consequently, debates about immigrants’ loyalty to their country of arrival in general and about the loyalty of people of Turkish descent to Germany in particular remain fruitless as long as political commitment to the country of origin is assumed to undermine political and civic integration in the country of arrival. Instead, it is necessary to provide opportunities for a comprehensive representation of immigrants’ interests, because this is the best way to counteract any potential susceptibility to anti-democratic positions originating from the country of origin.

Results of a survey conducted among German citizens of Turkish descent after the 2017 German federal election indicate a fairly low degree of loyalty to Erdoğan (see Goerres et al. 2018, p. 18), which fits well with the finding that there is a correlation between political marginalisation in Germany and leanings towards the AKP. However, we also find that the perception of political participation and of identification with Germany does not necessarily make people immune to supporting authoritarian rule in their country of origin. Our results suggest that Germany, as a country of immigration, will not be able to completely resolve this contradiction, even in the long run.

The fact that it is certainly possible to identify contrasting groups among those with a high degree of political interest in Turkey and different political attitudes – among other things, in terms of levels of social integration, political integration, and generational affiliation – demonstrates that analysing political activities in the diaspora is complex enough if it involves only one group of immigrants in a country of arrival, and that different conditions and motivations must be considered in each case. For this reason, it is highly unlikely that there will
ever be any general findings spanning two or more countries of immigration and groups of immigrants.

This article does not allow for a proper empirically-based assessment of intergenerational change within individual families. However, data from the 2,000 Families Project points to additional avenues for research on the group of people of Turkish descent in Germany that will make it possible to take a closer look at the relationship between intergenerational change and identification with Germany and Turkey.19

References


19 See Guveli et al. (2017) on the research potential of this data set.


Fostering Democratic Learning Experiences with Intercultural Virtual Problem-based Learning

Christoph Dähling

*Rhenish Friedrich Wilhelm University of Bonn, Germany*
cdaehlin@uni-bonn.de

Alfred Weinberger

*Private University College of Education of the Diocese of Linz, Austria*
alfred.weinberger@ph-linz.at

Jutta Standop

*Rhenish Friedrich Wilhelm University of Bonn, Germany*
jstandop@uni-bonn.de

**Keywords**
*Democratic learning; Intercultural competence; Problem-based Learning; Online learning; Teacher training;*

**Abbreviations**
Problem-based Learning= PBL
Abstract

This article documents a cooperation project between a German and an Austrian university. Teacher training students from both countries collaborated in binational groups on intercultural case studies using the method of Problem-based learning. The international collaboration was made possible by digital media (especially video conferencing software). In this pilot study, Reitinger's Criteria of Inquiry Learning Inventory (CILI) was used to investigate the extent to which students perceived the learning activity as democratic one. The results show that this was the case overall, but that further adjustments are needed to fully realise the democratic potential of the learning unit.

German Synopsis

Dieser Beitrag erläutert die konzeptionellen Grundideen eines einmonatigen Kooperationsprojekts, das im Wintersemester 2017/18 erstmals an der Universität Trier und der PH der Diözese Linz stattgefunden hat und dokumentiert die Ergebnisse der Evaluation, die untersuchte, inwiefern das Projekt von den teilnehmenden Studierenden als demokratische Lernerfahrung wahrgenommen wurde.


In dieser Pilotstudie sollte zunächst ermittelt werden, ob das Projekt, das sich in Ablauf und Inhalt als Beitrag zum demokratischen Lernen versteht, von den Studierenden selbst als demokratisch wahrgenommen wurde. Vor diesem Hintergrund fanden während der insgesamt vier virtuellen Sitzungen jeweils Befragungen unter Verwendung des Criteria of Inquiry Learning Inventory (CILI) von Reitinger statt. Die Auswertung der Daten ergab, dass das Projekt insgesamt von den Studierenden als demokratische Lerneinheit wahrgenommen wurde, diese Zustimmung aber über die Messzeitpunkte nachließ. Mögliche Gründe und Implikationen werden diskutiert.
Introduction

In various countries of the world, an increase in populist, anti-democratic currents can currently be observed. Even in countries where the democratic institutions themselves seem to have enough resistance against such forces, this trend is to be seen with concern if democracy is not simply understood as a form of rule, but – with John Dewey (1916) - rather as a form of common and interconnected shared experience. This form of interconnection seems at present to be in danger with a fragmentation of society along different groups in which no common experience seems to take place anymore. For some time now, the promotion of intercultural competence in the population has been regarded as a way of preventing at least a break-up of society along cultural lines, especially amongst the younger generation in the country's educational institutions. This approach also creates new demands on university teacher training. This pilot study explores the democratic potential of a cross-border cooperation project on intercultural competence that also incorporated new ways of digital learning and made use of the method of Problem-based learning.

Theoretical Background

Intercultural Competence

The concept of intercultural competence has been used more and more in recent years, in line with current social developments as

more than ever, within our communities we find people living side-by-side who hold different beliefs, backgrounds and outlooks. This enriching of European societies is to be celebrated, but it also requires us to think carefully about how we nurture a set of common values around which to organise. How do we resolve clashes between competing worldviews? What are the attitudes and behaviours we can and cannot accept? (Council of Europe, 2016)

The concept is regarded by many as particularly relevant for educational institutions, as can be seen from various official announcements.

For example, in its recommendation on "Intercultural education and upbringing in schools", the Standing Staff of Conference of the Ministries of Culture Affairs (KMK, 1996) describes "intercultural competence" as a core competence for responsible action in a plural, globally networked society, and the National Action Plan for Integration (BMBF, 2013) emphasises the importance of an intercultural opening of higher education institutions.
Nevertheless, the concept of intercultural competence has always been criticised as well. Due to its strong anchoring – at least in the early days – in economics, research has in fact provided a large surface for criticism in view of its focus on functional recipe knowledge (one may think in this context of the popular formulation of "intercultural training"). However, much more dynamic and open conceptions of intercultural competence were also subject to criticism. The argument is that it fixes people on their ethnic origin and their community of descent and locates discrimination and racism above all on the (inter-)personal level, thus concealing their institutional conditions.

Furthermore, from another thrust there is criticism of the alleged inaccuracy and contradictoriness of the basic concepts of culture, interculturality and intercultural competence (Radke, 1992).

Research on intercultural competence is therefore faced with the task of taking into account the fluidity and hybridity of culture on the one hand and, on the other hand, of moving from a – self-acknowledged (Bolten, 2007) – situation of conceptual confusion to definitional clarity in order to be able to fulfil the demands and expectations placed on it.

It is evident that the above-mentioned teaching of intercultural competence at school, which is demanded by state authorities, is only possible if the teachers also possess this competence. For example, the KMK calls for further training of educators and teachers and for the strengthening of the intercultural competences of the pedagogical staff.

The necessity of such a strengthening of intercultural competence can be deduced from the results of various studies in which the intercultural attitudes of teachers were determined (Busse & Göbel, 2017). The importance of attitudes is an important element in most definitions of intercultural competence, including that of Deardorff (2006, p. 247), which served as the basis for the project presented here:

"The ability to act effectively and appropriately in intercultural situations; it is promoted by certain attitudes, emotional aspects, (inter)cultural knowledge, special skills and abilities as well as general reflection competence".

In their mentioned compilation of various studies, however, Busse and Göbel have shown that teachers often tend towards ethnocentric perspectives and either minimize or deny cultural differences or adopt a defensive attitude towards them. This is all the more impactful because there is a connection between the intercultural attitudes of the teacher and the intercultural quality of his or her teaching. Positive attitudes towards interculturality are therefore desirable, but are often not automatically present (Göbel & Hesse, 2008).
As far as the promotion of such attitudes is concerned, literature shows that experiences of real cultural contacts can help to reduce stereotypes (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) and that teachers who themselves have lived abroad for a longer period of time are more likely to show ethnorelative attitudes than colleagues who have not (Lee, 2009).

Reflective activities contribute to the productive handling of such experiences of cultural contact and prevent them from being processed in the form of solidified stereotypes. Results from foreign language didactics point to the suitability of working with critical incidents in this context (Göbel & Helmke, 2010).

In the online project presented in this article, an attempt was made to generate the positive effects of cultural contact through a bi-national setting and at the same time to enable a reflexive approach to the topic through the use of critical incidents in order to strengthen the intercultural competence of future teachers. Such a strengthening is not only desirable due to democratic and inclusion-theoretical considerations, but in view of the study situation it can also be expected that the learning performance of pupils with a migration background will increase (Busse & Göbel, 2017).

**Digitization**

Digitization, understood here as a process in which digital media and digital tools increasingly take the place of analog processes and not only replace them, but also open up new perspectives in all social, economic and scientific areas, but also bring with them new challenges (KMK, 2016), is also and above all of great importance for the educational system. In this context, Germany's oft-quoted backwardness in international comparison has frequently been the subject of discussion (IW, 2018) and taken by politicians as an occasion for extensive investment (BMBF, 2017). Two main points serve as reasons for this digital turnaround. On the one hand, school has to prepare the pupils for the reality of life and – since this reality is an increasingly digital one – also incorporate digital media itself in order not to develop into a parallel space to the pupils' environment (Brinkmann et al., 2018). On the other hand, digitization opens up great opportunities for better, more meaningful and more sustainable learning, both on the individual learning side (Deimann, 2016) and on the collaborative learning side (Knaus, 2015).

In addition to problems of financing and infrastructure, teachers and their below-average digital competence have repeatedly come under fire in the discussion as an obstacle to the realisation of modern, digital classes (Vodafone Stiftung Deutschland, 2017). Other studies
have shown that this situation will not simply change with the entry of a new generation into the teaching profession, since students generally cannot be identified as drivers of digital change and students of teaching professions are even less digitally affine than their peers (Schmid et al., 2017). It is therefore called for a fundamental modification of teacher training and a comprehensive orientation towards the acquisition of digital skills by future teachers (Brinkmann, 2018). This focus seems to be reasonable because studies based on the Technology Acceptance Model by Davis et al. (1989) have shown that the successful use of new technologies in the classroom strongly depends on the attitudes and views of teachers towards them (Paraskeva & Papagianna, 2008). The online project presented here is an attempt to positively influence these attitudes and views through a model experience of the possibilities of digital learning.

Problem-based Learning

The literature on PBL is diverse and different authors often accentuate different elements. For the online project and this study, we were guided by Savery's (2006, p. 9) definition of PBL as a "learner-centered approach that empowers learners to conduct research, integrate theory and practice, and apply knowledge and skills to develop a viable solution to a defined problem."

Foundations

The confrontation with problems and the attempt to overcome them successfully is a basic constant of human experience.

The philosophical-theoretical foundations of PBL can be found above all in the approach of John Dewey's inquiry method (Dole et al., 2016). In contrast to a mere artificial instruction, the method is intended to represent the principle of thinking itself. Five phases are regarded as characteristic for this process, which can also be found in the PBL protocol: 1) the indefinite situation, 2) the institution of a problem, 3) the concretisation of a problem solution, 4) the rational reasoning, 5) the probation of the problem solution (Dewey, 1938). Dewey's pedagogical thinking is rooted in American pragmatism and understanding of democracy, and his perspective goes beyond the increase in the knowledge of the individual and refers to the way people live together in a society (Kerres & de Witt, 2004). Reitinger (2018) therefore speaks of an inherent nexus between inquiry-based forms of learning like PBL and democratic learning, as both approaches share essential elements like problem solving, autonomous-thinking and participation.
History

PBL's path to global dissemination began at North American universities, where work on problem cases was integrated into the curriculum at various faculties as early as the middle of the last century. Above all, however, the method is linked to the medical faculty of the Canadian McMaster University, where the entire teaching and learning concept was converted to PBL in the 1960s. The motivation for this radical change lay in the dissatisfaction of the teaching staff with the results of classical education, where good results in the reproduction of acquired knowledge were recorded, but the students had difficulties in transferring their knowledge into concrete actions in real life contexts. Starting from McMaster University, the concept spread worldwide, especially in the field of medical faculties. However, since the re-establishment of Maastricht University in 1976, which was based on the PBL approach, this method has also found its way to other departments and to various school subjects (Savery, 2006).

PBL in teacher training

The PBL approach can also be seen as promising in university teacher training, as it enables a comprehensive build-up of subject matter content knowledge by identifying and working on learning objectives, of pedagogical content knowledge by directly experiencing this form of learning, and of curricular knowledge by the greater focus of PBL on the larger curricular whole (Wilhelm and Brovelli, 2009). Due to the focus on situationality, complexity and authenticity, the approach can better prepare future teachers for the real situation in the classroom than traditional types of instruction (Reusser, 2005).

The Problem Case at the Center

The factors for a successful problem case have been described in various publications and under different approaches.

Des Marchais (1999) approached the question through expert interviews with experienced PBL facilitators, while Sockalingam and Schmidt (2011) base their study on the perspective of students whose reflections on successful PBL were subjected to a content analysis.

In addition, general findings of teaching-learning research on effective didactic design are taken into consideration when considering convincing problems (Ditton, 2002).
In recent years, promising developments have taken place in this area that provide users of PBL with models for creating effective problem cases. The most important of these recent developments are Hung's 3C3M model (2006) and the 9-step process derived from it (Hung, 2009). In addition, in the conception of the online project described here, the students' possibility to choose the problem case they wanted to work on was integrated which is little known in the PBL literature but which recurs to the self-determination theory of Ryan and Deci (2017), in particular to correspond to the students' striving for autonomy and to promote their motivation.

*Effectiveness*

The growing spread of PBL has been accompanied by criticism, some of which, as in Kirschner et al. (2006), has generally cast doubt on the effectiveness of the approach. Strobel & van Barneveld (2009), on the other hand, come to the conclusion in their meta-synthesis of various meta-analyses that different judgments have to be made regarding the effectiveness of the method depending on the area:

“Findings indicated that PBL was superior when it comes to long-term retention, skill development and satisfaction of students and teachers, while traditional approaches were more effective for short term retention as measured by standardized board exams.” (p. 44)

*Intercultural Competence, Digitization, and PBL: Synergies*

The three main components of the online project described above are logically related to each other, as will be shown in the following. The most obvious connection is probably between the complexes of interculturality and digitization. The existence of online collaboration tools makes it possible to interact almost in real time with people who are geographically far away. Such an "internationalization at home" can provide intercultural contacts, where these do not automatically arise due to great homogeneity or selectivity of the immediate environment. Such learning arrangements are to be classified at the highest level of the taxonomy of Puente-Duara (2006), that of the "redefinition", in which online tools make learning experiences possible that would not be possible without media (see table 1).
Table 1. The SAMR Model (Puenteudra, 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enhancement</th>
<th>Transformation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Redefinition</td>
<td>Tech allows for the creation of new tasks, previously inconceivable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modification</td>
<td>Tech allows for significant task redesign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augmentation</td>
<td>Tech acts as a direct tool substitute, with functional improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substitution</td>
<td>Tech acts as a direct tool substitute, with no functional change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is also a natural inner connection between the complex of interculturality and the method of problem-based learning. One of the most important approaches for teaching competencies in dealing with interculturality among trainers and academics has proven to be dealing with so-called critical incidents - intercultural situations that have either been particularly successful or particularly unfavourable due to cultural differences. Critical incidents - which are used almost exclusively in their negative form - have much in common with problem cases, which always form the core of Problem-Based Learning, regardless of the discipline in question (Hung, 2016). The successful work on a critical incident and on a problem case poses many similar challenges: quick answers have to be avoided, different perspectives have to be allowed, additional information has to be generated, exact solutions are not given.

For this reason, Critical Incidents were made the basis of the PBL problem case in the online project.

Finally, the combination of the digital component with Problem-based Learning enables considerable improvements and simplifications of the PBL protocol. Individual points of the classical seven jump can be realized more easily with digital media than in the classical classroom. The brainstorming/brainwriting session, for example, can be realized much more easily with the help of collaborative writing applications (in contrast to analog post-it's and flipcharts). The way in which different groups work together, not in the real world, but in virtual spaces, also facilitates the task of the facilitator, who can assign himself to a virtual group with a single click. Last but not least, the possibility of financial savings must also be considered,
since virtual PBL does not have the large space and material requirements of the classical method.

**Methods**

**Hypothesis**

Dimensions of democratic learning experiences (authentic exploration, critical discourse, experience-based hypothesizing, conclusion-based transfer) among students are fostered by the intercultural online-PBL setting.

**Personnel and Context**

The online project presented here took place in the winter semester 2017/2018 as a cooperation within the teacher training seminars "Education and Socialisation" (Jutta Standop, Christoph Dähling – then University of Trier) and "Introduction to Scientific Work" (Alfred Weinberger – Private University College of Education of the Diocese of Linz). In both cases the participants of the seminars were bachelor students at the beginning of their studies.

**Implementation**

The learning activity was realised as a virtual seminar in which the Austrian students worked together with the German students in bi-national small groups on an intercultural problem case according to a problem-based learning protocol. The cooperation was made possible by digital tools (video conferencing software, application for collaborative writing, learning management system).
Tab 2: Schedule of the online project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before</td>
<td>Students submit case stories of their own intercultural conflict situations, case stories are analyzed by the lecturers and distilled into three exemplary case stories, students assign themselves to the case that interests them most</td>
<td>Learning Management System</td>
<td>First point of measurement with the CILI (digital questionnaire at the end of session)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Week</td>
<td>Online lecture, lecturers introduce the topic and explain organizational matters</td>
<td>Videoconferencing software,</td>
<td>Second point of measurement with the CILI (digital questionnaire at the end of session)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In between</td>
<td>Self-study phase, literature research and evaluation</td>
<td>Individual (libraries, internet databases, search engines)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Week</td>
<td>The small groups come together, supported by one of the lecturers as facilitator, to work on the problem case.</td>
<td>Videoconferencing software, application for collaborative writing</td>
<td>Third point of measurement with the CILI (digital questionnaire at the end of session)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Week</td>
<td>Joint final conference, groups present their handouts, discussion in the plenary group</td>
<td>Videoconferencing software, Learning Management Software</td>
<td>Fourth point of measurement with the CILI (digital questionnaire at the end of session)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tab. 3: The exemplary problem cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common to the three cases was the basic constellation of intercultural conflicts: differing expectations due to different life-practical contexts as well as imaginative worlds with regard to values, norms, behaviour, (body) language, etc. (Auernheimer, 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case A was mainly about intercultural parental work. The young teacher Sophia has arranged a parental interview with the father of a Syrian girl who has problems finding friends among the children in the class. The teacher is worried about possible intercultural complications beforehand; above all, she fears an unpleasant situation if the father refuses to shake her hand as a woman. For this reason she greets him without a handshake. The conversation reveals irritations caused by different ideas about dealing with representatives of the state and the role of family and friends. Particularly in the aspect of handshake, there is a recognition that even supposed knowledge about intercultural differences must be handled reflexively and flexibly in order not to fall into stereotypical attributions. The teacher has no real indication that her handshake would be rejected, she suspects this only because of her father's cultural background and the story is legible in a way that much of the interpersonal irritation could be explained by the fact that the mood was impaired by denying him a polite, customary greeting.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inspired by some of the preliminary student submissions and the literature on intercultural conflicts between Europeans and Chinese, which is particularly rich due to the great diversity of cultures and the economic and political importance of China, the main focus was on dimensions of directness vs. indirectness and individualism vs. collectivism. In case history, the naive use of teaching methods based on Western teaching and learning philosophy by a young German intern at a Chinese school leads to far-reaching conflicts. This aspect provides links to a critical meta-view of the online project itself, because its design is also influenced by Western pedagogy, which should be critically reflected, especially with regard to later collaborations with non-European partners.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The last case story was about a young female teacher who had to deal with the macho behaviour of different pupils, which introduced a topic that was very often identified as important by the students in the preliminary inquiry. Within the story, the young teacher discusses with her colleague, where ethnorelativist ideas meet ethnocentralist ideas and the students are thus presented with two extreme points of possible discussion to which they can refer in the group work rejecting or agreeing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tab 4: The group work phase and the PBL protocol

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Arrangement</th>
<th>Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>PROBLEM DEFINITION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clarify comprehension problems, identify problem content</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>BRAINSTORMING</td>
<td>Group work</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collection of hypotheses, use of the preliminary knowledge for their evaluation and classification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>STRUCTURING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discussion of the hypotheses, alignment of knowledge in exchange</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>IDENTIFICATION OF LEARNING OBJECTIVES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formulating as specific a question as possible about learning objects, setting learning objectives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>SELF STUDY</td>
<td>Individual work</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent pursuit of learning objectives through literature</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>SYNTHEIS</td>
<td>Group work</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gathering of the findings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creation of a learning product</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data collection and analysis

The hypotheses were examined by using a pre-experimental research design without a control group (N=29). Dependent variables were (1) the democratic learning experiences and (2) the general learning experiences. The democratic learning experiences were assessed before the intervention (pretest), twice during the intervention and after the intervention (posttest). The general learning experiences were assessed after the intervention (posttest only). The data collection method that was used was the Criteria of Inquiry Learning Inventory (CILI, Reitinger, 2016). It evaluates the specific democratic learning experiences “experience-based hypothesizing” (exhy), “authentic exploration” (auex), “critical discourse” (crdi) and “conclusion-based transfer” (cotr). A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to examine the data of the CILI.
Results

We examined whether the requirements of a repeated measures ANOVA are fulfilled for the data of the CILI. This analysis revealed that the data of the four dimensions of the CILI are normal distributed (based on the Kolmogorov Smirnov test: p > 0,5) and that sphericity can be assumed (Mauchly-test: p > 0,5). The data of the repeated measures ANOVA with the within subject factors Time (four points of measurement) and Dimension (exhy vs. auex vs. crdi vs. cotr) reveal a significant main effect Dimension (F(3) = 4,21; p < 0,05; part. eta2 = 0,20). Post hoc analyses of this effect applying Bonferroni-corrected alpha-level show significant mean differences between the dimensions “exhy” and “auex” (Mexhy = 5,51; Mauex = 5,23), “exhy” and “cotr” (Mexhy = 5,51; Mcotr = 5,06) and “crdi” and “cotr” (Mcrdi = 5,35; Mcotr = 5,06). The main effect “Time” and the interaction effect “Time*Dimension” are not significant (Time: F(3) = 2,21; n.s.; part. eta2 = 0,12; Time*Dimension: (F(9) = 1,01; n.s.; part. Eta2 = 0,06).
Discussion

A possible explanation for the significant mean differences between the dimensions experience-based hypothezising and authentic exploration that have been identified could be a too high degree of control by the facilitator of the group work, who overly dictated the direction in which the group discussion moved. In the future, greater freedom is to be granted here, in combination with more pointed scaffolding, which - for example through greater assistance in researching scientifically high-quality literature - ultimately gives the students greater freedom through help structures by making intervention by the facilitator less necessary for a high-quality discussion.

Furthermore, the significant mean differences between experience-based hypothesizing and conclusion-based transfer as well as between critical discourse and conclusion-based transfer require a discussion. A lack of transfer of the knowledge gained into practice can be observed here, which runs counter to the objectives of the PBL in terms of imparting real life competences. An explanation for these results could be found in the selection of problem cases. It must be determined here whether their design might not prevent transfer because they are too far away from the reality of the participants for them to experience them as relevant and transferable to their own reality.

References


BMBF. (2013). Nationaler Aktionsplan Integration.


‘ICT Guides’ Project as an Example of Educational Support of Young Immigrants Through Intergenerational Learning and ICT Tools

Joanna Leek

*University of Lodz*
joanna.leek@uni.lodz.pl

Marcin Rojek

*University of Lodz*
marcin.rojek@uni.lodz.pl

**Keywords**

*immigrant young people, intergenerational learning, ICT tools, after-school activities, empowerment*
Abstract

This paper presents the results of research conducted with the context of an EU-funded ‘ICT Guides’ project which was carried out in Gothenburg (Sweden), Madrid (Spain), Sheffield (United Kingdom) and Berlin (Germany). The study aimed to find out how ICT tools and intergenerational learning can facilitate access to the general education system for newly-arrived immigrant young people. Our findings show that intergenerational learning and ICT tools empower immigrant young people, improve their language skills, and influence their attitudes towards education. Our study also emphasises that intergenerational learning and ICT tools can contribute effectively to a better understanding and harmonious coexistence between younger and older immigrants, influence a mutual understanding, and offer opportunities for learning about each other.

German Synopsis

Introduction

‘ICT Guides’ (acronym TIDES)\(^{20}\) was a project under the Erasmus+ programme, conducted from 2015 to 2018 by partners from the city councils of Gothenburg, Berlin, Madrid, Sheffield, as well as the University of Lodz as a research partner. The idea for the project resulted from a high percentage of young people, especially immigrant young people, being at risk of early school leaving (ESL) in Gothenburg, Berlin, Madrid and Sheffield; ESL in turn can result in social and individual problems such as poverty, unemployment, social exclusion and delinquency. In addition, in those cities a high percentage of older immigrants are perceived as being at risk of social exclusion because of their age. The main idea of the project was to let immigrant young people develop and conduct a series of ICT courses\(^{21}\) on how to use mobile devices targeted at an older audience. To accompany the courses, the project encompassed a research study focusing on the chances and challenges of supporting young immigrants through intergenerational learning with the goal of increasing their levels of success in school education.

In this paper, we describe the justification for project implementation, its basic assumptions and goals, the main activities carried out by partners, our general theoretical research findings, and project educational outcomes. Through the publication of this article, we also want to submit our activities and results for international scientific assessment in the hope that the results of our activities and our experience will be helpful for the future implementation of similar projects.

---

\(^{20}\) Programme: Erasmus+; Duration: 07.12.2015 – 31.08.2018; Coordinator: SDFUTB – Sektor utbildning, SDF Västra Hisingen Göteborgs stad (Sweden); Partners: Sheffield City Council (United Kingdom) DGI-CM – Dirección General De Inmigración, Comunidad De Madrid (Spain) SENBJF – Senatsverwaltung für Bildung, Jugend und Familie Berlin (Germany), University of Lodz (Poland). This project was funded with support from the European Commission No. 2015-1-SE01-KA201-012232. This publication only reflects the views of the authors, and the European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein. This scientific work has been funded with the support from the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education funds for science for the years 2016 to 2018 allocated to the international co-financed project agreement no. 3590/ERASMUS+/2016/2.

\(^{21}\) We have adopted a broad understanding of the term ‘information and communication technologies’ (ICT) to cover all tools and sources used to communicate, search, create, disseminate and manage information, and to include hardware, software, communications equipment, Internet, network equipment and equipment for data transmission, office accessories, telecommunication services, IT services, Internet, mobile phones, electronic media, and radio and satellite TV.
Project Rationale

The general goal of the ‘ICT Guides’ project was to reduce the risk of early school leaving (ESL) by young immigrants in four European metropolises: Berlin, Gothenburg, Madrid and Sheffield. There is no single definition of early school leaving among scientists and practitioners in European countries; therefore, we have taken the definition of ‘early school leaving’ as used by Barry Cullen (2000: 10), who summarises various positions in literature as follows: ‘“Early school leaving” can be understood as young people leaving school before the legal school leaving age and/or leaving school with limited or no formal qualifications.’ From this perspective, early school leaving can mean ‘leaving education and training systems before the end of compulsory schooling; before reaching a minimum qualification; or before completing upper secondary education’ (European Commission 2013: 8). In this project, we assume that ESL refers to the definition of European Commission and thus describes ‘all forms of leaving education and training before completing upper secondary education’. It includes those who have never enrolled and those who have dropped out of education and training. It also includes those who do not continue education and training after finishing lower secondary education or those who failed final exams at the end of upper secondary education.’ (European Commission 2013: 8). Reducing early school leaving is currently a main target for EU member states and policy makers and presents a major challenge for national and regional education and training systems. The study refers also partly to the impact of school drop-out, in particular when considering the consequences for future of immigrant pupils, such as lack of vocational training and social exclusion.

Early school leavers generally come from poor, distressed areas, socially disadvantaged, low-education backgrounds, and disadvantaged minority immigrant backgrounds, and belong to vulnerable groups. The effects of early school leaving at the individual and social level are manifold and widely studied (cf. Esteavo, Alvares 2014; Fu Jo Shan 2013; Lally 2012; Levitas et al. 2007; Balanskat et al. 2006; Cassidy, Bates 2005; Conen, Rutten 2003; Oppenheim 1998). Leaving the educational and training system without reaching a certain level of qualification strongly limits an individual’s range of life chances. In terms of professional career, ESL leads to an individual’s integration in less qualified employment segments characterised by low pay, a disproportional high risk of precarious employment and unemployment, and weak perspectives for mobility. Early school leaving also inhibits full participation in community life, either directly—due to deficits in interpretation and expression skills, speech organisation,
critical capacity, etc.—or indirectly, through the effects of the low self-esteem associated with precarious employment and low incomes in a society in which employment and consumption are central elements of identity. In sum, leaving school early implies disproportionally higher risks of poverty and social exclusion throughout an individual’s life.

Today, 24% of the EU population is at risk of poverty or social exclusion; this includes 27% of all children in Europe. Students dropping out of school provide an obstacle for smart and sustainable growth for all. If fewer youngsters drop out of education, and if general educational output is increased, this will work against unemployment and poverty. As highlighted in the ‘Youth on the move’ report, one of the EU flagship initiatives to significantly decrease the number of students dropping out of school is an investment, not only in the individual young person, but also in future EU social cohesion and wealth. In Sweden, 100,000 young people start senior high school every year. Approximately 25% of students drop out or leave school without completed grades. Out of these, 50% end up in circumstances of social exclusion. In the city of Gothenburg (Biskopsgården), there are numerous young people with immigrant backgrounds (under 16 years of age) who are at high risk of unemployment and social exclusion. Unemployment is high in general, but for those who are young and born outside of Sweden, unemployment rates are 70% higher than for young people born in Sweden. In recent years, Sheffield has seen an increase in the number of new arrivals of young people from white Gypsy/Roma backgrounds. These young people now make up more than half of new arrivals in Sheffield and tend to originate from Slovakia. Roma pupils are also less likely to progress into employment, education or training after year 11 than the Sheffield average. In December 2014, around 20% of Sheffield’s Roma population aged between 16 and 18 was classed as ‘Not in Education, Employment or Training’ (NEET), compared to the Sheffield average of 5.8% NEET. The situation for Berlin and Madrid shows similar figures.

**Project activities – an overview**

‘ICT Guides’ was a three-year project focused on activities to reduce early school dropout rates among immigrant young people. The first step in the project was a literature review and the analysis of the results of previous research on the ESL phenomenon and its limitations.

In theoretical research, we have found that early school leaving is a phenomenon that has existed for decades as an important educational issue and economic, social, and cultural problem, but whose importance has only recently risen to the fore because of social and economic changes and due to migration. Over the years, there have been many ideas on how
ESL could be reduced. The implementation of these ideas has revealed different outcomes. Despite strenuous efforts, the ESL phenomenon has not been eliminated or even reduced. Schools encounter many obstacles, with teachers lacking tools and, in some cases, appropriate equipment; in addition, educational institutions do not regularly implement the latest research findings, which perpetuates a situation where the ESL rate is not decreasing. In many parts of Europe, there is also a large inflow of young immigrants with an incomplete education, which partly results from the severe so-called ‘European immigrant (refugees) crisis’, and partly from the recent alarming situation in countries such as Syria and Afghanistan. Schools cannot handle students with many different needs in a traditional school environment. In some of the socially- and economically-challenged areas, teachers report that they do not just act as tutors and teachers, but also as parents, friends, police officers, and trauma psychologists. This, of course, imposes certain constraints on the teaching profession. New tools and methods are needed as well as different or increased cooperation between education and civil society. In this context, high hopes can be associated with ICT tools and intergenerational learning. ICT tools and learning (including intergenerational learning) constitute two areas which have gained in importance over the past few years (cf. Leek, Rojek 2017). Their importance in education has been well recognised and well researched. Individual learning (not formal education as such) is perceived as one of the most important processes for people during their lives. Intergenerational learning means to be open towards the educational possibilities which arise from everyday intergenerational experiences. Intergenerational learning is one of the irreplaceable intellectual stimulants not only for young people but also for older individuals. It is assumed that one of the results of intergenerational learning will be that ESL levels will decrease.

Nevertheless, intergenerational learning does not occur spontaneously; it needs convenient conditions, a bottom-up policy process, and some kind of accelerator to start. Moreover, it is too abstract and too prolonged an aim for young people to consciously take and realise intergenerational learning and ICT tools in order to improve their educational potential. Furthermore, its generality and abstraction may discourage learners to take part in the project. Therefore, learning content and detailed results should not be clearly stated at the beginning but should be identified spontaneously in intergenerational collaboration during the learning process. It is recommended that in informal learning, the content, methods, styles, speed, place or results should be determined by learners because they know the best what and how to learn.

Through the intergenerational learning process supported by ICT tools, learners are able to speak, read and write with understanding; to communicate in different situations; to present
their own points of view; to search, sort and use information from different sources; to recognise national cultural heritages in the context of European culture; to understand the rules of effective team work; and to take into account the views of other people as well as developing mental skills and personal interests and to develop an inquisitiveness aimed at the search of truth, goodness and beauty of the world.

Based on the above findings, educational activities were designed and carried out by partners from Berlin, Gothenburg, Madrid and Sheffield. The ‘ICT Guides’ project organised learning programmes for younger and older people in order to target some of the most vulnerable groups in Europe: newly-arrived immigrant children and young people between twelve and sixteen years of age (whereby ‘newly-arrived’ is defined as having been in the host country between zero and five years), and native older citizens of sixty-five years and over. We assumed that if the project was implemented to high standards, it would offer contexts that would promote opportunities for young people’s benefit. One of the advantages of programmes such as ‘ICT Guides’ was to provide young people with opportunities for taking part in the decision-making process, getting involved in work that is relevant for young people, and performing challenging tasks connected with projects allowing them to share power and to collaborate with adult staff and volunteers. In order to work towards social cohesion, we aspired to investigate how ICT tools can be used as ‘educational links’ between the newly-arrived young people at risk of early school leaving, older citizens, and a developer of intergenerational learning. In the project, we wanted to test, both from the participatory as well as the research perspective, if it is possible to successfully link the newly-arrived young people (12-16 years old) with older citizens (+65) for the purposes of collaboration and learning. Our activities target the two groups which, according to Eurostat, are the most excluded in Europe.

For this purpose, partners representing the cities mentioned above were responsible for developing and piloting courses on the use of ICT tools for young immigrants and local older people. The essence of the courses was that children taught the older people how to use new information and communication technologies. We assumed that collaborative learning would have an educational impact on young immigrants and relationships with older people which, in turn, would help them find a better place in the new environment and provide educational value.

The organisations involved in the project recruited immigrant pupils and native older adults in: Spain (CEPI Chamartin, Madrid); Sweden (Ryaskolan (school) and Monsunen (meeting place for the elderly), Gothenburg); United Kindgom (Sheffield City Council premises); and Germany (Alfred Nobel Schule and Fritz-Karsen-Schule). Qualitative and
quantitative research on the effective use of ICT tools and intergenerational learning intended to reduce early school leaving was conducted on the group of 267 immigrant pupils and native older adults from Gothenburg, Berlin, Madrid and Sheffield.

Research findings regarding project implementation and activities

Intergenerational practices, including learning, are understood in a variety of ways, and there is no single universally-accepted definition (Granville 2002). This variety is the result of intensive research carried out on this subject for many years (cf. Cichy, Smith 2011; Storm, Storm 2011; Thomas 2009; Newman, Hatton-Yeo 2008; Silverstein 2004; Brown Ohsako 2003; Davis, Larkin, Graves 2003; Noël, de Broucker 2001; Tapscott, Frick, Wootton, Kruh 1996; Mazor, Tal 1996; Doumas, Margolin, John 1994; Jecker 1992; Cappell, Heiner 1990, McClusky 1990). As a result of this theoretical and empirical research, two main contemporary approaches of research into intergenerational learning have been developed. The first perspective focuses on intergenerational learning within related generations, with studies emphasising the transfer of family knowledge and traditions. The second field explores intergenerational learning beyond family connections among non-related generations. The ‘ICT Guides’ project adopted the definition of intergenerational practice as referring to purposeful activities which are beneficial to both young immigrants and older people (Hatton-Yeo 2006). Our studies fitted in the second trend and were therefore conducted within informal and voluntarily-formed communities; we focused on measuring the attitudes of one generation towards the other and the impact of intergenerational relations on the educational future of the young people.

In our research, we sought to answer the question: How can ICT tools and intergenerational learning facilitate mutual understanding between newly-arrived immigrant young people and older native adults? To answer this question, a mixed research approach was adopted, conducting qualitative and quantitative research simultaneously. We assumed that the social world is not empirically measurable and that society is not a simple sum of individuals. Therefore, social processes and behaviours of individuals can be understood and described as a phenomenon embedded in culture, which is the axionormative matrix of behaviour of individuals and groups. The theoretical foundations for this assumption come from phenomenology, hermeneutics, and symbolic interactivity. Within this approach, we used a case-study–based research method which focused on a concrete example of educational
experience and sought to obtain theoretical and in-depth knowledge based on its complete documentation and detailed description (Sturman 1997: 61-66). We used the case-study method as an avenue for inquiry in which practitioners (i.e., Madrid, Berlin, Sheffield, Gothenburg city councils) and researchers (University of Lodz) could jointly reflect on specific cases of educational practice. The case studies followed educational activities (intergenerational learning courses using ICT tools) conducted by partners from Berlin, Gothenburg, Madrid and Sheffield.

To collect data, we decided to use two surveys (baseline and endline) with closed and open questions. The surveys were conducted at the beginning and at the end of intergenerational learning courses in order to identify changes which occurred in the intellect and personality of the participants during the courses. 267 respondents completed the survey questionnaires. Our second technique involved a qualitative analysis of photographs (visual data) and materials (applications, drawings, notices) produced during the courses as a result of intergenerational collaboration. The justification for this was that the application of visual research methods has also become increasingly widespread throughout the social sciences, and that this methodological approach offers the opportunity to look at reality through the eyes of the participants to reveal what may be invisible to the researcher. The photos were taken by partners during intergenerational courses.

Table 1. Number of completed survey questionnaires

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Pupils’ Course: Beginning Surveys</th>
<th>Pupils’ Course: End Surveys</th>
<th>Seniors’ Course: Beginning Surveys</th>
<th>Seniors’ Course: End Surveys</th>
<th>Teachers’ Surveys</th>
<th>Authorities’ Surveys</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gothenburg</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>93</strong></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
<td><strong>53</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>267</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Among immigrants, the largest group added to the project was girls and boys between the ages of 14 and 15.

**Figure 1.** Age of young immigrants taking part in the courses

*Source: Original research by the authors*

Based on our research, we have determined that it is possible to use ICT tools and intergenerational learning as a tool for preventing early school leaving. This finding is supported by evidence from our research outcomes. During the courses developed by partners and conducted as part of the project, young immigrants learned that ICT tools can be used not only for entertainment, but also for education and for personal and professional development. One of the issues we wanted to determine with the baseline and endline surveys was the role of ICT tools in the lives of young people. Before the courses started, we asked the young people what type of ICT tools they used and what role ICT tools played in their lives. Young people used Wi-Fi (86%), mobile phones (75%), audio-visual systems (53%), software (30%), tablets (21%), and cloud storage (18.18%) every day.

Figure 2. Frequency of use of ICT tools among young immigrants before the course

Source: Original research by the authors

Young immigrants most often used mobile phones and Wi-Fi. The main purposes of using mobile phones included communication (25%) and entertainment (22%). Tablets/iPads were mostly used for entertainment (26%) and communication (21%). Similar to tablets/iPads, notebooks/laptops or PCs were used for entertainment (26%) and communication (26%).

Figure 3. Role of ICT tools in young immigrants’ lives

Source: Original research by the authors

Our findings show that ICT tools were very useful and necessary during the first days, weeks and months of school education in a new country or a new social environment when young people face new challenges. They allow immigrant pupils to keep in touch with their family and friends and to adjust to their new reality. During the courses, by using ICT tools in
intergenerational relationships, both age groups (pupils and older people) reduced social and personal barriers and learned about each other. It turned out that most immigrant pupils are fluent in ICT technologies and tools; this proficiency is their strength, and it can be used by teachers in school. On the other hand, there is a low level of technological maturity among immigrants; in other words, ICT tools play a very important role in the immigrants’ life but at the same time consume time that should be dedicated to learning. For example, before the courses started, most students used YouTube only for entertainment purposes, but the older adults made them aware that YouTube can be used for learning too. They pointed out that most universities have YouTube channels where some lectures are presented; in this way, ICT tools enable access to almost unlimited sources of knowledge and communication. In addition, ICT tools help to overcome language barriers in intergenerational relations. The young people told us that their main reason for participating in the ICT course was the hope of improving their language competence.

One of the aims of the study was to find out prior to the course what young people wanted to learn from older people and compare these expectations to what they had actually learned after the course ended. Young people’s expectations about intergenerational learning were connected with language and the kinds of knowledge that would be useful to them when living in a new country. After the last meeting with the older participants, pupils were asked about the benefits of the course. They emphasised language learning and practical information. The pupils appreciated getting to know older people and to find out more about the life of the older generation, which they had not expected before the course started. The table below shows the most characteristic answers:

---

22 All quotes contain the original spellings.

Table 2. Pupils’ expectations before the courses and final outcomes

| Source: Original research by the authors |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Before the courses</th>
<th>After the courses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘relate better’</td>
<td>I learnt how to talk to old people (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘to learn Swedish language and culture’</td>
<td>Be sure of who and when u need to use wifi or the internet to search for words vocabulary. (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘I learn not to be shy when talking Swedish’</td>
<td>Some English words (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Talk Swedish and learn more about Sweden.’</td>
<td>Some things it’s good for a future (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘The language’</td>
<td>How to talk to old people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘To speak Swedish and to learn about Sweden’</td>
<td>I learnt that old people don’t use Wifi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Speak Swedish and learn about older people’</td>
<td>I learnt to make a game</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to be nice</td>
<td>Not answered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>how to communicate, talk English properly (3)</td>
<td>How to talk to people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lots of things around me. And how to work with the internet safety (3)</td>
<td>I learnt how to talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English language (2)</td>
<td>how to talk to old people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The language (2)</td>
<td>I learnt that when you are old you can retire and live in a retirement home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to talk to old people</td>
<td>I learnt old people live in a retirement home (who have retired from their jobs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to talk with an old person</td>
<td>Be sure of who and when u need to use wifi or the internet to search for words vocabulary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to communicate and talk English properly</td>
<td>I like to know about history and I learnt how the schools were when Barrie went to school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Language</td>
<td>I learnt every thing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>I practised my conversation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The past</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I want to learn how to be good with older people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I wanted to learn how to speak Spanish better</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The research project wanted to determine the role of ICT in intergenerational learning. Pupils’ perspectives on intergenerational learning emphasise the significance of ICT tools for initial interactions and conversations. ICT tools gave both groups opportunities to get to know each other better despite language difficulties. In particular, apps like online translators facilitated communication. According to young immigrants:

‘iPad was important when I met the elderly. We had something to concentrate on.’

‘I could help older people with apps and we talked about iPad.’

‘iPad worked as a matter of talk.’

‘We had something to talk about, we leadded plenty conversations.’

Language and communication skills was a recurrent topic among young immigrants in our research. At the beginning of the courses, young immigrants in all four countries were asked what they would like to learn from the older groups. They declared that they would like to be fluent in the language of country they came to, to learn how to communicate with older people, and to learn something about the history, traditions, and customs of their new country. At the end of the courses, each of these goals had been achieved to some extent, but the dominant effect of intergenerational collaboration and intergenerational learning was intergenerational integration in the form of overcoming barriers to communication and finding a common, intergenerational language.
Research also showed that an inability to speak the dominant language fluently, unfamiliarity with cultural codes, or uncertainty as to how to cope with different social groups might be sometimes challenging for young immigrants. The course offered both generations an opportunity to get to know each other better despite language difficulties, using ICT as a facilitator for their interactions and for learning, particularly drawing on online translators. In our respondents’ opinion, internet supports the first contacts and knowledge exchanges in intergenerational learning, allowing participants to get to know each other. Other elements helpful for learning were pictures, maps, and music from online sources. These items can sometimes replace language and facilitate learning. In this way, ICT tools reduce intergenerational distance and help to overcome the polarisation between younger and older citizens. Depending on the needs and possibilities of the participants, ICT tools were used spontaneously in intergenerational collaboration.

Both age groups were interested in using ICT in intergenerational collaboration because they realised that the ability to use ICT tools is one of the key skills of contemporary times and that the significance of these tools will increase in the future. However, ICT tools play different roles for the two cohorts. Pupils primarily use ICT for achieving relevant, specific goals and entertainment; for the older participants, ICT tools not only facilitate learning, but they are also in themselves the object of learning. In other words, the older cohort learned with the help of ICT while learning about it.

Paradoxically, this difference fosters the potential for intergenerational learning as it intrigues people and makes them interested in others. It turns out that while pupils are proficient at using ICT, they are usually not prepared to function independently and effectively in the information society (knowledge). This is evidenced by the fact that they treat ICT as a tool of entertainment, using it for pleasure or to alleviate boredom. Despite their proficiency in using ICT tools, pupils exhibit low technological maturity, whereby technological maturity can be defined as readiness for an independent, effective and responsible use of information and communication technologies – also in an innovative way – and readiness for formulating expectations about technology in terms of current and future needs.

Technological maturity determines the satisfactory and constructive functioning of individuals in the information society, while a lack of competence in this area puts individuals at risk of social exclusion. ICT-related competences are important for access to the broadly understood education and labour markets, and they are cited among the most important human competences of the twenty-first century as a so-called ‘key competence’ (Valentine, Marsh,
Pattie 2005: 5-7). As a result of pupils’ low technological maturity, the use of ICT tools plays an important role in the pupils’ lives but nonetheless consumes time that should be dedicated to learning.

Courses based on intergenerational learning and ICT tools support the development of contemporary key competences and soft skills, especially communication and language skills. According to the respondents of our survey, an improvement of communication and language skills mainly resulted from the use of ICT tools in intergenerational collaboration. Both young people and older participants told us that the courses definitely had an impact on a mutual understanding and offered an opportunity to introduce themselves, learn about each other, and share knowledge and skills.

Therefore, in order to increase the acquisition of EU key competences by immigrant pupils, actions taken can involve collaboration with the use of ICT tools. However, ICT tools only make educational sense when collaborative purposes are their main function. Otherwise, ICT tools themselves become a goal and effect of learning without any impact on immigrant pupils’ educational lives. ICT tools cannot replace face-to-face interaction, but they can effectively contribute to a better understanding and harmonious coexistence between young immigrants and local older people living together in big cities. Learning supported by ICT tools eliminates intergenerational and cultural distance. It helps to work towards the common good, creating a sense of belonging and ensuring mutual support. 95.5% of pupils declared that participation in ‘ICT Guides’ has impacted on the role of ICT tools in their lives.

![Figure 4. Role of the ICT tools after the courses](image_url)

**Source:** Original research by the authors
59.1% of the young participants changed their opinion about education.

![Pie chart showing 59.1% yes and 40.9% no]  

**Figure 5.** Change in young immigrants’ opinion on education  
**Source:** Original research by the authors

Asked why this should be, they provided the following answers:

- *I believe you need school to have a better future* (2)  
- *Because it helped me to be more convenient and be responsible for myself* (2)  
- *I have always thought education was important* (2)  
- *It’s easy now after we learn more*  
- *Because it helped me to be more convinient and be responsible for myself.*  
- *I've always thought education is important as I want to be a pilot so I've got to work very very hard*  
- *I have always thought that school is important so that I can do the job that I want to do*  
- *Education has always been important to me*  
- *I have learnt a lot* (2)  
- *Not answered* (6)

The research outcomes show a visible tendency to understand intergenerational learning as ‘learning about each other’ above all else. This was highlighted especially by the older participant group, who listed knowledge, skills and competences at using ICT tools as secondary to interacting with and understanding the immigrant young people. According to the immigrant young people, their ICT knowledge gave them the necessary confidence to interact with the older participants on equal terms. This conclusion is compatible with an emerging consensus among researchers that when young people, as part of different programmes, take on
the role traditionally reserved for adults, they gain a greater sense of belonging and enhance their ability to make a difference to their own lives and the lives of those around them. Our results showed that ICT-supported intergenerational learning enabled immigrant young people to perform better at school and to work independently of their schools and teachers. After the courses, the young people were also much more motivated to go to school because the older participants had tried to instil in them the belief that good education is a way of succeeding in life.

**Conclusions**

Our research shows that there are three main functions for the use of ICT tools in intergenerational learning. The first function is *educational* and is based on the fact that ICT tools extend the cognitive field of learners through the widespread reality available to them, while at the same time developing their perceptual, intellectual, and executive processes. It is obvious that intergenerational learning using ICT tools does not replace formal education, but that it can be treated as a complement to it. The second function is *emotional*; it emphasises the fact that intergenerational learning and ICT tools not only create strong intellectual experiences, but also evoke emotions and provide emotional and expressive experiences, thus stimulating commitment, curiosity and interest in the teaching material. And because there is a close relationship between emotions and motivation, the use of ICT tools—which affects the emotional sphere of a human being—triggers specific motivational processes without which learning is ineffective (Illeris and Associates 2004: 56-61). The third and final function is *communication*, based on the assumption that ICT tools, unlike other communication tools such as radio or newspapers, use media not only to transmit messages but also to enable mutual communication and dialogue that can stimulate intellectual development and learning.

Our findings further highlight that intergenerational learning is a significant socio-cultural platform for knowledge exchange. Both young immigrant pupils and older participants described their interactions as ‘a power to change’ their lives and ‘an exchange of knowledge’ that might inspire the other group.

We are aware that our research results cannot be considered as representative in general. But we believe that the linkage between intergenerational learning and ICT tools outlines a new prospective area for research and educational practice. It can effectively contribute to a better understanding and harmonious coexistence between young immigrants and older people living collectively in big cities. In the surveys, the young people indicated that the courses definitely
had an impact on the mutual understanding for both groups and that they offered young people the opportunity to introduce themselves, learn about each other, and share knowledge, skills and competences. ICT facilitated better interaction and understanding between immigrant young people and older participants by overcoming stereotypes and eliminating cultural differences. ICT courses gave young immigrants the opportunity to demonstrate their ICT knowledge and at the same time improve their competence in speaking their host country’s language. Meetings with the older participants gave immigrant young people the feeling of being included in the group of neighbours. Immigrant young people also felt that the older group provided them with emotional support on how to live in the new country and succeed in their lives there.

References


Thomas, M. (2009), Think Community. An Exploration of the Links between Intergenerational Practice and Informal Adult Learning, Leicester: NIACE.


Intercultural Competences of Fourth Graders in Germany

Kurd Azad
TU Dortmund University, Germany
kurd.azad@tu-dortmund.de

Heike Wendt
TU Dortmund University, Germany
heike.wendt@tu-dortmund.de

Keywords
intercultural competences, development, elementary school children, TIMSS

Abbreviations
\( \alpha \) Cronbach’s Alpha
bpb Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung
EMIL Europäisches Modularprogramm für Interkulturelles Lernen in der Lehreraus- und -fortbildung
IC Intercultural competences
IDB Analyzer International Database Analyzer
IEA International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
KMK Kultusministerkonferenz
M Mean
n Sample size
o. rep. Own representation
\( R^2 \) Coefficient of determination
SE Standard error
TIMSS Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
Abstract

The focus of this paper is to close the research gap regarding the development and determinants of intercultural competences (IC) by analyzing the components of IC and student characteristics based on representative data of TIMSS 2015 (n = 2248). Results show that many fourth graders express highly positive IC, with the most positive self-reports occurring in the component of “openness”. 24% of variance in IC can be explained by the covariates, which—with the exception of gender and prosocial behavior— all show significant relationships with IC. The results suggest that migration backgrounds and multilingualism should be seen as a special resource for the development of IC.

German Synopsis

1. Introduction

According to current discourse, macro phenomena such as globalization (e.g., free markets), technologization (e.g., social media), internationalization (e.g., international student exchanges) and migration (e.g., refugees from Kurdistan) have led to an exponential increase of cultural plurality and diversity all over the world (Woltin & Jonas 2009). Thus, Germany as an immigration country is characterized by a growing heterogeneity and multiculturality of lifeworlds (Banks 2011). Kurt & Pahl (2016) even say that Germany has become the world’s fastest-growing migration society. However, migration (background) is still seen as a deficit in the discourse (bpb 2008). Therefore, according to German education policy, schools should accept diversity as normality but also as potential for the development of the intercultural competences (IC) of all students (KMK 2013).

According to the reviewed literature, IC are the key competences of the twenty-first century (EMIL 2006) which should be promoted as early as pre-school education (Woltin & Jonas 2009), because nowadays everyone needs IC (UNESCO 2013). IC are essential for interacting with people from other cultures or in intercultural situations (Woltin & Jonas 2009). The term IC refers to a (self)reflexive confrontation with one’s own images of others and cultures as well as their social creation context (KMK 2013). IC help to reduce discrimination and to promote tolerance (Woltin & Jonas 2009). Despite their fundamental relevance, children’s IC are hardly explored (Grosch & Hany 2006). Consequently, there is a gap in knowledge and research regarding the development and characteristics of the IC of children with and without a migration background at German elementary schools. This paper aims to contribute to closing this gap by analyzing components of IC and individual characteristics of fourth graders (students with a mean age of 10 years) based on representative data of TIMSS 2015.

2. Development of IC

The development of IC is tedious, multidimensional, multifaceted and complex (Deardorff 2006). Nevertheless, IC are seen as the result of an (inter)cultural and individual learning and experience process (UNESCO 2013). Experiences with “foreign” (other) people are very enriching because they can expand one’s own horizon (Bolten 2012; Badawia 2006). Without (self-)reflection on the foreign view, sensitization towards one’s own cultures is impossible (EMIL 2006; Fantini 2000). So, IC, as well as interculturality, arise when individuals from different cultures (lifeworlds) interact with each other (Reinders et al. 2011; Bolten 2012).
According to the literature, the interplay of cognitive, affective and conative dimensions and their components supports the positive development of IC (Grosch & Leenen 2000; Navaitienė et al. 2015). The most common and important components of IC are shown in Figure 1.

![Learning model of IC](image_url)

Figure 1: Learning model of IC (o. rep.)

The cycle-based learning model of IC demonstrates that the development of IC is a lifelong, dynamic learning process (Krok et al., 2010), which enriches itself cyclically with various components (Boecker 2006). Most of the components of IC are built and developed during childhood (Simoni et al. 2016; Malti et al. 2016), and they become increasingly complex and abstract through the course of life. Moreover, they are shaped by different cultures and respective differences in socialization, education and milieu contexts (Trommsdorf 1993; Siegler et al. 2016). It should be noted that the IC-components not only influence each other reciprocally (Boecker 2006), but that they can also move over other dimensions like clouds. For example, (inter)cultural knowledge (the cognitive dimension) is first generated and developed through communication (the conative dimension) (Bolten 2012), which, in turn, is loaded with feelings (the affective dimension) and knowledge (the cognitive dimension). According to the paradigm of lifelong learning, people can progress their development of IC but never achieve them fully and completely (Krok et al., 2010). Fantini (2000) also affirms that there is no such thing as an end point of IC, and that people sometimes experience moments of regression or stagnation. Individuals are continually in the process of becoming...

interculturally competent (Fantini 2000). That is why children at first learn from older people (post-figurative cultures), then they only learn from each other (children’s cultures, configurative cultures), and finally, the older generation learns from children (pre-figurative cultures) (Oerter 2014).

Generally, theoretical and empirical approaches to the development and determinants of children’s IC are scarce (Grosch & Hany 2006), especially in the context of migration. However, it is assumed that in Germany, children with migration backgrounds have higher levels of IC than their peers without migration backgrounds. These higher levels of IC manifest themselves in terms of children’s ability to perform “culture switches” (Ittel 2016) and to show reflexive interculturality (Apitzsch 2006) and knowledge about the “migration culture” and the “native culture” (Bolten 2012), as they are more likely to be exposed to intercultural situations and related learning opportunities.

3. State of research

There are hardly any German or English studies describing the development of children’s IC and showing the differences between children with and without migration backgrounds. Five out of six children in German elementary schools visit multicultural classes and therefore have some kind of opportunity for intercultural contacts (Bremerich-Vos, Wendt & Hußmann 2017). In addition, 67% of children have regular meetings and activities with children of other cultures in everyday life (Krok et al. 2010).

Research in Germany has shown that children with migration backgrounds have higher levels of IC than their peers without migration backgrounds in terms of “culture switches” (Ittel 2016) and inter-ethnic friendships (Reinders et al. 2011). Krok et al. (2010) found gender differences in favor of girls and suggest that these may be partially explained by differences in social competences. However, no large-scale data set for German elementary schools exists.

4. Research questions

This paper focuses on three research questions:

1. How can the IC of fourth graders in Germany be characterized in terms of relationship, openness and (inter)cultural knowledge?
2. To what extent are IC related to language and social competences (empathy, prosocial behavior and perspective-taking)?
3. To what extent are IC related to other student characteristics (gender, migration background, socioeconomic and cultural capital)?

5. Sample & Methods

We used data collected as part of an extension to TIMSS 2015 in Germany (n = 2248). The sample is broadly representative of German fourth graders. However, students with low levels of achievement are underrepresented. We calculated descriptive statistics and multivariate regression models considering the complex sampling by using the IEA IDB Analyzer.

Instrument for IC

Table 1 shows that we distinguish three components of IC, namely: relationships (contact), openness, and (inter)cultural knowledge (knowledge transfer), using items by Reinders et al. (2011). These subscales, as well as the overall scale (α = 0.99), show very good reliability values.

### Table 1: Survey instrument of IC (o. rep.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component of IC</th>
<th>Description of component (subscale)</th>
<th>Number of items</th>
<th>Exemplary item</th>
<th>Reliability (Cronbach’s α)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relationship</td>
<td>Relationship (contact) with &quot;foreign&quot; children</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>&quot;How often do you play with children who come from another country?&quot;</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>Openness to other cultures</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>&quot;Do you like it when children from other countries are at your school?&quot;</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Inter)cultural knowledge</td>
<td>Knowledge about (own &amp; foreign) cultures</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>&quot;My friend tells me how festivals are celebrated at his/her home.&quot;</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Response format: 1 = Very often; 2 = Often; 3 = Seldom; 4 = Never. Recoded for the analysis: 0 = Never,….; 3 = Very often.

Instruments for covariates

For migration background, we used information of parents’ country of birth, distinguishing between children with at least one parent born abroad (30.3%; SE = 1.5) and both parents not born abroad (69.7%; SE = 1.5).
For multilingualism, we combined information on early home language and mother tongue and differentiated between monolingual (76%; SE = 1.9) and multilingual (24%; SE = 1.9) students.

For social competences, we built on the work of Frey & Wendt (2015), using scales of students’ self-reports on empathy, prosocial behavior (relationship) and perspective-taking (multi-perspectivity).

As further covariates we used indicators for socioeconomic (HISEI) and cultural capital (cultural activities); students’ gender was also included.

6. Results

Table 2 presents the German students’ self-assessment across IC and their subscales as well as their level of IC (IC-degree).

Table 2: Self-assessment of fourth graders by IC overall, subscales & degree (o. rep.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean IC</th>
<th>Percentage of students by IC-degree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M (SE)</td>
<td>low % (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall scale</td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>1.81 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subscales</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relationship</td>
<td>1.75 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>2.06 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Inter)cultural knowledge</td>
<td>1.72 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IC-degree: low 0-0.74 (M); medium 0.75-1.49 (M); high 1.5-2.24 (M); very high 2.25-3 (M)

The results show that the self-assessment of elementary school children in Germany is generally positive. All means from 1.72 to 2.06 can be considered as high. For example, 52.79% of fourth graders rate their IC as high. The component “openness” is rated particularly positively (M = 2.06). In other words, 41.22% of elementary students assess their openness as very high. 46.36% of children rate their relationship as high. While 31.96% of elementary school students assess their (inter)cultural knowledge as high, 15.76% of them assess their (inter)cultural knowledge as low.

Table 3 presents multivariate regression models of components and covariates on overall IC, i.e. it displays the determinants of IC.
If the covariates are categorised according to the theoretical learning model of IC (see section 2), IC can be better explained by model 1 (components) than model 2 (student characteristics), because it has a higher coefficient of determination ($R^2 = 0.18$). In addition, all components have a significant impact on IC ($p < 0.05$). Here, multi-perspectivity has the strongest effect ($\beta = 0.23$). In model 2, all student characteristics except socioeconomic capital have a significant impact on IC. The effect of migration backgrounds is particularly strong ($\beta = 0.28$), which is also found in model 3 ($\beta = 0.26$). This means that children with migration backgrounds are more likely to express positive self-assessments than children without migration backgrounds.

In terms of gender, it is noticeable that there is a stronger significant relationship between girls and IC than between boys and IC because the regression coefficient of girls ($\beta = 0.15$) is positive. However, in the overall model (model 3), which considers all covariates and best explains IC ($R^2 = 0.24$), there is no significant influence of gender and prosocial behavior on IC, but instead a significant impact of socioeconomic capital on IC.

### 7. Summary of results

The results show that the majority of fourth graders in Germany express high positive IC, with the most positive levels of self-assessment presenting in the component relating to openness.
followed by relationship and (inter)cultural knowledge. The multivariate regressions show that 24% of the variance in IC can be explained by the covariates, which – with the exception of gender (student characteristics) and prosocial behavior (social competences) – all have significant relationships with IC. It means that high levels of cultural and socioeconomic capital as well as migration backgrounds, empathy, multilingualism and multi-perspectivity show high positive relationships with IC.

8. Limitations

The sample has limited representative value for German elementary school children because fourth graders with low achievement are underrepresented. This was probably due to the research design of TIMSS, which is very time-consuming and may have overtaxed the students conducting the research. In addition, the instruments only include fourth graders’ self-assessments. However, in order to make general statements about IC, it is best to use a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, including interviews, observations, and self-assessments.

Next, the survey instrument only focuses on three central components of IC. This raises the question of how the other important components of IC can be characterized. TIMSS is a cross-sectional study that represents a “snapshot,” but not a developmental process of IC. Therefore, causal interpretations of any relationships identified in this paper are not possible.

9. Conclusion

The results suggest that migration backgrounds and multilingualism positively contribute to the development of IC. These factors should be seen as a special resource or advantage and not as a deficit.

The construct of IC needs further well-grounded empirical and theoretical studies, especially from the perspective of developmental psychology, because the development of children’s IC is based on cognitive, affective and conative dimensions which are at the same time key dimensions of developmental psychology. In this context, a very important question would be whether IC are innate competences.

There is a need for explicit learning opportunities and concepts for intercultural learning in all elementary schools, regardless of composition characteristics, because at least 15.76% of elementary school children assess their (inter)cultural knowledge as low. Pedagogical concepts should address cognitive, affective and conative dimensions of IC. Otherwise, according to the
learning model of IC (see section 2), it does not make much sense that elementary school students should have a lot of (inter)cultural knowledge, but that they should lack respectful attitudes and (self)reflexive behaviors. However, it should be taken into consideration that the development of IC is not a learning objective in itself, but a lifelong learning process.

References


Interpersonal Citizenship Skills of Primary School Students: The Role of Class Composition

Lisa De Schaepmeester

Ghent University
Lisa.DeSchaepmeester@ugent.be
https://www.ugent.be/pp/onderwijskunde

Lisa Dewulf

Ghent University
Lisa.Dewulf@ugent.be
https://www.ugent.be/pp/onderwijskunde

Koen Aesaert

Ghent University
Koen.Aesaert@ugent.be
https://www.ugent.be/pp/onderwijskunde

Johan van Braak

Ghent University
Johan.vanBraak@ugent.be
https://www.ugent.be/pp/onderwijskunde

Keywords

interpersonal citizenship skills; class composition; primary education; multilevel; educational effectiveness
Abstract
This study aims to identify how class composition characteristics are related to the interpersonal citizenship skills of students by considering some important student characteristics. To gather information about the student and class characteristics, questionnaires were administered to 1,013 sixth grade primary school students in 55 classes in Flanders, Belgium. The results of the two-level regression analysis indicate that students’ interpersonal citizenship skills are mainly explained by characteristics at the student level (gender, home language, and parents’ country of birth). At the class level, only ethnic diversity is related to the interpersonal citizenship skills of students, favouring more ethnic diversity in the class.

German Synopsis
1. Introduction

During the past few decades, society has been challenged by sociopolitical and cultural changes, such as globalisation, neoliberalism, increasing diversity and growing multiculturalism (Dusi, Steinbach, & Messetti, 2012; Torney-Purta, 2002). These changes are associated with a gradual decrease of shared values and a strong individualisation. In the current fragmented society, many subcultures with different norms and values coexist (Geijsel, Ledoux, Reumerman, & ten Dam, 2012), which causes concerns about divisions among citizens and a reduced social cohesion (Jansen, Chioncel, & Dekkers, 2006).

In order to cope with these changes, people need a wide range of citizenship competences. This brings a renewed interest in citizenship, and particularly in the citizenship competences of young people (Lawy & Biesta, 2006). However, changes in society challenge the traditional concepts of citizenship. Traditionally, citizenship has been mainly considered from a political perspective. In this perspective, knowledge about voting, political participation, and democratic attitudes are the competences to be pursued (Campbell, 2007; Kiousis & McDevitt, 2008). However, the current diverse, individualised society requires a more social concept of citizenship to foster social cohesion (Geijsel et al., 2012). From this social perspective, citizenship is defined from the context of the civil society which emphasises relationships between citizens, the coexistence of different individuals, and the exchange of values and cultural meanings (Oser & Veugelers, 2008).

In accordance with this shift from political to social citizenship and the fact that the social domain is underexposed in empirical research (Geijsel et al., 2012), this study explores the social perspective to define citizenship competences. More specifically, citizenship competences are defined as the knowledge, skills, attitudes, and reflection needed by young people in a democratic and multicultural society to adequately fulfil social tasks that are part of their daily lives (ten Dam & Volman, 2007). In this study, the focus is in particular on the citizenship skills that are important to communicate with others, to embrace diversity, and to handle conflicts, because of their importance in fostering social cohesion.

Schools play a key role in the development of the citizenship skills of students (Dusi et al., 2012; Hoskins, Janmaat, & Villalbata, 2012; Leenders, Veugelers, & De Kat, 2008). Although research indicates that the citizenship skills of students are partially explained by characteristics at the class and school level (Isac, Maslowski, & van der Werf, 2011), most studies so far have mainly focused on students’ background characteristics such as gender,
ethnic background, age… (e.g. Cleaver, Ireland, Kerr, & Lopes, 2005; Torney-Purta, 2002). Consequently, it is still unclear which specific school and class characteristics are related to differences in students’ citizenship skills (Hoskins et al., 2012; ten Dam, Dijkstra, Geijsel, Ledoux, & van der Veen, 2010).

In educational effectiveness research, composition characteristics are treated as important variables for explaining the differences in both cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes of students (Denessen, Driessen, & Bakker, 2010; Driessen, 2007). With regard to the development of citizenship skills, school and class composition are also expected to have an influence. After all, citizenship skills are learned through social practices, collaboration, and exchange of experiences; and these experiences differ for groups with different background characteristics (Geboers, Geijsel, Admiraal, Jorgensen, & ten Dam, 2015; ten Dam et al., 2010). However, the few studies that have already taken school and class composition characteristics into account when explaining differences in citizenship skills have produced inconclusive results (Dijkstra, Geijsel, Ledoux, van der Veen, & ten Dam, 2015; ten Dam et al., 2010).

Accordingly, the aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between composition characteristics and the interpersonal citizenship skills of students.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1 Interpersonal citizenship skills

Increased levels of diversity in society reinforce the formation of more and more subcultures which live separately in the society. This new pluriform context fosters individualisation and affects the social cohesion of society (Geijsel et al., 2012). However, the impact of globalisation, individualisation, and diversity causes a shift in the interpretation of social cohesion. In the current society, social cohesion can no longer be interpreted as trying to achieve a consensus on fundamental values and norms to reproduce the social order, but has to be seen as coping with diversity and widespread dissent. Social cohesion then depends on the social interactions of people, the communication about different meanings and opinions (Jansen et al., 2006), and the ability of citizens to function in diverse contexts (ten Dam & Volman, 2007).

In this context, the social perspective of citizenship is of increasing importance, because this perspective provides the opportunity to focus on the coexistence of citizens and the interactions between citizens (Geboers, Geijsel, Admiraal, & ten Dam, 2013). Various authors stress the importance of citizenship skills, such as helping each other, dealing properly with
others, and handling conflicts and differences (ten Dam, Dijkstra, & Janmaat, 2016), because citizens need to be able to communicate with diverse social groups with different values and opinions (Schuitema, ten Dam, & Veugelers, 2007).

This study focuses in particular on the kind of skills relating to interaction and communication between individuals and different groups because these are of greater importance in the current fragmented society (Jansen et al., 2006; ten Dam et al., 2016). In this study, these skills are summarised as interpersonal citizenship skills.

### 2.2 Class composition

In line with the increasing societal diversity, schools are also becoming increasingly diverse (Dusi et al., 2012). Students from different socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds are not equally distributed across schools (Dewulf, van Braak, & Van Houtte, 2017). This causes the existence of big social-ethnic differences in school populations, which can influence students’ learning outcomes (De Fraine, 2004). Effectiveness studies confirm the role of compositional effects on the cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes of students (Denessen et al., 2010; Driessen, 2007). Compositional effects can be defined as the impact that being part of a specific group with certain background characteristics has on specified outcomes (van Ewijk & Sleegers, 2010). Compositional characteristics that are often investigated are gender composition, average socioeconomic status (SES), ethnic share, and ethnic diversity. Although the relationship between these composition characteristics and the citizenship skills of students has so far been studied by some authors, results are inconclusive (Dijkstra et al., 2015; Geijsel et al., 2012; ten Dam et al., 2010).

The studies that took gender composition into account show a positive relationship between gender composition and citizenship knowledge and the interethnic tolerance of students, favouring students in classrooms with more female students (Isac et al., 2011; Kokkonen, Esaiasson, & Gilljam, 2010). They indicate that further research is needed to investigate the relationship with other citizenship outcomes (Isac et al., 2011), such as citizenship skills.

The mean SES of students in a classroom is often used as a proxy for the social composition of the class. Ten Dam et al. (2010) and Dijkstra et al. (2015) measured the mean SES of students by means of the percentage of students of parents with low education and find no relationship with students’ citizenship skills. Isac, Maslowski, Creemers and van der Werf (2014) found a positive relationship with citizenship knowledge and the intended participation
in political and social activities. More specifically, students from schools with a higher mean SES tend more to participate in social and political activities.

*Ethnic share* refers to the proportion of migrant students in the class (Veerman, van de Werfhorst, & Dronkers, 2013). Ten Dam et al. (2010) use the country of birth of the mother to measure the ethnic share of the class. Their results indicate that the proportion of immigrant students in the class has no impact on students’ citizenship skills.

*Ethnic diversity* refers to the variety of ethnic groups in the class (Dronkers & Vandeveldt, 2010). Authors who already investigated the relationship between ethnic diversity and citizenship skills have generated contrasting results. On the one hand, some argue that ethnic diversity fosters conflicts in the classroom and avoidance behaviour (Lindo, 2008; Lindo & Pratsinakis, 2007). On the other hand, some authors stress that ethnic diversity is associated with less prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), or they find no relationship between ethnic diversity and citizenship skills (Dijkstra et al., 2015; ten Dam et al., 2010).

Although these studies provide some important insights into the relationship between school and class composition characteristics and citizenship competences, results are still inconclusive (Dijkstra et al., 2015). Furthermore, none of the studies concentrate on interpersonal citizenship skills in particular. Consequently, this research examines the relationship between composition characteristics and interpersonal citizenship skills. To investigate this relationship, the focus is at the class level because effectiveness research emphasises the dominance of class level effects above effects at school level (Kyriakides, Campbell, & Gagatsis, 2000).

### 3. Research aim

This study aims to identify which class composition characteristics are related to differences in the interpersonal citizenship skills of primary school students, with a particular focus on gender class composition, social class composition, ethnic share, and ethnic diversity. In so doing, some important student background characteristics, such as gender, SES, home language, and parents’ country of birth, are taken into account.
4. Method

4.1 Sample

In order to measure the interpersonal citizenship skills of primary school students, 1,013 sixth-grade students in 55 classes at 54 primary schools in Flanders (the northern part of Belgium) took part in the study. Data was gathered by student researchers between October and December 2017. A convenience sampling method was used, which implies that researchers were free to choose schools without any specified criteria. 49.6% of the surveyed students were male and 50.4% were female. Their ages ranged from ten to thirteen years old (M=11.04, SD=0.49).

4.2 Measures

4.2.1 Dependent variable

The dependent variable ‘interpersonal citizenship skills’ was measured by means of the Citizenship Competences Questionnaire (CCQ) of ten Dam, Geijsel, Reumerman and Ledoux (2010). The questionnaire included 94 items measuring four components of citizenship competences, which are: knowledge, skills, attitudes and reflection. In this study, only citizenship skills are taken into account. The 15 citizenship skills items measure the degree to which students perceive themselves to have the skills to act democratically, to act in a socially responsible manner, to deal with conflicts, and to deal with differences. Students were asked to provide their answers via ratings on 4-point Likert-type scale, ranging from ‘not good at all’ to ‘very good’. The basic form of the questions was ‘how good are you at…’, followed by, for instance: ‘finding a solution that everyone is satisfied with for a conflict?’

Ten Dam et al. (2010) distinguish four scales for measuring citizenship skills; however, these scales are measured by only 3 to 5 items, which is too limited for a reliable scale. Therefore, an exploratory factor analysis was used to explore the structure of the data. This analysis revealed two dimensions for measuring citizenship skills. The first dimension consists of 3 items with a Cronbach’s alpha of $\alpha = .67$ and can be summarised as intrapersonal citizenship skills. The second dimension contains 12 items and has a Cronbach’s alpha of $\alpha = .84$. The items of this dimension can be summarised as interpersonal citizenship skills and are the focus of this study. Appendix A gives an overview of the items used to measure interpersonal citizenship skills.
4.2.2 Independent variables

Student level. Data about the students was gathered by means of a student background questionnaire, taking into account the following characteristics:

- gender (boy = 0; girl = 1);
- home language (Dutch = 1; French = 2; Turkish = 3; English = 4; Moroccans/Berbers = 5; other language = 6);
- country of birth of the parents (mother and father born in Belgium = 0; at least one parent born in a country other than Belgium = 1);
- highest educational level of the mother (no education = 1; primary education = 2; secondary education = 3; higher education = 4).

The highest educational level of the mother was used as a proxy indicator of SES. At student level, the home language was recorded as a binary variable (Dutch = 0, other language = 1).

Class level. Class composition variables were calculated based on data retrieved from the student background questionnaires. Gender class composition was measured by the percentage of girls in the class. Social class composition was based on the classroom average of the highest educational level of the students’ mother. When measuring the ethnic composition of a class, a distinction can be made between ‘ethnic share’ and ‘ethnic diversity’ (Dronkers & Van der Velden, 2010). Ethnic share refers to the proportion of migrant children in the class and, in this study, was measured by means of the proportion of non-native speakers. Students were categorised as non-native speakers when they spoke at least one language other than Dutch at home. Ethnic diversity was based on the amount of different ethnic groups in the class. This was measured by means of the Herfindahl index, which is calculated based on the variety of spoken home languages in the class. The formula to calculate the index was: 1 - [(proportion Dutch)^2 + (proportion French)^2 + (proportion English)^2 + (proportion Turkish)^2 + (proportion Moroccans/Berbers)^2 + (proportion other language)^2]. This yielded a value between 0 and 1, with a higher value representing more diversity in spoken home languages in the class.

The descriptive results and correlations for all the variables are presented in Table 1 (student level) and Table 2 (class level). The results show that primary school students perceive themselves as having pretty good to very good interpersonal citizenship skills (M = 3.109, SD = 0.454). Table 1 shows that the average highest educational level of students’ mothers is secondary education (M = 3.581, SD = 0.583); that 28.3% (SD = 0.451) of the students speak
another language than Dutch at home; and that 24.9% (SD = 0.433) of the students’ parents were born in a country other than Belgium.

Table 1: means, standard deviations and correlates at student level (n = 1013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M(SD)</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Gender</td>
<td>0.504(0.500)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Highest education of mother</td>
<td>3.581(0.583)</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Home language</td>
<td>0.283(0.451)</td>
<td>-.020</td>
<td>-.218**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Parents’ country of birth</td>
<td>0.249(0.433)</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>-.194**</td>
<td>.614**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Interpersonal citizenship skills</td>
<td>3.109(0.454)</td>
<td>.103**</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.103**</td>
<td>.117**</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table 2: means, minimum and maximum scores, standard deviations and correlates at class level (n = 55)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M(SD)</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Gender class composition</td>
<td>0.504(0.117)</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Average highest educational level of mother</td>
<td>3.568(0.257)</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>-.199**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Proportion of non-native speakers</td>
<td>0.287(0.204)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>-.464**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ethnic diversity</td>
<td>0.395(0.198)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>-.043</td>
<td>-.397**</td>
<td>.893**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Interpersonal citizenship skills</td>
<td>3.109(0.454)</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>-.033</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>.083**</td>
<td>.097**</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
The minima and maxima in Table 2 indicate that there is only limited variance between classes in the average highest educational level of the mother (2.83 – 4.00). The proportion of non-native speakers (0.00 – 0.94) and the ethnic diversity (0.00 – 0.80), by contrast, vary more between classes.

4.3 Analysis

The data of the sample has a hierarchical structure, which means that the students are nested in classes and the classes are nested in schools (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). In this study, the difference between the class level (55 classes) and the school level (54 schools) is very small. This could lead to confounding of class and school level and could cause standard errors and inaccurate measures (Hox, 2002). Therefore, the school level has not been taken into account, and a regression analysis with a two-level design (MLwiN 2.29) at student and class level was conducted to identify which class composition characteristics are related to students’ interpersonal citizenship skills.

Three models were tested. First, a null model without independent variables was tested to investigate whether a multilevel approach was more desirable than a single-level, linear regression analysis. In the second model, student background characteristics were added to the fixed part of the model. The third model also contains the variables at class level. Using this stepwise approach provided the opportunity of testing the additional value of each subset of variables to the model. Difference in deviance between two models was used to control for model improvement (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). More specifically, a significant decrease of the deviance between two consecutive models signifies model improvement.

5. Results

The first step of the analysis was used to verify whether a multilevel analysis or a single-level analysis was most appropriate for explaining differences in students’ interpersonal citizenship skills. Therefore, a null model was created which contained no independent student or class level variables. The intercept of 3.114 on 4 represents the mean score on interpersonal citizenship skills of all students in all of the classes. This means that students perceive themselves as having pretty good to very good interpersonal citizenship skills.

The results of the null model indicate that 93.24% of the variance is located at student level, whereas only 6.76% of the variance is due to differences at class level. The difference in deviance between the single-level model and the two-level null model shows that the null model
fits the data better ($\chi^2 = 8.594$, df = 1, p < .005). This justifies the use of multilevel analysis to model the data adequately.

In the next step of model specification (Model 1), the student characteristics – gender, highest educational level of the mother, home language, country of birth of the parents – were added as explanatory variables to the fixed part of the model. This model fitted the data significantly better than the null model ($\chi^2 = 492.585$, df = 6, p < .001). The results of Model 1 indicate that gender ($\chi^2 = 11.154$, df = 1, p < .001), home language ($\chi^2 = 4.565$, df = 1, p < .05) and parents’ country of birth ($\chi^2 = 4.092$, df = 1, p < .05) are related to the interpersonal citizenship skills of students. More specifically, girls who speak another language at home and have a parent born in a country other than Belgium have better interpersonal citizenship skills. The SES (no education: $\chi^2 = 0.788$, df = 1, p > 0.05; primary education: $\chi^2 = 0.651$, df = 1, p > 0.05; higher education: $\chi^2 = 0.422$, df = 1, p > 0.05) is not significantly related to the interpersonal citizenship skills of students.

In the last model (Model 2), class composition characteristics – gender class composition, social class composition, ethnic share and ethnic diversity – were entered in the model. This model is no significant improvement of Model 1 ($\chi^2 = 8.154$, df = 4, p > .05). At student level, gender ($\chi^2 = 12.262$, df = 1, p < .001), home language ($\chi^2 = 4.106$, df = 1, p < .05) and parents’ country of birth ($\chi^2 = 4.421$, df = 1, p < .05) are still significant. With regard to class composition variables, ethnic diversity ($\chi^2 = 4.596$, df = 1, p < 0.05) is positively related to the interpersonal citizenship skills of students. This implies that students in more ethnically diverse classrooms have better interpersonal citizenship skills. Gender class composition ($\chi^2 = 0.059$, df = 1, p > 0.05), social class composition ($\chi^2 = 3.437$, df = 1, p > 0.05) and ethnic share ($\chi^2 = 2.335$, df = 1, p > 0.05) are not significantly related to the interpersonal citizenship skills of students. Table 3 provides an overview of the model estimates.

Table 3: Multilevel parameter estimates for the two-level analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 0: null model</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.114 (0.021)</td>
<td>3.012 (0.039)</td>
<td>3.016 (0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Student background</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (ref: boy)</td>
<td>0.111*** (0.033)</td>
<td>0.118*** (0.034)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level of the mother (ref: secondary education)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education</td>
<td>-0.194 (0.219)</td>
<td>-0.138 (0.219)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education</td>
<td>-0.082 (0.102)</td>
<td>-0.071 (0.103)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>0.024 (0.036)</td>
<td>0.008 (0.038)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home language (ref: Dutch)</td>
<td>0.101* (0.047)</td>
<td>0.097* (0.048)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents’ country of birth (ref: Belgium)</td>
<td>0.104* (0.051)</td>
<td>0.110* (0.052)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Class composition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion girls</td>
<td>-0.047 (0.195)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average highest educational level of mother</td>
<td>0.180 (0.097)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion non-native speakers</td>
<td>-0.372 (0.244)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic diversity</td>
<td>0.515* (0.240)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Random</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2: class</td>
<td>0.014 (0.005)</td>
<td>0.014 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.010 (0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 1: student</td>
<td>0.193 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.175 (0.010)</td>
<td>0.175 (0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model fit</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviance (-2log)</td>
<td>1249.204</td>
<td>756.619</td>
<td>748.465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>8.594</td>
<td>492.585</td>
<td>8.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Df</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>0.0034</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1011</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>659</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001*
6. Discussion and Conclusion

Research into the role of compositional characteristics in explaining differences in citizenship skills is scarce (Dijkstra et al., 2015). The research presented here begins to close this gap in literature by focusing on the relationship between class composition and interpersonal citizenship skills of students.

The variance in the interpersonal citizenship skills of students is mainly explained by characteristics at student level, while only a limited part of the variance can be explained by class composition characteristics. These findings are consistent with previous studies that investigated the relationship between composition characteristics and students’ citizenship skills, and they confirm the limited variance explained by composition characteristics (Dijkstra et al., 2015; ten Dam et al., 2010).

With the exception of SES, all included variables at student level are significantly related to students’ interpersonal citizenship skills. The results at student level indicate that being a girl, speaking another language than Dutch at home, and having a parent born in a country other than Belgium are positively related to the interpersonal citizenship skills of students. These findings are in line with previous studies which focused on citizenship skills in general (Dijkstra et al., 2015; Geboers et al., 2015; Geijsel et al., 2012; Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Kerr, & Losito, 2010). The non-significant relation between interpersonal citizenship skills and SES is also consistent with the results of previous studies (Dijkstra et al., 2015; Geboers et al., 2015; Geijsel et al., 2012; Ledoux, Geijsel, Reumerman, & ten Dam, 2011).

With regard to class level, the results indicate that only ethnic diversity in the classroom is positively related to the interpersonal citizenship skills of students. This result is in line with the idea that ethnic diversity in the classroom gives a more natural environment for students to constantly practice living with diversity (Radstake & Leeman, 2010; ten Dam & Volman, 2007) than schools with no ethnic diversity can provide (ten Dam, Volman, van der Veen, & Zwaans, 2005). In a diverse classroom, students have more opportunities to learn how to deal with diversity, conflicts, and social tensions (Green & Wong, 2009; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) which reduces prejudice and promotes better inter-ethnic relations (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). These findings are based on Allport’s contact theory (1954), which states that if people have the opportunity to communicate with others, they will appreciate different ways of life and have better interactions. However, some authors found the opposite to be true and argue that ethnic diversity leads to more conflicts in the classroom and fosters avoidance behaviour and negative
perceptions (Lindo, 2008; Lindo & Pratsinakis, 2007). Radstake and Leeman (2010) also assert that ethnically diverse classrooms do not necessarily lead to better relations between students.

Teachers possibly play an important role in determining whether an ethnically diverse classroom has a positive or negative impact. Teachers are after all important actors in the classroom who can influence the relationship between composition characteristics and the outcomes for students (Bellens & De Fraine, 2012). Furthermore, by fostering citizenship competences, teachers are thought to be the most accountable actors (Isac et al., 2011) who influence the value development of students consciously as well as subconsciously (Leenders et al., 2008). The way in which teachers implement citizenship in the classroom largely depends on the beliefs teachers themselves hold about citizenship education and society in general (Pulinx, 2017). These beliefs are generated by teachers’ personal experiences and characteristics of the environment, which means that the educational context can influence the teachers’ beliefs (Van Maele, Van Houtte, & Forsyth, 2014). Other authors also confirm that teachers’ beliefs (Pulinx, 2017) and instruction (Opdenakker, Van Damme, & Minnaert, 2002) are influenced by composition characteristics.

However, this study does not investigate the role of the teacher in the relationship between class composition and students’ interpersonal citizenship, which is a first limitation. Further research needs to reveal what role teachers play in the relationship between compositional characteristics and the interpersonal citizenship skills of students.

A second limitation of the study is that only students completed the background questionnaires. It is possible that the information about the background of students contains errors because not all students may have known the answers for all questions. Research with additional background questionnaires completed by parents can give more accurate background information.

A final limitation is the fact that interpersonal citizenship skills are measured by means of students’ self-perception. Answers in self-perceived questionnaires are sensitive for social desirability (Ledoux, Meijer, van der Veen, Breetvelt, ten Dam, & Volman, 2013; ten Dam & Volman, 2007) and overestimation by students (Ledoux et al., 2013). Measuring the interpersonal citizenship skills of students through a test would give a more accurate view of their actual skills. In future research, it would therefore be an added value to measure the interpersonal citizenship skills of students also by means of a test.
Despite these limitations, this study contributes to the knowledge about the role of class composition in explaining differences in the interpersonal citizenship skills of students, which are essential in the current individualised society.

References


### Appendix A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Item 1</td>
<td>How good are you at letting others finish their speech?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 2</td>
<td>How good are you at listening to the reasons why others choose something else?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 3</td>
<td>How good are you at understanding how others think?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 4</td>
<td>How good are you at imagining how someone else feels and taking that into account?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 5</td>
<td>How good are you at imagining how someone else feels when you give your opinion about him or her?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 6</td>
<td>How good are you at making friends again in a conflict?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 7</td>
<td>How good are you at understanding what someone else feels in a conflict?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 8</td>
<td>How good are you at coming up with a solution that satisfies everyone in a conflict?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 9</td>
<td>How good are you at adjusting at the rules and habits of someone else?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 10</td>
<td>How good are you at acting normal in an unfamiliar environment?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 11</td>
<td>How good are you at adapting your language to the person you are talking to?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 12</td>
<td>How good are you at taking into account the wishes of others when making a decision together?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Effects of Linguistic Competencies and Civic Literacy on Political Decision-making in School – First Results of the Interdisciplinary Project, “SchriFT II”

Sabine Manzel

University of Duisburg-Essen
sabine.manzel@uni-due.de
www.cives-school.de

Claudia Luft

University of Duisburg-Essen
claudia.luft@uzni-due.de
https://www.uni-due.de/schrift/mitarbeiter.php

Keywords
decision-making, citizenship education for Turkish-speaking students, multi-lingual learners, migration research, knowledge and writing test

Abbreviations

SchriFT I and II = “Writing in Subject Lessons Including Turkish in Lower Secondary Education,” funded by the BMBF research cluster “multilingualism and language education,” https://www.uni-due.de/schrift/

BMBF = German Federal Ministry of Education and Research
Abstract
The ability to form political judgements and to make decisions is a key competence for the political participation of citizens in democracy. This study is based on the results of “SchriFT II” project, which finds that missing literal competences constitute a disadvantage for success in school and political participation, especially when connected with a migration background (multivariate analysis t(305)=-3.385, p<.001, r=.19). We assume that text-genre based epistemic writing, which connects linguistic action patterns with linguistic expressions, is an effective instrument for encouraging language and subject-integrated learning. In the pilot study, we examine the political knowledge and decision-making skills of students in secondary schools in North Rhine-Westphalia.

German Synopsis
The ability to form political judgements and to make decisions is always a requirement for politically mature actions, and the opportunity to apply conceptual political knowledge to different controversies is therefore a key competence for reasonable political participation of citizens in democracy. The competence debate in Germany led to the formulation of a model of political competence (Detjen et al. 2012) that includes four dimensions: knowledge, participation, attitudes/motivation and decision-making. Value-based decisions can be characterized as a problem-solving process that involves knowledge and a discussion of pro and cons and that leads to a final judgement or a decision for or against a political issue. Manzel & Weißeno (2017) developed this model further: they suggest that in addition to individual factors, domain-specific and general factors such as epistemological beliefs, language, and rhetoric skills influence political judgement (p. 71). The ability to argue for or against a political issue in a controversial discussion depends on civic literacy (Habermas 1978).

To enable students to take part in civic discourse, subject-specific language skills have to be imparted. In German lower secondary education, civic education is mainly an “oral” subject without written exams. Only in upper secondary education do students of civic education occasionally sit written tests. Studies show that there is a competence gap in subject-specific writing skills. In particular, students with migration backgrounds, such as Turkish immigrants or children of Turkish immigrants, as well as students with a low socioeconomic status lack the necessary language skills (Manzel & Nagel 2018, Goll et al. 2010). Domain-specific language support is a big benefit in knowledge acquisition (Weißeno & Eck 2011). Text genres and linguistic action patterns play an important role in acquiring writing skills. Linguistic action patterns, such as describing, explaining, and reasoning (Ehlich & Rehbein 1986) require specific language elements at word, sentence and text level (Becker-Mrotzek & Böttcher 2006). Such patterns have a cultural imprint, are modeled in social contexts, and serve as instruments for organizing, structuring and presenting subject knowledge. Therefore, subject learning and language learning condition one another, so that even in subject teaching the importance and function of language must be considered (Becker-Mrotzek et al. 2013, Manzel 2015, Beese & Benholz 2013).

**Theoretical Background**

Today’s mass media report on political, economic and social issues. A so-called fourth power, their function is not only to inform the public, but also to articulate public opinion as well as to control and criticize politicians and other social and economic actors. As the OECD (2018)
states, media literacy is essential for citizens and must be developed in school to enable students to draw on and combine the disciplinary knowledge and modes of thinking acquired in schools in order to ask questions, analyze data and arguments, explain phenomena, and develop a position concerning a local, global or cultural issue (Boix Mansilla & Jackson 2011).

Media literacy is defined as the ability to access, analyze and critically evaluate media messages, as well as to create new media content (Buckingham 2007, Kellner & Share 2005). Media content is transferred via audio, video or texts. In general, texts are used in different contexts, and they play an important role in human communication and interaction. With domain-specific texts, people not only transfer and produce knowledge but also reflect on it.

The theory of functional pragmatic linguistics focuses on texts that are typical in a particular domain to identify typical language procedures in order to improve knowledge acquisition and language skills. But “only the understanding of the content of a text can transfer information into knowledge and helps to construct a net of meaningful context knowledge” (Mandl et al. 1998, p. 6). The understanding of a text depends on the producer, the recipient, and the communication context. Therefore, a text is not a random product (Püschel 1997), but the result of cognitive processes, selection strategies, and language procedures.

Brinker (2005) defines texts as “a limited series of linguistic symbols, which are themselves coherent and have a communicative function” (p. 17). If texts contain similar characteristics, forms, and aims, and if they are used in similar communication contexts, then they can be categorized as special types of texts. Fix (2000) states that members of a social or cultural community use special types of texts routinely (p. 55f.). They use internalized linguistic patterns and typical wordings. In the sphere of politics and the mass media, there is a large spectrum of types of texts (Klein 2011, p. 289).

For political learning processes, two types of texts are relevant: assertive und directive texts. Assertive texts provide information (Rolf 1993). Political issues, problems, and processes are described and explained. Examples are news items, reports, articles in magazines, or interviews. Directive texts are intended to encourage or move readers towards an action, or to discourage or steer them away from it, e.g. laws, proclamation and leaflets.

Domain-specific language education is structured by a systematic classification and connection of cognitive functions, knowledge processing, and linguistic action patterns (Redder 2013). Successful learning in politics manifests in political knowledge and in the ability to argue and to make decisions, amongst other competencies (Detjen et al. 2012, p. 29f., Weißeno 2010). While knowledge comprises single facts and data, conceptual knowledge combines elements
of different data and different contexts into meaningful knowledge. Technical terms are connected via language and can build a semantic network. Students can show this ability in producing coherence (proven, for example, with texts in other domains Becker-Mrotzek et al. 2015).

But each domain and each type of text requires different linguistic action patterns which need to be practiced in subject lessons. To articulate one’s own standpoint, to argue for or against a political issue, or indeed to make a decision, students use linguistic action patterns such as describing, explaining, arguing, reasoning and critical thinking, which count among the core competencies of discourse (Vollmer 2011). In this study, the focus is on the identification of four cognitive-linguistic action patterns: naming, describing, explaining, and reasoning. In contrast to the discourse function of “describing,” the discourse function of “naming” does not need to characterize events, processes and facts with regard of their function and relationship. It is more about identifying a context, about selecting a single piece of information out of a mass of phenomena, or about collecting relevant facts out of a number of similar events by using adequate linguistic patterns (i.e., labeling) (Vollmer 2011, p. 5).

The discourse function of “describing” incorporates comparisons of domain-specific facts, problems, and issues, alongside given characteristics, e.g. the functioning of a government. In SchriFT I, students had to decode information from graphs or tables in order to explain political issues and interrelations to a person who did not know anything about them.

The discourse function of “explaining” involves the naming and explaining of backgrounds and origins of situations, phenomena, or processes (ibid., p. 7). Typical discourse functions in the field of politics are designed to systematically describe complex political issues in order to explain the structure of a political system or process, such as: a) laws; b) the function and effect of political issues; c) the role of political actors with their interests and aims; and d) decision-making processes where positions diverge based on values and other effects. Patterns of explanation can contain causal or modal elements (“It is about democracy because people can vote”) or can relate to effects (consecutive) and aims (“A party needs politicians, who are elected to represent the opinion of the party in public.”).

Those action patterns require specific language elements at word, sentence and text level (Becker-Mrotzek & Böttcher 2006). The linguistic action patterns of “reasoning” are characterized by comprehensible action steps (Gohl 2006), action-justification (Ehlich & Rehbein 1986), position-taking by using subject-specific concepts, and the reconstitution of deviant positions (Tindale 2013).
Empirical Findings

Theoretical thinking about the connection between subject language, content knowledge, and motivation/interest has been systematically put on the agenda of the didactics of politics since 2013 (see Oleschko & Manzel 2015, Manzel 2015, Weißeno 2013). Richter (2006) presented a research approach for working towards civic reading competence for students in which she mentioned the endeavor of modeling a writing competence also for the teachers (p. 55).

Weißeno & Eck (2012) show that especially students with migration backgrounds can be supported in their knowledge acquisition via fostering domain-specific language skills. But in general, they do have lower results in political knowledge tests (Goll, Eck, Richter & Weißeno 2010) and in writing tests exploring their common language skills (Haag, Böhme & Stanat 2012, Schwippert, Wendt & Tarelli 2012). There are also negative gender effects. Girls have better language competencies than boys (Phillip 2015, p. 43). But in the content knowledge test in the subject of politics, there are divergent findings regarding gender (Boeser 2002, Oberle 2012, Weißeno & Eck 2013). Additionally, the effect of motivation and political interest is proven to have a positive effect on knowledge acquisition (Weißeno & Landwehr 2015, 2017).

Oleschko (2017) compares graphs and tables used in teaching materials in history, politics and geography lessons, but the interdisciplinarity of the subjects impedes a didactical approach to drawing conclusions regarding the subject of politics in isolation. Michalak, Lemke & Goeke (2015) discovered large language and content heterogeneities in their case studies through the use of graphs (p. 134).

Pilot of SchriFT II

The aim of the main study is to examine the effects of developing writing skills via a “types of texts” approach on political decision-making and judgement. Before implementing the intervention through argumentative discussions (pre–post-design), two instruments, a knowledge test and a writing test in the subject (two versions each, test A and test B) were tested in a pilot study. The political knowledge test of SchriFT I, based on the POWIS scale, was too difficult for the students in grade 7 and 8, and only reached reliabilities of Cronbach’s alpha = .66, so new test items were constructed. The new scales of the knowledge test were constructed around the four topics of democracy, the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany, the environment, and child labor. Test A contained 32 items, test B contained 26
items. In the writing test, students had to solve four tasks using the three linguistic action patterns (describing, explaining and reasoning) for two topics: child labor (A) and environment (B).

The research focus is on the following questions: What level of political knowledge and civic literacy do students in grade 7 and grade 8 have? What kind of linguistic action patterns do they use to make a decision in a political controversy? What level of writing skills do they have?

Table 1: Test instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test</th>
<th>scales</th>
<th>format</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge Test: 32 items</td>
<td>- democracy</td>
<td>paper pencil test with multiple choice</td>
<td>Item analysis, Quantitative analysis (SPSS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A) 26 items (B)</td>
<td>- political system Germany</td>
<td>single select items</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- environment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- child work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing Test: text and 4</td>
<td>- child labour</td>
<td></td>
<td>Qualitative analysis, category based with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tasks</td>
<td>- environment</td>
<td></td>
<td>anchor examples Rater: N = 5 (collaborative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>organized) IRR: k = 0.2 - 0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-Test</td>
<td>paper pencil test</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES-Questionnaire</td>
<td>paper pencil test</td>
<td>quantitative analysis (SPSS) t-tests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation Questionnaire</td>
<td>paper pencil test</td>
<td>quantitative analysis (SPSS) t-tests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Interest in politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Interest in child labour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Interest in environment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first sample of the pilot contained 7 classes (grades 7 and 8) of 4 secondary schools in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) with a sample size of 166 students altogether. Of these, 87 students took part in test version A, and 78.3% of this group had a migration background. 79 students took part in test version B, and 72.6% of this group had a migration background.

Results

The quantitative analysis of the knowledge test showed that both content knowledge tests (A and B) were comparable, but that the items were too easy to answer (mean of correct answers: 70%). This might have been due to the proximity to fifth and sixth graders’ knowledge. The best items of the test were selected (reliability, IRT WrightMap) and put together with some new items out of the questionnaire of the commission of federal countries for education planning and research funding (Abs et al. 2007) into one new knowledge test with 33 items for
a second pilot test. In the second pilot with N=207 students, reliability increased to a Cronbach’s alpha = .776. Item difficulty was normally distributed (mean 44.38, SD 16.1).

The writing tests were analyzed qualitatively by five trained raters with a category-based manual including anchor examples. The validity of the category system for evaluating the high-inference coding increased noticeably in the second pilot from k =.04 up to k =.07.

![Image of a political judgement in writing test A](image)

The example in Figure 1 shows the results of a very good student who reached 20 of 28 points. The translation is as follows: “In my opinion, it’s partially yes and partially no. Partially yes, because children need their childhood in order to gather experiences. Children should have a nice start to their life and should enjoy it. Children shouldn’t have to start to work and to worry about money at a young age. Partially also no, because there is a reason. The families need money, and the children help with that. So, my opinion is divided, but if I had to make a decision, I would say that it should be illegal because children need their childhood.” Thus, in the introduction, he cannot clearly position himself, partly because of the different perspectives that he is considering. He names the family and children as political actors, and he cites money and the financial situation as a driving motive. In his reasoning, his value is justice. The student weighs up his arguments and uses modal verbs (would, should) as well as several conjunctions (because, and, but, in order to).
But in general, the results in writing test A were low. In the mean, students achieved only 34% of all points. On average, girls achieved more points than boys, but the significance is weak (p = .074). Students without a migration background achieved better results than first-generation migrant students, and there is also a significant difference between first- and second-generation migrant students.

We found positive correlations between the grade achieved in the subject of politics and the writing test results, especially in the reasoning task. Students had an independent opinion of their own (73.1%), but just 19.5% considered an opposing position, and even fewer students used arguments to dispute their own position (9.8%). 78% of the surveyed students did not use political values to argue. With regard to linguistic action patterns, 52.4% of students used the type of “cohesion” once, and 42.7% used it at least twice. We also found positive correlations between subject-specific knowledge and writing competence (reasoning) of .344**, p < 001. These are moderate hints in support of the assumption that political knowledge is a basis for domain-specific literacy.

Having confirmed the validity of both test instruments, we began the intervention proper in politics lessons. In particular, we expected that scaffolding approaches with the three phases of the genre cycle (deconstruction, joint construction, independent construction, see Knapp & Callaghan 1989) would improve the individual writing skills of the students in a given subject.

Figure 2: Genre cycle (Callaghan & Knapp 1989, Martin & Rose 2005)
Other test instruments for the main study were the C-test for general language competencies and an SES-questionnaire. The project was embedded in the interdisciplinary project SchriFT II and aimed to investigate transfer effects. First, best practices with the material were developed (Luft et al. 2015, 20017, free download under www.cives-school.de); moreover, teacher training courses were conducted as an integral part of the project.

References


147


Indicators of (In)Tolerance Among European Young People: An Assessment of Measurement Invariance in ICCS 2016

Maria Magdalena Isac
University of Groningen
m.m.isac@rug.nl

Laura Palmerio
INVALSI
laura.palmerio@invalsi.it

M.P.C. (Greetje) van der Werf
University of Groningen
m.p.c.van.der.werf@rug.nl

Keywords
Tolerance; Measurement Invariance; International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS); International Large-Scale Assessments
Abstract

This contribution is an executive summary of the draft article “Indicators of (In)Tolerance among European Young People: An Assessment of Measurement Invariance in ICCS 2016” which was presented at the EARLI SIG 13 and InZentIM Conference 2018 on “Migration, Social Transformation, and Education for Democratic Citizenship.” A subsequent version of the background article is under consideration for publication in a journal. Further information can be obtained from the first author upon request.

The work considers the topic of tolerance as an important goal of those European education policies that focus on education for democratic citizenship. It argues that cross-cultural comparability must be empirically assessed and ensured to enable the measurement of highly relevant indicators that serve to monitor inter-European and international differences in young people’s tolerant attitudes. Using data provided by the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS, 2016), we examine the extent to which average comparisons of European cross-national differences in young people’s tolerant attitudes toward immigrants, ethnic/racial groups, and gender equality, are empirically justified. Results of multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) show that cross-cultural comparability can be achieved with some modifications. We conclude by providing information on further scale refinement and improvement.

German Synopsis


Der Beitrag betrachtet das Thema der Toleranz als wichtiges Ziel der europäischen Bildungspolitiken, die den Schwerpunkt demokratische Bürgerschaft haben. Es wird erörtert, dass kulturübergreifende Vergleichbarkeit empirisch bewertet und sichergestellt werden muss, um die Messung von wichtigen Merkmalen, die der Beobachtung von innereuropäischen und internationalen Unterschieden in der Toleranzhaltung von Jugendlichen dienen, zu ermöglichen.

Background

In brief, the theoretical part of the article reflected on the following points:

In the European context, which faces the challenge of unprecedented levels of migration, the monitoring and promotion of tolerance (tolerance being broadly defined as respect, acceptance and appreciation of diversity (UNESCO 1995) is an essential part of policies focused on education for democratic citizenship and human rights (Council of Europe 2017; European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice 2017; European Council 2015). Therefore, comparative studies gauging the extent of cross-national differences in young people’s tolerance levels are a key requirement.

The Civic Education Study (CIVED, 1999) and the International Civic and Citizenship Education Studies (ICCS, 2009 and 2016) (Schulz et al. 2010, 2018; Torney-Purta et al. 2001) conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) are among the most informative studies that serve to chart tolerant attitudes among young people in an international and European comparative context. For example, they investigate young people’s beliefs about equal rights and opportunities for different groups in society based on gender, ethnic/racial status, and immigration background (Schulz 2016).

Yet a large body of research warns about the risks associated with directly comparing scores on constructs of interest across educational systems, especially in the context of international large-scale assessments (ILSAs) such as ICCS (He and Van de Vijver 2013; Rutkowski and Rutkowski 2017). Meaningful comparisons of means across countries require that the construct is understood and operationalized in a similar way in each context. Nevertheless, measurement instruments can be sensitive to cultural, linguistic, and geographic differences. For this reason, secondary users of data collected in such studies are urged to test the assumption of cross-cultural comparability or measurement invariance before proceeding to cross-national comparisons.

Against this background, this study examined the extent to which average comparisons of cross-national differences in young people’s levels of tolerance toward immigrants using data from the ICCS 2016 study are justified. The theoretical part included a literature review on three main topics. First, main theoretical perspectives on the conceptualization and measurement of tolerance concept (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Côté & Erickson, 2009; Forst, 2003; Gibson, 2006, 2013; Green, Preston, & Janmaat, 2006; Mutz, 2001; Van Driel, Darmody, & Kerzil, 2016; Van Zalk et al., 2013; Weldon, 2006); second, the state of the art regarding the
concept of measurement invariance and methods for measurement invariance testing with ILSA data (e.g. Brown, 2014; Byrne & Van de Vijver, 2010; Kim, Cao, Wang, & Nguyen, 2017; Marsh et al., 2017; Millsap, 2011; Putnick & Bornstein, 2016; Rutkowski & Svetina, 2017); and third, insights from previous research on measurement invariance as applied to tolerant attitudes in previous IEA civic and citizenship education studies (e.g. Miranda & Castillo, 2018; Munck, Barber, & Torney-Purta, 2017).

**Methods**

The main characteristics of the strategy used for data analysis in the article were as follows:

We used data from the fourteen European countries that participated in the European Module of the ICCS 2016 study (Losito et al. 2018; Schulz et al. 2016), where students completed questionnaires exploring their attitudes toward equal rights for immigrants, attitudes toward equal rights for all ethnic/racial groups, and attitudes toward gender equality. In total, data from 51,040 students clustered in fourteen European countries was included in the research.

Based on ICCS 2016 study data, the construct of “tolerance” was defined and measured as young people’s beliefs about equal political and cultural rights and opportunities for (three) different groups in society based on immigration background, ethnic/racial status and gender (Schulz et al. 2016a). Three scales were used to measure this three-dimensional construct: a) student attitudes toward equal rights for immigrants, b) student attitudes toward equal rights for all ethnic/racial groups, and c) student attitudes toward gender equality. Student attitudes towards equal rights for immigrants were captured by items focusing on civil and political liberties such as equal rights to education, rights to linguistic and cultural diversity, and the right to vote. Similar sets of indicators, tailored to rights and opportunities relevant for each of the groups, were used to capture tolerant attitudes toward ethnic/racial groups (e.g., equal opportunities for labor market participation) and toward gender equality (e.g., equal opportunities for political participation). Different levels of agreement with these items were measured by means of a 4-point Likert scale.

Data preparation was conducted with the IEA IDB analyzer (IEA 2017) and IBM SPSS Statistics 23.00 (IBM Corp. 2015). All CFA and MGCFA analyses were performed in Mplus 7.4 (L. K. Muthén and Muthén 2017), taking into account the complex survey design on the ICCS 2016 study.
We applied multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) (Jöreskog 1971; Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998) to assess whether comparisons of average scale scores across fourteen European countries participating in the ICCS 2016 study could be made with confidence. We took into account the ordered categorical character of the data and followed the most recent guidelines for model fit evaluation (Rutkowski and Svetina 2017). The assessment of measurement invariance involved the comparison of three competing nested models, namely: configural, metric, and scalar models (Brown 2014; Putnick and Bornstein 2016). The configural invariance model tested if the instrument measured the same latent factors and if the set of items associated with each factor was similar across countries. The metric invariance model tested whether the factors had the same meaning and the same measurement unit in all groups. The scalar invariance model tested, in addition to equal item loadings, that item thresholds (the levels of the categorical items) were equal in all countries. Reaching the level of scalar measurement invariance was taken as an indication that valid cross-country comparisons of factor scores (scale means) are defensible.

We also tested the robustness of our findings by means of subgroup analysis (e.g. testing whether the comparisons were defensible also within four subgroups of country clusters that showed similarities in terms of linguistic, geographic, and cultural characteristics) and by comparing results of the MGCFA with the ones obtained with alternative, less strict methods (i.e. the alignment method) (B. Muthén and Asparouhov 2014).

Results

The main results obtained can be summarized as follows:

Preliminary country-specific analyses pointed out three items (one for each of the three factors) with low factor loadings in a majority of countries. These items were: “Members of all ethnic/racial groups should be encouraged to run in elections for political office;” “Men and women should have equal opportunities to take part in government;” and, “Immigrants should have the opportunity to continue speaking their own language.” These items were excluded from further analyses.

Results of measurement invariance analysis pointed to the achievement of full scalar invariance with the implication that average scores based on the three interrelated scales can be validly compared across the European educational systems under investigation. These findings were largely corroborated by the robustness analyses (i.e. comparisons with results from the country cluster analysis and the alignment method).
Model-based scale reliabilities for three scales were above .800 in all countries, ranging from 0.809 to 0.960. These estimates suggest high reliability of the three latent variables underlying the three sets of observed indicators (items). In addition, the scales proved to be particularly reliable in most of the Nordic countries (i.e. Finland, Norway and Sweden), with the reliability measure well above 0.900 for the scales capturing attitudes toward equal rights for all ethnic/racial groups and attitudes toward gender equality, and above 0.880 for the scale capturing attitudes toward equal rights for immigrants.

Model-based item loadings, representing indicator reliability, were well above the .500 for all scales and countries, ranging from 0.577 to 0.966. This finding indicated sufficient indicator reliability. Yet, findings were diverse across countries. Item reliability was high (above 0.780, on average) and rather consistent across countries for the attitudes toward equal rights for all ethnic/racial groups and attitudes toward gender equality scales. In contrast, on the scale measuring attitudes toward equal rights for immigrants, some items were clearly stronger than others. More specifically, the strongest indicator of the scale in the majority of countries was the item: “<Immigrant> children should have the same opportunities for education that other children in the country have,” with item loadings exceeding .800, while the weakest indicator was the item: “<Immigrants> should have the opportunity to continue their own customs and lifestyle,” with item loadings ranging from 0.577 to 0.720.

Results also revealed that the three factors are connected with strong associations in most countries, with an average correlation of 0.600. This was especially true for the associations of attitudes toward equal rights for immigrants with attitudes toward equal rights for all ethnic/racial groups. More specifically, across the fourteen countries, associations of attitudes toward equal rights for immigrants with attitudes toward equal rights for all ethnic/racial groups ranged from 0.465 to 0.748, with an average of 0.628.

Conclusions

The most important findings highlighted by this research were:

The results obtained pointed out that cross-cultural comparability can be achieved for (most items of) these scales with data from the ICCS 2016 study among the fourteen investigated countries. More specifically, results of measurement invariance tests using MGCFA pointed to the achievement of full scalar invariance, with the implication that average scores based on three interrelated scales (attitudes toward equal rights for immigrants, attitudes toward equal rights for all ethnic/racial groups, and attitudes toward gender equality) can be...
validly compared across the educational systems under investigation. These findings were largely corroborated by robustness analyses.

In addition, the country cluster-specific analyses indicated that cross-country comparisons are defensible also among more homogeneous groupings of countries, and that these comparisons are particularly strong in the “Nordic” and “Western” European clusters of countries. Such findings may be due to greater closeness between these countries in terms of, for example, their linguistic similarity, democratic tradition, and/or experience with immigration and integration policies.

Moreover, the analysis also revealed information relevant for further scale refinement that could be considered, especially in the developmental phases of future ICCS studies. First, corroborating existing assumptions from previous research (Miranda and Castillo 2018), we confirmed that tolerant attitudes toward immigrants are one aspect of a larger three-dimensional concept encompassing three (correlated) factors: attitudes toward equal rights for immigrants, attitudes toward equal rights for all ethnic/racial groups and attitudes toward gender equality. Second, in line with previous findings (Munck et al. 2017), we showed that items capturing cultural aspects of tolerance toward immigrants (e.g. endorsing rights to linguistic and cultural diversity) are either unreliable in most countries or show substantial variability in terms of factor loadings.

References


Forst, R. (2003). Toleration, justice and reason. In C. McKinnon & D. Castiglione (Eds.), The culture of tolerance in diverse societies (pp. 71–85). Retrieved from


Upstream With Tiny Oars: Promoting Citizenship Education Within a Non-democratic Culture and in Low-cognitive-demand School Settings

César Guadalupe

Universidad del Pacifico (Peru)
CA.GuadalupeM@up.edu.pe

Keywords

citizenship education; abstract thinking; school cognitive demands; parochialism; cognitive bias

Abstract

This text draws on the Peruvian case to illustrate that the achievement of goals relating to citizenship education requires the concomitant development of abstract thinking skills, overcoming parochial biases, and the provision of a rich learning environment. These elements become particularly relevant where the social settings are not characterised by attributes that are conducive to these types of learning. Thus, citizenship education efforts will be fostered or restrained by factors within and outside of the school setting that go well beyond the scope of typical civic education initiatives.

German Synopsis

Introduction

Social sciences have addressed, from very different perspectives, the relationship between how a society operates, including its political dimension, and its educational systems. Some authors have stressed the socialising attributes of education, focusing on how schooling plays a role in making people internalise society’s values and rules (Berger & Luckmann, 1984; Parsons, 1959) and, consequently, considering schools as a ‘reflection’ of society (Durkheim, 1951, p. 373). Others have suggested that in order to modify a society, the education of its young people is a critical task, as illustrated in Mandela’s frequently quoted statement, ‘Education is the most powerful weapon we can use to change the world.’

It goes without saying that this relationship is much more complex than any unidirectional link, not only because those who educate should, in turn, be educated (Marx, 1845, para. 3), but also because this relationship entails both a contextual and an intentional component (Apple, 2012, 2013). Thus, in order to unravel this relationship, we need a sociologically-informed approach that focuses on cultural elements and their linkages with the institutional and political world as advanced by Archer (1995b, 1995a), and illustrated by her empirical study of the origins of educational systems (2013). Such an approach takes social reproduction and social change (continuity and change) as realities equally calling for an explanatory effort.

The pages that follow arise from a long-held interest in how education is related to the weaknesses of the Peruvian democratic polity and some attributes of Peru’s political culture. This paper has been written in a peculiar context where we can celebrate that our last coup d’état happened 26 years ago and that the authoritarian government established through it ended 18 years ago; yet, Peruvian democracy does not show many elements of maturity and, on the contrary, shows several signs of poor health. Moreover, this situation clearly illustrates that the unusually successful cycle of economic growth experienced by the country since the beginning of the twenty-first century falls short of what we need to create a decent life for everyone, since economic growth has not been accompanied by anything that could resemble institutional development.

While this paper is rooted in the Peruvian situation and illustrated by Peruvian realities, it connects some conceptual elements in order to provide an interpretative framework that can

---

be useful in other contexts, not only to understand important issues relating to democratic education, but also to promote citizenship education in general.

**Democracy in Peru: Franchise and Much More**

Democracy is not only a political regime that enables its citizens to authorise governments and enact a legal system to regulate their public affairs. Democracy is also a way of living together based upon internalising and asserting that we are all citizens *because* we are all equals in the dignity and liberties (and consequent responsibilities) associated with our human condition. Thus, democracy is, essentially, a universal value (Sen, 1999) because we are all human beings.24

Several authors have identified evidence of the weak presence of democratic values in Peruvian society. For instance, Abugattás (1983) highlights how difficult it can be for Peru to become a republic comprising citizens in the classical sense because social interactions are usually founded in parochial identities (which prioritise individual’s own small groups, groups he calls mini-corporations, in order to safeguard the supremacy of parochial interests). Vergara (2013) has identified several critical issues in the connections between the condition of individuals as citizens and the polity that supposedly guarantees it: a republic. Everyday debates on public issues both at national and local levels seem to be consistent with Abugattás’ views and are also illustrative of the issues highlighted by Vergara.

While a detailed, long, and probably tedious debate on this issue is feasible, for the purposes of this paper, consulting the results of the Peruvian participation in the AmericasBarometer (for the adult population) and in the *International Civic and Citizenship Study* (ICCS) (for students) should suffice to assert that democratic values do not seem to be deep-seated in Peruvian society. One illustration, including data from other Latin American countries, is depicted in Figure 1 to allow for a better grasp the of the issue.

---

24 Claiming that all humans are equal in dignity and liberties is a recent phenomenon in human history. It relates to what Singer identifies as an ethical ‘expanding circle’ (2011). Initial forms of democracy limited citizenship to free adult men (classical Greece). Later forms limited franchise to those who paid taxes (most Western democracies in the nineteenth century). Women’s rights started to be acknowledged from the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and even today, several minorities are still deprived of elemental forms of recognition (even in countries like France, where citizens from the Basque country cannot choose for their child a name using the diacritic tilde on top of an ‘n’ as in Iñaki—a common Basque name—or a Breton can hardly find a school where children are instructed in their Breton mother tongue, both in the name of the *nation française*). Human Rights were adopted as a universal legal instrument in December 1948, but even this declaration is, sometimes, contested, not to mention ignored, under many circumstances.
Figure 1: Percentage of individuals who would accept a dictatorship if it brings order and security. Adult population (LAPOP) and grade eight students (ICCS). 2016/17. Selected Latin American countries.
Sources: AmericasBarometer/LAPOP data taken from Carrión & Zárate (2018); ICCS data retrieved from the ICCS Latin American report (Schulz, Ainley, Cox, & Friedman, 2018). Other ICCS data is also available (Schulz et al., 2017). Peruvian ICCS results are compiled in Perú: Ministerio de Educación (2018b). Standard errors not included to facilitate presentation of the data.

At the same time, an original study carried out by the Peruvian Ministry of Education (Perú: Ministerio de Educación, 2018a) shows that most sixth-grade students facing a set of democracy-related moral dilemmas choose options that are not necessarily aligned with the principles of liberal democracy, but that are more consistent with, for instance, grounding the idea of rights in conditions that are lacking or needy but always concrete. Only one in four students systematically shows a pattern of responses that are more consistent with seeing democracy as stemming from a universal human condition and asserting, therefore, the importance of institutions as the rule of law that puts individuals on an equal footing.25

Some studies based on class observations (Ames, 1999; Eguren & de Belaúnde, 2012; Guadalupe, 2015; Rodríguez & Domínguez, 2009) also show several attributes exemplifying how students see social life and politics that are problematic, to say the least, from a perspective of asserting democratic values. Moreover, these studies suggest that social representations

---

25 This analysis was based on classifying the pattern of responses to the whole set of dilemmas using Latent Class Analysis statistical methods (Bollen, 2002; Hagenaars, 2002). The majority group tended to be enrolled in state-run schools, and most of the rural inhabitants clustered in this class. Most students in privately-run schools, which are mostly located in urban settings, belong to the second group (Perú: Ministerio de Educación, 2018a, p. 67).
among students have shifted from the prevalence of a ‘critical idea’ identified in the 1980s (Portocarrero & Oliart, 1989) to less critical views or unclear perceptions of the current situation of Peruvian society as a democratic community, giving way to opinions organised primarily around the individual or the small groups that students might belong to (groupings based on kinship, a shared local situation, etc.).

These observable changes in representations of society are clearly associated with an overall shift in Peruvian political culture. Between the 1950s and the 1980s, a view according to which social reform was required to develop a country that could still be described as an ancien régime was common sense. From the late 1980s onwards, and especially since the 1990s (given the profound crisis—economic, institutional, and political, including armed confrontation; and the way the non-democratic government dealt with this crisis), Peru’s political culture has become more influenced by a right-wing discourse that emphasises, among other things: the value of the market economy (and the need to weaken state activity); the supposedly inherent ‘evil character of politics’ as opposed to the need for a technocratic and supposedly apolitical government; the rejection and de-legitimation of left-wing options; and the focus on individually-defined options and needs.26

An understanding of students’ views on Peruvian history and its current situation as well as teachers’ views on those issues requires that this overall cultural framework is taken into account.

Education in Peru: A Deep and Long Crisis (eppur si muove)

The Peruvian education system has experienced the crisis and changes occurring in the Peruvian society as a whole in its own manner. As an illustration of the magnitude of this crisis, one can refer to a simple indicator that is directly associated with the capacity to provide acceptable educational services: public expenditure per student.

---

26 These ideas are taken from an essay currently being written by the author and are linked to some ideas advanced in previous texts (Guadalupe, 1990, 1991; Guadalupe & Villafuerte, 1988).
As clearly illustrated by Figure 2, public expenditure per student in Peru is low, and it was extremely low for a long period of time: between 1975 and 2005, it represented less than $600 per student per year.27

Data produced by different student assessments conducted in the late 1990s (i.e., the Latin American Laboratory study and the national assessment conducted in 1998), and at the beginning of the twenty-first century (first round of the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment—PISA) suggests that these low levels of funding produced a school system that was mostly unable to guarantee basic levels of learning. By the same token, the systematic increase in public expenditure observed in the last 20 years is consistent with the also systematic improvement shown by Peru in every student assessment conducted during the same period of time.28

27 This value corresponds to a threshold identified for addressing differences in quality among Peruvian private schools. Below this level, schools are considered to be too poorly resourced (since, typically, tuition fees are the only source of funding they have) to provide minimum services, and their students’ performance tends to be below that of students in state-run schools. This situation was documented by Balarín and Ñopo in a work currently in progress (preliminary results were presented in August 2017: http://www.grade.org.pe/eventos/maria-balarin-y-hugo-nopo-presentaron-los-hallazgos-iniciales-de-su-estudio-sobre-el funcionamiento-del-mercado-de-servicios-educativos-en-el-peru/). A 25% higher threshold ($750) is used in a recently published work for a similar purpose (Fontdevila, Marius, Balarín, & Rodríguez, 2018).

28 Comparable data for Peru has been produced through PISA iterations of the year 2000 (administered in Peru in 2001), 2009, 2012 and 2015. Changes introduced in this latest iteration might have led to comparability issues with previous cycles that, so far, have not been appraised for Peru; these changes are documented in OECD (2016; annex A5). National data comparable across time.
Nevertheless, it is important to consider that an important share of the improvement in students’ results can be explained by changes in the overall socioeconomic environment and not necessarily by improvements in the school system itself: Guadalupe and Villanueva (2013) estimated that these socioeconomic changes can explain half of the improvement in mean reading scores recorded for Peru via PISA 2009/2001.

Notwithstanding the recent improvement in students’ performance, the situation depicted in Figure 1 suggests that a large share of the Peruvian adult population (including, but in no way restricted to, those who currently serve as teachers in our system) was exposed to a rather mediocre or ineffective school experience.  

Education and Democracy: Key Linkages

Democracy rests upon a simple and basic principle: humans are all equal as beings endowed with dignity and liberties. These equally-regarded individuals exist in societies and, therefore, they form a sovereign demos. Therefore, they rule themselves, and the idea of dividing society between a sovereign and those who are subjected to the sovereign is banned from the realm of politics. This community that rules itself is what we call citizenry.

The concept that every human being is equal to every other human being is a deeply abstract idea. Actually, every human being is different from every other, and identifying a common condition presupposes abstracting (literally, ‘pulling away’) the discrete elements that form each (concrete) individual human being with whom we interact. Thus, educating for citizenship and democracy requires the development of some abstract thinking skills.

This train of thought leads us to consider what Vygotsky and Luria explored in the early 1930s. Luria (1976) found that even if every human is capable of developing higher thinking skills, not every social situation is conducive to said development. Actually, what he found was that in pre-modern societies, people tend to be too attached to the concrete elements of a situation and therefore experience difficulties (including anxiety and denial) when facing hypothetical or non-concrete (including functional) situations.

Starting from a totally different set of concerns, Flynn (2007) found something consistent with Luria’s findings in the American experience during the twentieth century.
regarding the measurement of intelligence: he found significant gains in IQ points that are explained not by actual advancements in intelligence, but by the expansion of more abstract forms of thinking which coincided with the expansion of international trade, the development of science, and its more regular presence in everyday life activities, i.e. the consolidation of the modern, industrial way of life.

Thus, there is a well-established connection between the development of some contextual conditions and abstract thinking, and the latter is a requirement for developing and internalising our notions of citizenship, especially as linked to universal values (like human rights), that are present in an increasingly interconnected world. Therefore, when citizenship education emphasises only the importance of coexisting in peaceful or democratic terms, it might lose sight of the fact that coexistence always happens in concrete locales and with concrete individuals. While such coexistence may look democratic, it can also assert that democratic principles apply only to those with whom we coexist and as such do not extend to those beyond the concrete setting in which we live.

This train of thought helps an understanding of why most human societies in history were not democratic societies or did not develop universal values. Indeed, until very recently, most societies in human history were based on instituting hierarchical relationships among people, leading to the rejection and despise of those considered as ‘others’, especially those who spoke a different language or were culturally different from ‘us’. Singer (2011) talks about an expanding circle of empathy and solidarity leading from the smallest unit of ‘us’ (kinship) to a universal ‘us’ that connects every human being as belonging to the same species or even to different forms of life, and relates this expansion to different moments in human history. In that sense, even if one can identify that some instances of social practices went beyond allocating value only to one’s own kin or to any other form of small group and authority, Western liberal democracy is the specific setting in which the idea of a universal human condition emerged throughout a long process that goes back to classical Greece, but especially to the city-states of the late medieval period (Skinner, 1985). There are some social

30 The ‘Flynn effect’ refers to the results of equating IQ tests conducted during the twentieth century in the United States. This exercise led to the identification of major gains (two standard deviations) in mean scores that posed a major interpretation challenge since this meant that either the typical current American citizen should be considered ‘gifted’ according to the standards in place a hundred years ago, or those living at the beginning of the twentieth century should be typically considered at the verge of mental retardation according to current standards.

31 The etymology of barbarian (barbar) is a good illustration given its connection with speaking a different language and stammering.

32 Probably the most salient examples are Mozi in China before Qin (Mozi, 2013), the argumentative tradition in India (Sen, 2005), or the scientific tradition in the classical Arab world (Graham, 2006).
conditions that simultaneously promote the development of abstract thinking and democratic values.

In addition to these considerations, it is also important to understand that human beings are not born as blank slates (Pinker, 2002), but come to the world equipped with some predispositions that are critical to different aspects of our lives, including the development of a democratic understanding of our human condition. On the one hand, as a social species, we are born with prosocial predispositions that provide the foundations for our cooperation (de Waal et al., 2017), joint intentionality (Tomasello, 2014) and sense of morality (Bloom, 2013; Tomasello, 2016). However, these prosocial dispositions are intertwined with parochial dispositions in which the ‘us/them’ dichotomy is grounded (Hamlin, Mahajan, Liberman, & Wynn, 2013; Wynn, Bloom, Jordan, Marshall, & Sheskin, 2018). Thus, developing an abstract view of humans as equals requires overcoming parochial biases that are entrenched in our minds as a result of our evolutionary history in which the ‘us/them’ dichotomy has been a central component. Traditional (small-group oriented) forms of reciprocity and prosociality have been a common attribute of human societies (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984) until very recently. Actually, the currently prevailing political climate in several countries seems to host a revival of particularisms, as expressed in different movements based on the ‘us/them’ dichotomy, that undermines the idea of a human universal condition.

The previous considerations might lead anyone concerned with citizenship education to wonder to which extent a particular context (in my case, the Peruvian society in all its diversity) and the actual operation of schools promote the development of the abstract thinking skills required to conceive of ourselves as members of a community of equals, including our capacity to reflect and to manage the biases moulded in the course of our evolutionary history. Schools can play a major role precisely in relation to the two latter elements (abstract thinking and managing our biases), but the chances of success will be contingent upon the relationship with the first element (the contextual components) that can be aligned with democratic ideals; conversely, the relationship with the first element can represent a significant hindrance to, or even a countermeasure acting against, the purposes of a democratic education.

Moreover, these ideas prompt consideration of the relationship between other areas of learning in school and the development of abstract thinking in particular. Abstract thinking skills can be, and are usually, developed beyond the limits of civic education.
In a recently conducted field study focused on understanding the performance of Peruvian students in rural areas in mathematics, 33 I have identified that Peruvian students face deep difficulties exactly in this area: they learn some algorithms and procedures that are mathematically defined, but they have difficulties applying said learning (which seems to be too attached to very specific contexts and contents) to situations that go beyond the exact setting in which they learnt them. That is, there are difficulties in abstractly identifying rules that can be used in other situations or in relation to other elements. This situation can be related to the low level of cognitive demand that has been identified in school-based learning activities (Cueto, Guerrero, Leon, Zapata, & Freire, 2014; Cueto, Ramírez, León, & Azañedo, 2006).

**Putting these Considerations Together**

This paper is intended to contribute to the understanding of the relationship between the school system and democracy by recommending some avenues for advancing a more complex view of said relationship. Thus, it suggests that a particular democratic society (in this case, Peru) cannot be understood only in connection with the institutional components that lead towards establishing a democratic polity, but that it is also necessary to factor in the analysis some key elements related to the political culture (or cultures) prevailing in said society. Thus, the current institutional crisis being experienced by Peru cannot be fully understood without reference to the way Peruvians understand their polity and the relationships among themselves. But including cultural elements is not only important for political analysis, it is also critical for understanding the linkages between citizenship education and politics.

Based on this overarching argument, this paper proposes some reflections that go beyond the Peruvian case, since the relationship between internalising democratic values and abstract thinking skills has a general character, as does the relationship between these skills and the cognitive complexity of school activities. This paper claims that citizenship education requires concurrent efforts that encompass different areas of learning, and that citizenship education is contingent upon the characteristic of the local and global settings in which each particular school operates.

With that, it is possible to understand schools and their role in citizenship education on different levels: (i) an institutional setting where the main attributes of the global, national, and local culture are dynamically (re)produced, that is, reinforced or modified; (ii) the meaning of

---

33 The article reporting on the results of this research work is currently under review for publication.
the school-society relationship cannot be assumed in any unidirectional manner and, therefore, should be unraveled through specific analysis that takes into account a complex set of factors; and (iii) there are elements in citizenship and democratic life that demand specific cultural initiatives that can be supported or carried out by the school settings.

For the school system to contribute to democratic development and citizenship education, it is especially important to factor in the actual conditions under which it operates, the resources that it can mobilize as well as the attributes of the local settings in which it works. An educational system like the Peruvian one (which is only recently emerging from a long period of crisis; which does not create opportunities to learn complex tasks; which functions in cultural environments where democratic values do not seem to be deeply rooted and are limited in resources and in which abstract mental operations are not regularly conducted) will face major challenges in promoting citizenship values since, in a very profound way, it assumes an upstream direction of travel while relying on rather limited resources or, indeed, tiny oars.

Acknowledgements

This text has been produced as part of my research responsibilities at Universidad del Pacífico (Peru) and relies exclusively on the resources provided by said university, including notional costs associated with my time allocated to research activities.

An earlier draft was presented at the XXXVI Congress of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA, Barcelona May 2018), and at the World Education Research Association (WERA) invited symposium held at the Migration, Social Transformation, and Education for Democratic Citizenship conference (Essen, August 2018) organised by the Special Interest Group Moral and Democratic Education of the European Association for Research on Learning and Instruction (EARLI SIG 13) and the Interdisciplinary Center for Integration and Migration Research of the University of Duisburg-Essen (InZentIM). The author is solely responsible for the content and limitations of this text.

I, the author, hereby confirm that I do not violate the interests or rights of third parties regarding texts, figures, tables, and other materials. I also confirm that the manuscript is an original contribution and has not been submitted or published elsewhere.

References


https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721417734875

175
Value as a Component of Teacher Ethos in Times of Migration

Dr. Martin Drahmann

University of Tübingen
martin.drahmann@uni-tuebingen.de

Jun.-Prof. Dr. Samuel Merk

University of Tübingen
samuel.merk@uni-tuebingen.de

Prof. Dr. Colin Cramer

University of Tübingen
colin.cramer@uni-tuebingen.de
http://www.colin-cramer.de/site/index_de.html

Keywords

Teacher Ethos, Value Orientation, Caring, Justice, Responsibility, Truthfulness
Abstract

Values play an important role in the professional actions of teachers. Both in professional research and in the discourse on the professional ethos of teachers, reference is made to values, and their function as a guiding principle is emphasised. So far, however, there is no instrument available for recording value orientations specific to the teaching profession. This paper therefore presents an overview of the development of the ‘Tübingen Inventory for Measuring Value Orientation in the Teaching Profession’ (TIVO) and its use in a representative Germany-wide survey of teachers. The results show that TIVO can be used to measure values specific to the teaching profession and that caring, justice, responsibility, and truthfulness are profession-specific values that manifest strongly in the actions of teachers.

German Synopsis

1. Introduction

In light of current sociopolitical movements like the influx of refugees into Europe, a renaissance of the discussion about values has been ignited in the public sphere and in schools. Teachers and parents regard values as a very important element of social coexistence, and for them, schools are an important place for students to engage with values (Drahmann, Cramer & Merk, 2018a, b, c). The acknowledgement of general human rights for living together in a diverse society is accorded particularly high importance by teachers and parents (ibid.). Although the teaching of values in schools is often discussed (Oser, 2001; Standop, 2016), hardly any focus is placed on the values and value orientations of teachers. Because values in the sense of a guiding principle influence our thinking, feeling and acting (Kluckhohn, 1951), they are not only of fundamental importance in human life in general, but consequently also influence specifically how teachers teach. Even though research on values in the context of the teaching profession has been part of the research discourse on professionalism (cf. Baumert & Kunter, 2006; Helsper, 2016) and on teacher ethos (cf. Oser, 1994; Hansen, 2001; Veuglers, 2010) for a long time, there are hardly any empirical studies that address value orientations in the context of teacher ethos (exceptions: cf. Harder, 2014).

In particular, this article focuses on the importance of values and value orientations in the teaching profession (cf. Baumert & Kunter, 2006; Veuglers, 2010). Its purpose is to develop an instrument for measuring specific values that seem to be important for the teaching profession (cf. Carr, 2010; Forster-Heinzer, 2015; Klaassen, Osguthorpe & Sanger, 2016). Drawing on the scientific discourse on teachers’ ethos and by reviewing literature, the ‘Tübingen Inventory for Measuring Value Orientation in the Teaching Profession’ (TIVO) for recording these values was developed exploratively and then tested using confirmatory factor analysis. Furthermore, the instrument was used in a representative Germany-wide survey to gain first insights into the teaching-specific value orientations of teachers. The TIVO can potentially show the teaching-specific value orientations that can influence professional actions like supporting students’ individual development (regarding their family background) or inculturation (transmission of general values and norms).
2. Value Orientation in the Teaching Profession

Values and value orientations represent a central concept for human thinking, feeling and acting (Kluckhohn, 1951). Various disciplines, such as philosophy, (social) psychology, or sociology attribute great importance to values (cf. Krobath, 2009). For instance, value orientations at an individual level and values at a collective level (groups or entire societies) function as the basis for explaining individual or collective behaviour patterns, attitudes, or even motives and goals. Social subgroups and subsystems can also be distinguished in terms of their value preferences (Höffe, 2008; Schwartz, 2012). In this respect, the importance of values in the professional activities of teachers, especially in the moral domain of teaching, is emphasised (Oser, 1994; Carr, 2010; Klaassen, Osguthorpe & Sanger, 2016).

In light of the general discourse on values, there is comprehensive literature that highlights significant values in a society or even cultural universals (Spranger, 1921; Allport & Bracken, 1959; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Renner, 2003). Based on the different theoretical and empirical approaches, various instruments have been developed in the past few decades for recording values and value orientations in different societies and for different subgroups (for example, the ‘Value-Interest-Test’ by Allport & Bracken (1959); the ‘Rokeach-Value-Survey’ by Rokeach (1973); the ‘Schwartz Value Survey’ by Schwartz (1994); or ‘Austrian Value Questionnaire’ by Renner (2003)). However, these instruments focus on general values that are shared within societies. There are hardly any instruments available that focus on the values and value orientations that are specific to the teaching profession or that provide information regarding the central values and value orientations of teachers.

Independent of the availability of empirical instruments for the measurement of general value orientations, reviews and studies have emphasised the importance of values and value orientations in the teaching profession (Campbell, 2008; Carr, 2010; Kunter et al., 2013; Klaassen, Osguthorpe & Sanger, 2016). In the discourse on teacher professionalisation, the individual characteristics of (pre-service) teachers—like their value orientations—are important moderating variables in the process of achieving professional competence in teaching (Kunter et al., 2013). Furthermore, in the discourse on teacher ethos, the importance of value orientation is emphasised: values and value orientations can be understood as general orientations or principles that guide individuals and groups in their actions (Höffe, 2008). They influence—be it consciously or subconsciously—an individual’s morals and moral behaviour (Schwartz, 2012) and, in this context, the morals and moral behaviour of an individual teacher.
Therefore, values and value orientations (implicitly or explicitly) have a fundamental influence on the teaching profession and the actions of teachers (Willemse, Lunenberg & Korthagen, 2005; Veugelers, 2010; Harder, 2014; Drahmann, Cramer & Merk, 2018d).

While there are a variety of papers frequently of a hermeneutic nature that examine the importance of teacher-specific value orientations like caring, justice, tolerance, responsibility and truthfulness in the teaching profession (cf., among others, Carr, 2010; Veugelers, 2010), there is still a lack of empirical evidence, which is the result of the lack of instruments that can measure the specific value orientations in the teaching profession (Forster-Heinzer, 2015).

Given the lack of instruments for the measurement of teacher-specific value orientations and the lack of knowledge of these values in the teaching profession, both themes are pursued in this article. The research project presented here aims to develop a new instrument for the measurement of teacher-specific value orientations, and it uses it a representative Germany-wide survey of in-service teachers to test the instrument. Therefore, the main questions are whether and which value orientations specific to the teaching profession can be empirically measured (for details, see Drahmann, Merk & Cramer, sub.).

3. Tübingen Inventory for Measuring Value Orientation in the Teaching Profession (TIVO)

As we aim to develop a new instrument for measuring the value orientations of teachers, this section describes in a very general way the construction of the instrument, the ‘Tübingen Inventory for Measuring Value Orientation in the Teaching Profession’ (TIVO) (for details, see Drahmann, Merk & Cramer, sub.).

For this new instrument, the ‘semantic differential’ type of rating scale was chosen (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957; Osgood, 1964). This is a rating technique that enables the measurement of connotative aspects of perception via a multi-stage rating scale (Kanning, 2011). The extreme poles of each scale are linguistically anchored in adjectives and their antonyms, although numerous variations are also possible (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957; Schäfer, 1983).

In short, we went through the following steps to develop the ‘Tübingen Inventory for Measuring Value Orientation in the Teaching Profession’ (for details, see Drahmann, Merk & Cramer, sub):
1. Based on a review of English and German literature on the professional ethos of teachers with a specific focus on the values and value orientations of teachers (25 papers in total), the following five values were identified as the most important for the teaching profession for the purposes of this scientific discourse: caring, justice, tolerance, responsibility, and truthfulness.

2. In a second step, we parsed the 25 papers for adjectives that described these five value dimensions and supplemented them with additional, theoretically-derived adjectives.

3. All adjectives were rated for their content validity by 14 external experts using an anonymous survey. In addition, these experts made suggestions for antonyms for these adjectives. Based on these ratings, a total of 40 different pairs of adjectives were identified (eight pairs for each value).

4. In a first exploratory study with N = 334 student teachers, the participants were asked to rate the pairs of adjectives using the following prompt: Please try to assess your (future) professional behaviour as a teacher characterised by the following pairs of adjectives. You may find that some pairs of adjectives are not always appropriate. However, please try to make a personal assessment for each pair. Exploratory factor analyses (EFA, using Maximum Likelihood EFA for model estimation and the Very Simple Structure Procedure for extracting the number of factors) suggested using 18 pairs to build two factors defining the dimensions of ‘caring’ and ‘fairness’, whereby the latter contained items which initially were assigned to the dimensions of ‘justice’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘truthfulness’. Furthermore, for all five values we used stimuli (negative and positive descriptions of daily teaching situations) to test the empirical separability of the five values on the basis of the adjectives.

Based on these exploratory factor analyses, we identified the following 18 items:

(1) legitimate—illegitimate,
(2) attentive—apathetic,
(3) dependable—undependable,
(4) lenient—strict,
(5) honest—dishonest,
(6) caring—negligent,
(7) orderly—disorderly,
(8) fair—unfair,
(9) unbiased—biased,
(10) dutiful—undutiful,
(11) with integrity—corruptible,
(12) empathetic—reserved,
(13) compassionate—indifferent,
(14) affectionate—loveless,
(15) just—unjust,
(16) reliable—unreliable,
(17) sympathetic—unsympathetic, and
(18) righteous—unrighteous.

At the beginning, we expected that the five dimensions (‘caring’, ‘justice’, ‘tolerance’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘truthfulness’) could be represented empirically using these items. However, on the basis of the explorative factor analyses, only two dimensions (‘caring’ and ‘fairness’) could be modelled using the 18 items. With one exception, the items of the ‘tolerance’ dimension could not be mapped to the two factors. To further investigate the relation of the theoretically proposed and empirically found factor structure, we fitted a second-order confirmatory factor analysis model whereby the remaining dimensions ‘justice’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘truthfulness’ formed the second order factor (‘fairness’). As this model showed good fit to the data it was examined and in a second confirmatory study which will be described in more detail below.

5. In a second (preregistered) confirmatory study, the confirmatory factor analysis was run on a new data set of $N = 239$ student teachers (Merk & Drahmann, 2018). Results favoured the two-factor solution obtained from Study 1 over a one-factor solution ($\Delta \chi^2 = 389.76$, df = 1, $p < 0.01$) and further showed good fit (CFI = .93, TLI = .90, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .08) for a second order-model consisting of four first-order factors (‘caring’, ‘justice’, ‘responsibility’, ‘truthfulness’) and one second-order factor (‘fairness’ that loads on ‘justice’, ‘responsibility’, ‘truthfulness’). The structure of the second-order model is presented in Figure 1 and shows a good fit.
4. Value Orientations of German Teachers

After the successful development of the TIVO (Drahmann, Merk & Cramer, sub.), in-service teachers were asked about their teaching-specific value orientations in a representative Germany-wide study (funded by ‘Verband Bildung und Erziehung’). The study is described briefly below, and first descriptive results with reference to the measured value orientations are presented (for details see, Drahmann, Cramer & Merk, 2018a, d).

4.1 Design and Sample

Forsa Politik- und Sozialforschung GmbH was entrusted with carrying out the nationwide representative survey of teachers at general education schools after the questionnaire had been prepared by the authors of this article. The teacher survey was conducted in June 2018. Teachers at general education schools were identified by means of a daily telephone-based screening procedure as part of the multi-topic, population-representative survey. They were then sent an electronic invitation to take part in an online written survey. The total sample comprised 1,185 teachers at general education schools.

Figure 1: Second-order model of the ‘Tübingen Inventory for Measuring Value Orientation in the Teaching Profession’
4.2 Results

For the four value orientations of ‘caring’, ‘justice’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘truthfulness’, Figure 2 shows the teaching-specific value orientations regarding their teaching actions as assessed by the teachers themselves, which were recorded using the TIVO.

![Figure 2: Distribution of the TIVO-Scales of in-service teachers in Germany (violin and boxplots with arithmetic means)](image)

Over all dimensions the arithmetic means were rather high, indicating, that the teaching-specific value orientations manifest in the self-assessed actions of teachers. Nevertheless, it also becomes clear that the dimension of ‘truthfulness’ shows the greatest level of manifestation in action, while the dimension of ‘caring’ shows the lowest level, but still with a high rating. Further gender-specific analyses indicate that female teachers show a significantly higher degree of ‘caring’ ($p < .001, d = .32$) and ‘responsibility’ ($p < .001, d = .31$). Statistically significant differences in the value orientations ‘caring’ ($p = .001; \eta^2 = .004$), ‘justice’ ($p < .001; \eta^2 = .007$) and ‘truthfulness’ ($p < .001; \eta^2 = .01$) can also be revealed with regard to the age of the participating teachers. However, only the difference regarding ‘truthfulness’ between the four different categorised age groups shows a small effect. Teachers in the over-51 age group, for example, show the strongest levels of manifestation of ‘truthfulness’ and the age group under 35 years shows the weakest. A final analysis, which takes the school type of the respective teachers into account, indicates that there is one small, statistically significant difference between the teachers of the individual school types for the value orientation of ‘caring’ ($p < .001; \eta^2 = .01$). Teachers at primary schools and special needs schools show the strongest level of manifestation of this value orientation and teachers at lower secondary schools (‘Hauptschule’) the weakest compared with the other school types.
5. Discussion

Several theoretical approaches have shown that the values and value orientations of (pre-service) teachers are an important moderating variable in the process of achieving professional competence in teaching (Kunter et al., 2013) and are important in the context of teaching morally (Klaassen, Osguthorpe & Sanger, 2016). But there is still a lack of empirical insight. The purpose of this paper was to develop and to present the ‘Tübingen Inventory for Measuring Value Orientation in the Teaching Profession’ (TIVO) as a new empirical instrument for measuring specific values in the teaching profession. As values do not represent visible objects, the semantic differential was chosen as a method for measuring the values using rating scales which were anchored in adjectives and their antonyms. Initially, five different values were identified from the literature on research on professional ethics. The results show evidence that the values ‘caring’, ‘justice’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘truthfulness’ derived from the literature can be recorded separately by means of the semantic differential over 18 different items (pairs of adjectives).

In addition, using the TIVO in a Germany-wide representative study for the first time, it has become apparent that (in-service) teachers ascribe great importance to the four teaching-specific value orientations of ‘caring’, ‘justice’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘truthfulness’ in their own professional actions. The results show that ‘truthfulness’ has the highest meaning for teachers in terms of their professional actions, and ‘caring’ the lowest compared to the other value orientations. Even though the value orientations of the surveyed teachers are generally very high, differences specific to gender, age and school type can be detected. For example, the higher levels of self-attribution of female teachers to the ‘caring’ value orientation can also be seen in other perspectives of professional ethos, such as the caring approach (cf. Noddings, 1984). The higher level of primary school teachers describing themselves as ‘caring’ compared to secondary school teachers can also be explained by the focus on the teacher-pupil relationship in primary schools.

This paper has limitations that should be addressed in future research. First, the value orientations have been taken from the literature, which means that we cannot be certain that they cover all teaching-specific value orientations. Further qualitative research approaches would be helpful for clarification in this regard. Secondly, the studies do not yet reveal any connection between the value orientations of teachers and their concrete professional actions (Baumert & Kunter, 2006).
That said, the results show a possible way for measuring the value orientations of teachers, suggesting an empirical second-order factor solution: ‘caring’, ‘justice’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘truthfulness’ (first-order factor) and ‘fairness’ (second-order factor). Moreover, the results can potentially highlight value orientations which, in turn, can influence professional actions and can therefore influence issues such as handling migration and integration. Similarly, results from other studies suggest that value orientations have an influence at least on the attribution of meaning to educational goals. As a case in point, there is a connection between the educational goals of ‘practising tolerance’ or ‘recognising basic social values’ and the values of ‘caring’ and ‘truthfulness’ (Drahmann, Cramer & Merk, 2018d). On the one hand, the development and initial use of the TIVO illustrates that value orientations in the teaching profession can be empirically measured and, on the other hand, it makes it possible to establish potential links between the specific value orientations in the teaching profession and the way teachers are thinking, feeling, and acting in their everyday work.

**References**


VaKE Intervention Method: Education for Democratic Citizenship for Female Refugees

Jean-Luc Patry
University of Salzburg, Department of Education
jean-luc.patry@sbg.ac.at

Sieglinde Weyringer
University of Salzburg, Department of Education
sieglinde.weyringer@sbg.ac.at

Natascha Diekmann
University of Salzburg, Department of Education
info@natascha-diekmann.de

Keywords
Female refugees; Integration; VaKE; Muslims; Host society; Values reference systems; Behavior resolutions

Abbreviations
AT: Austria
CAPS: Cognitive-Affective Processing System (Mischel & Shoda, 1995)
HC: Home country
ÖIF: Österreichischer Integrationsfonds (Austrian Integration Fund, https://www.integrationsfonds.at/)
VaKE: Values and Knowledge Education

**Abstract**

VaKE (Values and Knowledge Education) is an intervention tool that seems appropriate for fostering Muslim refugees’ integration in Western countries. This paper presents the principles of VaKE and the underlying concept for integration. A system of workshops for female refugees (N=95) is described, each lasting three half-days; for this purpose, VaKE was enhanced with a behavior-oriented intervention, among other things. Some concrete examples of the procedure (including drawings and posters) and general experiences are reported. The procedure was well received and the participating women were highly motivated. The paper concludes with some suggestions for developing VaKE further.

**German Synopsis**

1. Introduction

The high number of asylum seekers in most Western European countries has become one of the most important political issues across Europe. The main themes of political discussion have been about how refugees come to Europe, how to reduce the number of immigrants, who is responsible for immigrants, whether they are entitled to stay, and how to return them to their home country if they are not entitled to stay. However, there is little political discussion about treating immigrants as human beings with the same dignity shown to the citizens of the host countries, and little has been done to foster immigrants’ integration beyond providing language and values courses and passing laws, thereby restricting integration to a very superficial level as well as prohibiting immigrants from displaying in public behavior patterns that refer to their culture of origin and particularly to their religion.

In 2017, the Austrian Integration Fund (Österreichischer Integrationsfonds, ÖIF) initiated a pilot project for the integration of recognized female refugees (individuals with a positive asylum decree or entitled for subsidiary protection) based on the Values and Knowledge Education (VaKE) intervention method. VaKE is a teaching-learning method that combines knowledge acquisition with values education on a constructivist base. Research has shown (see, for instance, Patry et al., 2013) that VaKE provides deeper and more sustainable learning than the traditional teaching methods used in the values courses offered in Austria. VaKE is particularly appropriate for fostering integration because it integrates values and knowledge, which in their reciprocal reliance are central preconditions for integration. The present paper provides a first account of this project.

2. VaKE – Theoretical Foundations

The necessity of values education is acknowledged by most educators, teachers, and others (e.g., Gruber, 2009a, 2009b). In most teaching-learning arrangements, however, values education, if practiced at all, is strictly separated from knowledge acquisition; for instance, in school, values education is usually delegated to specific subject areas like religion or ethics. Abandoning this strict separation, VaKE aims to integrate values education and knowledge acquisition in order to overcome the problem that values without associated knowledge is blind, while knowledge without associated values is irresponsible. Values on their own are blind because an individual may have the best of intentions but does not have sufficient knowledge about the context, conditions, and opportunities to put them into effect. Knowledge by itself is
irresponsible because it can be used for good or bad purposes; the latter can only be avoided if individuals relate their knowledge with values.

VaKE has a strong theoretical background (see Figure 1). Its basic underlying principle is constructivism (for our interpretation of constructivism see Patry, 2016; Weinberger, 2016). The core assumption is that learning is an active process in both the domains of values and knowledge: Learners construct new concepts and integrate them into their existing system of subjective theories through assimilation or accommodation in the sense of Piaget (1976). The teacher provides situations that foster such new constructs. In addition, it is necessary that learners test whether the newly constructed concept is viable, i.e., whether it satisfies need; this is done through viability checks (Patry, 2014), and it is also the responsibility of the teacher to provide opportunities for such systematic viability checks (Weinberger, 2006).

![Figure 1: Theoretical Foundations of VaKE (based on Patry et al., 2013, p. 564; simplified)](image)

VaKE starts with a dilemma that addresses opposing values which can only be discussed if some contextual knowledge is given. The discussion of this dilemma stimulates moral development (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975). Given the specific construction of the dilemma, the learners recognize during the discussion that they need additional information, which they can attempt to obtain from any source that is available to them (inquiry-based learning, Reitinger, 2013). Based on this newly acquired knowledge, they are able to continue their moral discussion on a higher level. The learning process is enhanced through techniques like perspective-taking.
and perspective change (e.g., in role-plays), self-reflection and preflection (anticipating future consequences of an action), etc.

In the course of our research on VaKE, it turned out that several additional theories had to be taken into account (Weinberger, in prep.), including: the Cognitive-Affective Processing System (CAPS, Mischel & Shoda, 1995); the theory of situated learning (Brown, Collins & Duguid, 1989); self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985); the theory of cognitive structures (Seiler, 1973); learning through arguments (Kuhn, 2010); and Toulmin’s (2003) argumentation model.

Our research has shown that participants in the VaKE processes acquire at least as much knowledge as learners from the control groups who receive traditional teaching. In addition, participants are extremely highly motivated, they become more critical and social, and they increase their levels of moral competence (Patry et al., 2013; Weinberger, in prep.). We have used VaKE in different contexts; for instance, we held a VaKE course about democracy for unaccompanied minor male refugees (Patry et al., 2016), which was very much appreciated by the participants.

3. Principles of Democratic Citizenship and Integration Education

The practice of fostering democratic citizenship and integration as embedded in VaKE requires unconditional respect for the following items, in the order in which they are listed: human dignity and equal rights; political and civil rights; social and cultural rights; and economic rights. This means that five dimensions are addressed: ethics, policy and laws, and the social, cultural, and economic dimensions. The core competences to be acquired, then, are ethical and value choices (e.g., to value freedom, equality, and solidarity), cognitive (e.g., to know about relevant issues and to be able to solve problems), and social (e.g., to cooperate, to resolve conflicts in accordance with the principles of democratic law, to take part in public debate) (adapted from Audigier, 2000). In the particular target group of Muslim refugees, three reference values systems are of special importance: law (as a compulsory reference system), religion, and cultural traditions.
By integration, we refer to a circumstance whereby the respective person: (1) acknowledges the primacy of human dignity and of the democratic principles underlying laws, and complies with the laws; (2) consciously acknowledges as legitimate the values reigning in the different cultures, provided they comply with factor (1); and (3) lives these values in a way that fits in with the respective cultures while maintaining an appropriate personal balance of consideration for law, religion, and tradition (see also Molinsky, 2010).

VaKE can establish the relationship between the values addressed in this concept of integration and the knowledge about principles of human dignity and democracy, the values, rules, and customs in the respective cultures, and one’s own beliefs and convictions. Therefore, VaKE seems an appropriate tool for fostering democratic education and integration. Since individuals’ concrete actions are part of their efforts for integration, VaKE was enhanced with a behavior-oriented intervention.

4. Project “VaKE for Female Refugees”

In 2015, we informed the Austrian Ministry for Europe, Integration, and Foreign Affairs, as it was then called, about VaKE and its potential for integration. After some discussions with officials from the Ministry, we were asked by the Austrian Integration Fund (Österreichischer Integrationsfonds, ÖIF; a fund of the Republic of Austria) to design a pilot project for the integration of female refugees using VaKE. We proposed a concept (Patry et al., 2017) which was approved. The pilot project started in November 2017 and ended one year later with a final report. As the report has not yet been officially approved, we are not entitled to publish the results of the project; hence in this paper, we can only report on the implementation of the project, assessments, and some first experiences and outputs.

4.1. Implementation

A total of 95 women participated in eleven workshops in groups of between four and 16 participants. Of the participants, 49 hailed from Syria, 30 from Afghanistan, five from Somalia, four from Iran, two from Iraq, and one each from Dagestan and Yemen. The respective numbers of participants depended on accessibility, language, and other issues beyond our influence. Each of the workshop sessions lasted three half-days, with the third session taking place about two weeks after the second. Some workshops that had been planned could not be implemented due
to low sign-up rates and no-shows. The workshops were organized in Vienna, in the city of Salzburg, and in several small towns in the states of Upper Austria and Salzburg. Most workshops were conducted in Arabic, and some in Dari/Farsi. Each workshop was led by a female leader with the help of an interpreter.

The procedure was adapted to the needs of the respective groups. Table 1 provides the prototypical framework which was implemented flexibly by the workshop leaders in accordance with the underlying theory as presented above. On the first day, a substantial amount of time was required to build trust; for this purpose, the concept of identity was used, discussing what it means to be a woman in the home country of time was required to build trust; for this purpose, the concept of identity was used, discussing what it means to be a woman in the home country and in Austria, women’s needs, and factors or aspects which are important to participants for their further development.

Table 1: Prototypical course of the workshops (underlined: VaKE; in italics: outputs which are used for assessment purposes; AT: Austria; HC: Home country)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td>Getting to know each other</td>
<td>Partner interview, introduction of partner during the plenum, <em>drawing oneself</em>, keywords, self-presentation in the plenum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Typical for women in AT/HC</td>
<td><em>Drawings</em>, keywords; <em>posters</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-reflection</td>
<td>What is important to me? What do/don’t I like? <em>Drawings</em>, <em>keywords</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation AT vs HC</td>
<td>Table based on individual work: Negative and positive issues in HC and AT; collecting key words, collecting in plenum (<em>posters</em>: Differences HC vs AT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>Discussion: What is integration? <em>Posters</em>: What is necessary from both sides for successful integration? Self-reflection: What would I like to keep or change?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td>Law, religion, tradition</td>
<td><em>Poster</em> and discussion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision-making</td>
<td>Decision game: Either/or <em>posters</em>; or poster: how decisions are taken. Relation to law, religion, tradition; what is necessary for decision-making? Self-reflection and discussions about decision-making and about the need for knowledge for decision-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Problems in general</td>
<td>What problems do I have in everyday life? Differences HC and AT? Group work, <em>posters</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concrete problems</td>
<td>Dilemma stories adapted to the workshop; discussion, group work, possible solutions; collecting possible solutions (<em>posters</em>) and their discussions; hypothetical decision and its justification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Information that is required but missing for decision-making; discussions, avenues for gathering information, collection in the plenum, own search for information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision on resolution</td>
<td>Individual decision on the resolution on which the individual’s work will focus for the next two weeks; using prepared <em>resolution notebook</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td>Implementing resolution</td>
<td>Discussion of experiences of implementing the resolution; verbal evaluation of whether the notebook was helpful or not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhanced decision-making</td>
<td>Further discussion of dilemma stories. How can we solve upcoming future real problems? Discussions, <em>posters</em>, possibly final output; summary, maybe using role-plays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Future as women in AT</td>
<td>How do I see myself in the future as a woman in AT? Discussion and <em>drawings</em>, reference to the workshop content: Integration, law vs religion vs tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workshop evaluation</td>
<td><em>Standardized written questionnaire</em>: Evaluation, what did I learn?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Only on the second day was it possible to start with the proper VaKE process, using prepared dilemma stories chosen to fit the participants’ interests. Some of them are as follows (abbreviated versions); the core question was, “What should the female protagonist do?”

- Mrs. Sanar has the opportunity to get a job. She is very interested in taking it. Her future boss says that she has to give up her headscarf (hijab) to get the job.
- Mrs. Sanar’s daughter, Mariam, is 14 years old and goes to a secondary school. Swimming lessons are on the curriculum, and Mariam wants to take part and wear a swimsuit like the other girls. The family objects to her participation in the swimming lessons. Mrs. Sanar does not know what to do.
- Mrs. Sanar had become friends with her Austrian neighbor, Mrs. Gruber. Mrs. Gruber often asks Mrs. Sanar to go out with her for a meal or a drink. Mrs. Sanar would like to accept the invitation, but her husband reacts negatively and exerts emotional pressure. (To exacerbate the story, one can add that the husband exerts physical violence.)

The VaKE process followed a standard procedure (see section 2), but many of its steps had to be translated by the interpreter, and it was necessary to explain that VaKE does not mean direct instruction but autonomous work; moreover, the role of the workshop leader as a facilitator of learning (rather than a teacher) had to be elucidated. Even the information search had to be completed autonomously by each participant, in some cases drawing on the technical and language support of the interpreter.

Towards the end of the second day, the women were asked to formulate individual resolutions regarding what behavior change they intended to implement over the coming two weeks. They recorded their resolution in their resolution notebook, and they were instructed to write in the notebook every day, assessing their experience on a four-level rating scale using smiley-face icons and reflecting on the following five open writing prompts: This is what happened when I tried to implement my resolution; these are my questions; that’s what I would like to know; this was important for me today; and further remarks. In some of the courses, the participants got daily SMSs reminders to take notes in their notebook; in others this was not possible.

During the third day, experiences of implementing the women’s resolutions were discussed, and the VaKE process was continued, resulting in a final output that could take different forms, such as a role-play in which the participants enacted roles defending positions diametrically opposed to their own, thus providing the opportunity for a change of perspective.
Usually the workshops concluded with a discussion about the women’s future with respect to integration. At the very end, participants completed a course evaluation questionnaire.

4.2. Example Outcomes

Because the analysis has not yet been finished and the final report has not been released for publication, we can only offer some general impressions of results at this stage. The instruments used for data collection are shown in italics in Table 1. Because of language problems, and because some of the participants were illiterate, language-based assessments had to be very simple, and many women needed the help of the interpreter or conducted individual tasks (e.g., self-reflection) in their own language rather than in German. To overcome the language problem, for some of the tasks and questions (e.g., What is typical for a woman in the home country? What is typical in Austria?), participants were asked to draw their respective ideas. One group refused to draw, saying that it was childish, whereas other groups did it with enthusiasm.

Two examples of drawings from two different participants are shown in Figure 2; the left-hand side shows drawings about women in the home country, and the right-hand side about women in Austria.

![Figure 2: Drawings from two different participants about women in their home country (left: teacher, housewife, having a party) and in Austria (right)](image-url)
Figure 3 presents two participants’ wishes for their future life in Austria. The handwriting in the left drawing means: an apartment, a car, a job, good health, and good German language skills.

![Figure 3: Two participants’ drawings of their wishes for their future in Austria](image)

Figure 4 presents an individual outcome in table format outlining the positive and negative features of the home country and of Austria respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive – Home Country</th>
<th>Positive – Austria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sociability</td>
<td>Deciding for oneself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social contact</td>
<td>Treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for the parents</td>
<td>Punctuality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All humans are equal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Being married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thinking about the future</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negative – Home Country</th>
<th>Negative – Austria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speaking about others</td>
<td>Dress code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jealousy</td>
<td>Racism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot voice one’s opinion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thinking that men are better than women</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Me](image)

Figure 4: Example of a poster about the positive and negative features in the home country and in Austria (translated by the authors)

In addition to such individual work, group posters were produced, usually with the help of the workshop leader; participants had to make themselves understood to the workshop leader, thus exercising their language skills and experiencing the difficulty of communication, but also the
results when it is successful, in a safe and supportive environment. Figure 5 presents an example of a group poster, this one showing what is typical for women’s daily existence in the home country and in Austria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typical for women</th>
<th>…in the home country (Syria, Iraq, Somalia)</th>
<th>…in Austria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contacts</td>
<td>Practical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social life</td>
<td>Highly stressed because of work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaking, small talk</td>
<td>A lot of responsibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooking</td>
<td>Living by oneself from 18 years onwards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household work</td>
<td>Having a boyfriend from 14 years onwards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not deciding oneself</td>
<td>Is ambitious</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family first</td>
<td>Household work on the weekend, hence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping</td>
<td>constantly occupied</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students: very high percentage of women</td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driving</td>
<td>Confident</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoking the water pipe in the café, more than men</td>
<td>Everyone works, men and women are equal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can work if they want</td>
<td>Can get a career, become a boss</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerate beatings from husbands because they want to hold the family together</td>
<td>Deciding for oneself</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic dependency</td>
<td>Separation is no problem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Late marriages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: Example of a group poster about what it means to be a woman in the home country and in Austria (translated by the authors)

These images and outputs shown in Figures 2 through 5 are not representative for the outputs created by all participants. Therefore, we do not want to provide specific interpretations; the aim is rather to provide an impression of what was done in the workshops.

The majority of participating women implemented the resolutions that they had formulated during the second workshop quite reliably by the third meeting and completed the resolution notebook appropriately; during the discussions of the impact of their resolution, the women said that they appreciated the approach. Some did not act on their resolutions or did not fill in the resolution notebook properly; it is likely that in many cases this was due to language problems.

4.3. Experiences

From the courses conducted so far, we can report on a first set of experiences. It turned out that recruiting and participation were often difficult: First, the family culture of the women was important, as sometimes the husband prohibited the participation or the scale of the commitment entailed by signing up to the course had not been recognized. Second, it was difficult to reach
the women; addressing them personally proved to be the best approach. Third, the time or the place of the workshops was not always optimal for the women (e.g., Ramadan and holidays required the women’s presence in the family, preventing them from participating; also, traveling to the course location was sometimes too complicated for them).

At the beginning, many of the women were skeptical of the course, but the trust-enhancing procedure of the first session proved successful, and soon the women participated with commitment in all activities and enjoyed them despite their problems with speaking and writing. The informal feedback provided was very positive, and many participants said that they would recommend the workshops to their peers. It proved to be an advantage that the groups were highly heterogeneous in terms of education level, language skills, literacy levels, and cultural background, since the participants could help each other to the mutual benefit of both the skilled and the less skilled women.

Although such non-directive interventions are uncommon in the countries of origin, the women engaged quickly even in activities that were very unusual to them. At the beginning, it was a challenge for many participants to express their feelings and to present arguments to other women and thus voice their own opinions and values, but soon they became quite confident in doing so. An example was the final role-play that was performed in some groups; some women particularly enjoyed assuming a role in which they had to defend the position of Austrian women. Further, their reasoning and discussion became more knowledgeable, particularly with respect to using the three values reference systems of laws, religion, and family tradition.

5. Conclusions

VaKE was well accepted, which could be seen in the intense discussions during the sessions. Obviously, the method was expedient, which was certainly due to the adaptation of the prototypical approach used in previous studies. A key problem was language and that several women were illiterate. Hence the information search was difficult in some cases, but the support of the interpreter proved very helpful in providing a workaround. We could collect a great number of narratives addressing specific issues of VaKE; based on the experiences in these workshops, some improvements for the application of VaKE can be suggested.

It is crucial that the women discover that their statements and opinions are not judged; rather they must recognize the workshop as a safe and non-threatening environment, which might contrast with their experience of daily encounters with Austrian citizens. It is also important that they recognize that they can do more with their language than they thought; this
was particularly the case when they communicated with the workshop leader, who did not speak their language. In many cases, it was helpful that the interpreter refrained from intervening and left the women to try to make themselves understood (e.g., when creating group posters).

The participants had to look for information instead of being spoon-fed it. This is the principle of inquiry-based learning, and for their life in Austria it is important that participants should learn that they need to be (pro)active to improve their integration. How individuals could move through the process steps of “What do I want to know?”, “What information sources do I have?” (e.g., internet, counseling center, mosque), collecting the information, and evaluating the information critically (“What is it worth?”), depended on the source(s) available to them. Women had to perform the process themselves, and workshop leaders acted only as advisors but not as instructors; specifically, workshop leaders were not supposed to perform the tasks on behalf of the participants.

It was important that the participants learned to distinguish between “This is important to me,” and “This is the right thing to do.” Both are viability checks in the VaKE sense; however, the latter has to have a higher priority, and it is the workshop leaders’ responsibility to insist that the distinction is made and to argue for the moral judgment instead of the personal preference. And it is also the workshop leaders’ responsibility to remind the participants to refer to and differentiate between the three values reference systems of law, religion, and tradition.

One of the most important issues in VaKE is the integration of behavior-oriented intervention techniques. Since the VaKE dilemmas were close to the participants’ everyday lives, or in some cases even based on participants’ personal experiences, it was easy for participants to formulate resolutions and to put them into practice. Values education in the tradition of Blatt and Kohlberg (1975) has often been criticized for not addressing moral action (e.g., Becker, 2011). The present study shows that it is possible to integrate action-related principles in this particular context. The underlying theory here was not the relationship between judgment and action (e.g., Blasi, 1983); instead, techniques based on behavior modification were used. The relationship between the two theoretical approaches remains to be established. In any case, the experiences presented in this paper show that at an empirical level, the combination of the two approaches is possible despite the assumed incompatibility of the theories.
Acknowledgements

This study was funded by the Austrian Integration Fund (Österreichischer Integrationsfonds), https://www.integrationsfonds.at/.

References


Religion and Normativity in Pedagogical Situations

Thorsten Knauth

*University of Duisburg-Essen*

thorstenknauth@t-online.de

**Keywords**

dialogue in education/ interreligious education, religious heterogeneity, youth and religiosity, dialogical value education, dialogue and conflict
Abstract

Apart from the structural normativity of pedagogical situations, normativity is at stake when people discuss and reflect on issues of (daily) life. Especially when it comes to basic issues of life orientations, ethical convictions, and decisions and religion-related life-stances, normativity forms a decisive situational background. This makes religious and ethical education an exciting domain of pedagogical reflection and interaction with normativity. Four key elements can be mentioned: 1. Pedagogical situations are shaped by ambiguity. 2. Religious positions are normatively charged because they relate to binding values which provide points of orientation. 3. Pedagogical situations which are shaped by religious heterogeneity and normative ambiguity are susceptible to conflict. 4. Quite often there is a conflict zone of subjective relativization of normativity and exclusive rejection of the normative claims of others. This provides a challenging task to relate the different positions to another and to foster real interest in one another.

In the article it is argued that a dialogical value education which is embedded in a sustainable culture of dialogue and interaction can provide a way out of the previously discussed dilemma of subjective relativization vs objective universality of religious normativity. Cemented claims of religious validity and an incurious indifference towards the life of others can be eroded through patient and persistent efforts to immerse students in situations of encounter and dialogue. The work should predominantly try to develop an understanding of how values and orientations have been “grown” in the life of individuals. Encounter and relationship are not always remedies for tendencies of fragmentation and freezing, but they are necessary prerequisites for mutual recognition and exchange.

German Synopsis

1. Normativity as an intrinsic feature of the pedagogical relationship

Dealing with normativity is a key element of pedagogy. Part of the pedagogical relationship between teacher and student, tutor and tutee, is the reference to a general goal, objective or task. Thus, pedagogical situations are always concerned with the issue of what specific educational aims are being pursued and of how specific pedagogical actions can be justified in the context of general educational aims.

In a way, the structure of pedagogical action is shaped by the contradictory task of accepting the present—the current—being of the tutee whilst guiding him or her towards the future realm of general aims and duties. Pedagogy is always at risk of exploiting the present state of learners for the future of educational goals which have not necessarily been agreed by the learners.

The German educational reformer, Hermann Nohl, has expressed this basic and persistent antinomy of pedagogy as follows: “…the child is not only a means in itself, but is compelled towards objective contents and goals, to which it is being educated. Those contents are not only meant individually but have a value in themselves. The child cannot be only educated for itself, but also for cultural work, profession and for national community.” (Nohl 1948, S.127f)

The emphasis which is placed on the “general” and the objective frame of education is a good example of the ambivalence of educational reform because conceptual tools could not resist the normative power of Nazi ideology for defining the general aim of education. It is clear that pedagogy which does not critically reflect the normativity of the so-called “general” is at risk of serving the ideological interests which dominate the reality of education at any given time.34

At the beginning of my speech, I deem it necessary to point out that pedagogy is inherently susceptible to transformation into violence and ideology. Therefore, pedagogy must critically reflect on its own normativity on an ongoing, continuous basis. My assumption is that pedagogy can only protect itself from its inherent susceptibility for transforming into violence if education can be conceptualized as a relationship which is sensitive towards subtle power relations. And the implicit risk that pedagogy acts against the backdrop of a normative horizon

34 This task of critical self-reflection was discussed thoroughly in Peukert’s article on approaches of critical pedagogy (cf. Helmut Peukert 1983).
which is not justified can only be counteracted if the justification of norms is established as part of the pedagogical process with all participants.

Apart from the structural normativity of pedagogical situations, normativity is also at stake when people discuss and reflect on issues of (daily) life. Especially when it comes to basic issues of life orientations, ethical convictions, and decisions and religion-related life-stances, normativity forms a decisive situational background. This makes religious and ethical education an exciting domain of pedagogical reflection and interaction with normativity. There is a widespread consensus among pedagogues of religion (in Germany) that the pedagogical treatment of religion is especially fruitful if it is oriented towards subjective positioning and processes of defining personal meaning.

In the face of ongoing dynamic processes of religious pluralization in society and schools, issues of normativity in the pedagogical domain become even more important and challenging. Normative claims for validity are diversified and contribute to conflicts in pedagogical situations. Justifications of pedagogical aims are questioned or blurred and have to be negotiated anew. To put it simply: in religious education (RE) classes, students discuss what is good and what is the truth in the face of diverse ideas about what is good and what is the truth. And pedagogues of religion, experts of school education, and theologians alike discuss approaches and aims of religious education in the context of religious plurality (cf. Kenngott, Englert, Knauth 2015; Lindner, Schambeck, Simojoki, Naurath 2017).

2. Normativity in RE classrooms

I would like to illustrate the question at stake with two examples. The examples show how issues of religion and normativity surface in the reality of classroom interaction. The examples are taken from daily life. They are taken from religious education courses with students of different religious backgrounds and worldviews, i.e. a truly diverse and heterogenous composition of the student body. Both RE courses claim to deal with different backgrounds in terms of religion and worldview in a dialogical way.
(1) Dying for the sake of religion?

The first example is taken from a course with 10th grade students. The group is working on the topic of Jesus’s last days before his crucifixion: the night in Gethsemane, his arrest, and his conviction. One lesson deals with the disciples’ attitudes after Jesus was arrested in Gethsemane. A significant majority of students with a Muslim background feel somehow outraged that the disciples abandoned Jesus, and—in Peter’s case—even pretended not to know him. Others, especially students with Christian backgrounds, are inclined to defend or to justify the behavior of the disciples. A very passionate and heated debate takes place during the course of the lesson; emotions are boiling.

Two girls in particular, Imen and Svenja, respectively representing the two conflicting positions, are involved in quite a personal and emotional way. Personal attitudes towards religion are mirrored in the positions they defend. One party emphasizes that one has to be willing and prepared to die for religion. The other party stresses more tactical arguments, suggesting that it would not have been very clever to openly show one’s own affiliation with Jesus. The consequence would only have been to suffer the same fate, with no opportunity for helping Jesus. However, this argument does not convince the Muslim students at all. Especially Imen, one of the Muslim girls, seems to be completely overwhelmed by her passion and attacks Svenja, the Christian girl, in an almost personal way.

(2) Being tolerant or being honest?

My second example is taken from a 9th grade class with a similar religious composition of the student body. The class is engaging with the topic of homosexuality. The teacher asks the students to role play counseling as a group exercise. Simulating an advice column in a well-known youth magazine, individual cases are submitted to the students who are supposed to give advice, playing the role of “experts on issues of homosexuality.”

The cases were as follows:

(1) Muslim girl with strictly religious parents turns out to be lesbian. She suffers from social pressure and expectations of a future heterosexual marriage.

---

35 The example is taken from a research project which was conducted in the framework of the European Research Project “Religion in Education. A contribution to Dialogue or a factor of Conflict in transforming societies of European Countries” (REDCo). During the course of the project, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in several RE classes at schools in Hamburg, Germany. Results are published inter alia in: Jozsa/Knauth/Weiße 2009 and ter Avest, Jozsa, Knauth, Rosón. Skeie (2009).
(2) Girl admires girl from another class in her year, does not dare to approach her. Some students in her class mock her and gossip maliciously.

(3) Girl is in love with another girl. Everyone who is aware of her infatuation puts her down and claims she is sick, but she is simply being who she is.

In a group comprised mainly of Muslim girls, we observe a conversation between Beria and Zahra. Beria encourages Zahra to write that homosexuality is entirely normal. Zahra disagrees, saying that this is not the case. Beria admonishes her to be tolerant because tolerant behavior is being expected during the task.36

(3) Analysis: religion and normativity in the classroom

What do these examples tell us about the relationship between religion and normativity? Four remarks come to mind:

Ambiguity:
Pedagogical situations are shaped by ambiguity. Different patterns of interpretation are brought into communication, which can cause conflicts. The hidden normativity of institutional classroom communication contributes as well. Classroom communication, however, does not accept every interpretation or position. The normative horizon of the school context differentiates between perspectives which are recognized as legitimate and others which do not fit into the normative ground rules of educated behavior. Students understand this hidden curriculum of political correctness, and they balance and negotiate the issue. During these processes, they reflect to what extent, if at all, they can reveal their actual perspectives and positions—even in cases where their actual position is part of the exercise. The challenging question is: To what extent can classroom communication allow for, and even promote, tolerance and acceptance of ambiguity?

Normative charge:
The examples show that religious positions are normatively charged because they relate to binding values which provide points of orientation. At least this is the case when religion is

36 The example is taken from a comparative case study of schools with different RE models in the cities of Hamburg and Duisburg. The research question focused on patterns of dialog in the respective contexts. The case study was part of a wider research project on religion and dialog in modern societies, which was funded by the German government (MBF). For results, see Thorsten Knauth/Dörthe Vieregge, “Religion and Dialogue in Religious Education. A Comparative Case Study in Duisburg and Hamburg”, in: Julia Ipgrave, Thorsten Knauth, Anna Körs, Dörthe Vieregge and Marie von der Lippe (Eds.), “Religion and Dialogue in the City. Case Studies on Interreligious Encounter in Urban Community and Education”, Münster/ New York (Waxmann) 2018, S. 183 230.
introduced in a mode of subjective experience and sense-making. By positioning themselves, the students reveal their normative ties and belonging. They open up and show the “normative orders” (Forst/ Günther 2011) which they relate to. In the case of religion, the normative orders relate to traditions which shape the identities of individuals and groups. These traditions are not necessarily fully developed. Quite often they are only token and used in an emblematic way. But they illustrate the normative contexts in which individual orientations, values, and positions are embedded. They equip the subject with a sense of belonging to something general which transcends individual existence. The challenging question here is: To what extent can subjects be encouraged to openly show and reflect normative stances?

Conflict:

Pedagogical situations which are shaped by religious heterogeneity and normative ambiguity are susceptible to conflict. The examples show that conflicts can take shape in different ways: they can be touched upon and be expressed very openly, as shown in the first example. Quite often, however, they do not cross the border into open communication and instead remain hidden in the “safe space” of private communication, which is protected from sanctions. The underlying question is: To what extent could it be possible to create classrooms as safe spaces where potentially objectionable contributions can be expressed without being sanctioned?

Different levels of access to religion:

The examples also highlight very different levels of access to religion which are connected to different attitudes towards the normativity of religion. Many empirical studies show that a kind of subjective personalization of religion is the overwhelming dynamic feature of the religiosity of young people with formal Christian backgrounds. Young people are very distant towards religion in its institutionalized forms, such as church and traditional beliefs. However, they do not totally refuse religion but instead relate to it in the sense of a “life-faith.” With regard to the vast landscape of religious traditions, they behave like tourists, as one study (Calmbach et al. 2016) has described their attitude. They travel from site to site and take their pick from the pool of religious symbols, rituals, and explanations of life. They create a bouquet of individual religiosity which follows the logic of personal coherence and efficacy (Does it fit me? Does it work for me?). Thus, the validity claim of general normativity is strongly reduced; it is taken

---

37 A decisive factor determining the opportunities and limitations of dialog in RE classes is whether ground rules of communication can be established which allow for trustful exchange and which reassure students that their attitudes and life stances are respected and tolerated; cf. for the discussion of “safe space” cf. Rothgangel, von Brömssen, Heimbrock, Skeie 2017.

back behind the lines of subjective convictions which may not necessarily be valid for any other person. The only remaining normativity is the conviction that everyone should live according to their own individual beliefs.

There is another type of religiosity which is clearly differentiated from this kind of radicalized subjectivity. Mainly Muslim youngsters show a strongly normative type of religiosity which is related to a purified image of religious tradition as a binding resource for every question in life. These young people emphasize the life-determining significance of religion (cf. Knauth 2008; Jozsa 2008). They regard religion as a signpost and decisive guide in life. Religion provides clear instructions and prescriptions for shaping life, for managing the ethical decisions and problems of daily life. These youngsters are also convinced that Islam holds the complete truth and is the one and only way to salvation (cf. Knauth/Vieregge 2018 206–210). Laying claim to an exclusive truth and the negative evaluation of other religions and people who do not believe in religion belong to the attitudinal part of this religious profile. We know about this specific structure for interpreting religion as a requirement of a tradition which provides unambiguous rules and answers from several empirical studies that have been conducted over the past twenty years (see also Aygün 2013).³⁹

However, for a couple of years now, experienced Muslim pedagogues of religion are concerned about a radicalization of this particular tradition among Muslim young people. Muslim religiosity has come under the influence of Salafist discourse. Without necessarily being part of the Salafi movement itself, Muslim religiosity, guided by the wish for unambiguity and using religion as an identity marker, has picked up prevailing patterns of Salafist interpretations and rhetoric figures. The dogmatization of religion among Muslim youngsters is a real challenge to any educational approach which works with critical reflection and individual reasoning (cf. Kulacatan/Behr 2016; Behr 2017). A very strong theme is the attempt to judge human behavior and human praxis from dichotomic categories of what is allowed and what is forbidden. Criteria for decision are allegedly taken from the Qur’an or deduced from the practice of the Prophet. This verification of religious righteousness is not conducted by the young people themselves but by self-declared experts who spread their sermons via the internet.

³⁹ These patterns can also be interpreted against the background of structural disintegration and a lack of social recognition of Muslim youngsters and their families. The study by Aygün makes clear that the experience of belonging to a religious community is an important factor determining the sense and the strength of religious belonging (see Aygün 2013).
3. Pedagogical reflection: how to come to terms with religion and normativity?

My previous remarks on different attitudes with regard to religion provide the background for explaining the difficulties of a dialogical approach to religious diversity. The difference of religious positions is not an incentive or challenge to young people with individualized and subjectively selected forms of religiosity. In the heat of current and permanent processes of individualization, generalized religious validity claims become meaningless. A religiosity which is shaped by exclusivism and which aims for unambiguity does not have an intrinsic motivation to listen to others. How can we deal with the conflict zone of subjective relativization of normativity and exclusive rejection of the normative claims of others? How can we manage to relate the different positions to another? How can we manage to foster real interest in one another?

The comparative case study by Knauth/Vieregge mentioned previously found that “realising dialogical practice in religious education is a complex and challenging endeavour. To succeed, it needs to balance tensions. In simple terms, the elements of these tensions are organised around poles of proximity and distance in communication. For a dialogue to succeed—in school as well as elsewhere—it must allow participants to contribute their own convictions, their own creativity and spontaneity, and to lay out how they wish to be understood. This opportunity for learners to introduce themselves as they are, unique, self-determined subjects engaging in their own religious quest, allows for a productive, relevant dialogue.” (Knauth, Vieregge 2018, S.226)

My assumption is that a dialogical value education which is embedded in a sustainable culture of dialogue and encounter can provide a way out of the previously discussed dilemma of subjective relativization vs objective universality of religious normativity. Cemented claims of religious validity and an incurious indifference towards the life of others can be eroded through patient and persistent efforts to immerse students in situations of encounter and dialogue. The work should predominantly try to develop an understanding of how values and orientations have been “grown” in the life of individuals. Encounter and relationship are not always remedies for tendencies of fragmentation and freezing, but they are necessary prerequisites for mutual recognition and exchange. Due to space constraints, I can only briefly
mention that dialogical value education\textsuperscript{41} should relate particular traditions of values with individual perspectives and the general claim of democratic education for all. Finally, four conceptional elements must be very briefly introduced:

**Value Education needs to work with biographies:**

The biographical dimension can make transparent how values evolve from questions regarding shaping one’s own life. Especially in situations of cultural and religious heterogeneity, the narrative and reflective self-ascertainment about biographic traits can be an eye-opener for diversity in society.

**Value Education produces and reflects experiences:**

Values evolve through processes of self-ascertainment and self-transcendence (Hans Joas). They have an expressive face which can be formed by educational processes. Subjects show what they regard as right and wrong, good and bad, true and false, just and unjust. Value education has to create contexts to give space to the affective aspects of value-issues.

**Value Education needs social spaces which involve subjects in practice:**

Conventional classroom teaching is hardly an adequate place for giving values a practical shape. Contrast experiences, however, can play a significant role because they disturb familiar patterns of perception and experience. Contrast experiences can be made possible in social spaces beyond the own comfort zones which only mirror the routinized habits and desires of the subjects.

**Value Educations needs narrative approaches:**

During situations of conflict, it becomes visible that persons are guided by values. Conflicts also show that the convincing force of the better argument does not matter in practice. Instead, it is the connection between biography and value orientation that counts. That is why young people should be enabled to tell each other their own stories of value-formation. They should show each other in a dialogical way why they feel attached to certain values and their traditions and, in so doing, they can canvass for understanding of the biographical development of their own orientations.

To put it in a nutshell: The challenging relation between religion and normativity can be met

\textsuperscript{41} The concept of dialogical value education is elaborated in more detail in: Thorsten Knauth, Wertebildung durch dialogisches religionsbezogenes Lernen. Systematische Überlegungen, in: Mirjam Schambeck/Sabine Pemsel-Maier (Hg.), Welche Werte braucht die Welt? Wertebildung in christlicher und muslimischer Perspektive, Freiburg, Basel, Wien (Herder), S. 139–156.
through dialogical approaches which contextualize normative orientations in the life-world and biographies of the students. An alphabetization in dialogue is needed. Continuous encounter is the first step to build up understanding and interest in the stories which we can tell and share with each other.

References


Religion as a Challenge in Preventing Radicalization? Empirical Insights from Germany

Dr. Carmen Figlestahler
Deutsches Jugendinstitut e.V. (DJI)
figlestahler@dji.de
www.dji.de/figlestahler

Joachim Langner
Deutsches Jugendinstitut e.V. (DJI)
jlangner@dji.de
www.dji.de/jlangner

Keywords
Prevention; Radicalization; Civic Education; Religion; Islamist Extremism; Social Work; Islam
Abstract

During the last decade, the pedagogical prevention of violent and antidemocratic Islamism has developed as a new field of work. It contains measures of social work, civic education and sometimes elements of religious education. The religious dimension in particular is one of the main differences to more established areas of work like the prevention of right-wing extremism. Based on empirical cases, this paper pursues the question: in what way is religion a relevant dimension in preventing Islamist radicalization in Germany, and which challenges arise from it?

German Synopsis


During the past decade, the pedagogical prevention of violent and antidemocratic Islamism has developed as a new field of work. Through measures of social work, civic education, and sometimes elements of religious education, this work aims to either strengthen young people against possible dangers of radicalization or to promote distancing strategies from violent or antidemocratic Islamist contexts. In Germany, the majority of this work is realized by civil society initiatives which are funded by government institutions. Within a relatively short amount of time, a diverse landscape has emerged consisting of different organizations pursuing various approaches (Schau et al. 2017; Said/Fouad 2018). This variety, which focuses strongly on the local level, can be seen as a special trait of prevention work in Germany (Nordbruch 2017).

Compared especially to more established areas of work such as the prevention of right-wing extremism, the religious dimension of this new field of work is one of its main distinguishing features. Against the background of being a rather unestablished area of pedagogical work with a variety of actors and approaches, there is an ongoing debate about the role of religious organizations and the significance of religious approaches in prevention work (ibid.; Greuel et al. 2016; Charchira 2017, Schmidt 2018; Taubert/Hantel 2017). However, up to now this debate has rarely been based on empirical research that considers the concrete implementation of pedagogical work.

In order to contribute to this debate, we build on empirical research conducted in the context of the evaluation of pilot projects for the prevention of Islamist radicalization in the German federal program, “Live Democracy!” (“Demokratie leben!”). In particular, we seek to explore the question: in what way is religion a relevant dimension in the prevention of Islamist radicalization in Germany, and which challenges arise from it? In order to discuss this question, we will first outline the role of religion for radicalization. In a next step, based on empirical cases, we will present two types of religious approaches carried out in prevention work. We see this typology as a first step in the attempt to ground the debate on the role of religion empirically; it is also an invitation to complement, differentiate or contradict it. Finally, we will show advantages and challenges resulting from the religious dimension in pedagogical prevention on a more general level, and we will conclude that there is no contradiction per se between civic education and religion in this field of work.
Before we discuss the prevention of radicalization, we would like to take a swift look at the role of religion in radicalization itself. As studies illustrate, processes of radicalization are complex combinations of manifold causes, motivations, and influencing factors. Therefore, religion is only one aspect among others, but it does contribute to the process. For example, radicalization is often anticipated by a personal and religious search for sense and answers. Also, a common trait of many Islamist extremists is that most of them were not very religious before they joined extremist scenes. This means that they often do not have the knowledge and experience to put extremist interpretations of Islam into perspective. Therefore they are potentially more receptive to extremism as they are not capable of weighing up differing versions of Islam against each other or of putting forward theological counterarguments (Wiktorowicz 2005; Precht 2007; Venhaus 2010; Glaser/Herding/Langner 2018).

Finally, social work and youth work have long been domains of work for major Christian organizations (Gabriel 2018). However, we know little about how religion actually becomes manifest in their work. Islamic organizations, on the other hand, are just emerging as new actors in these fields in Germany, and they need to find their own ways of work (Charchira 2017; Schau et al. 2017). The prevention of radicalization is presently an entry-point for Islamic organizations to these fields. In the empirical analysis that follows, we hope to provide some first systematic insights into their work.

**Two Types of Religious Approaches**

The following empirical findings arise from the evaluation of pilot projects on the prevention of Islamist radicalization in the German federal program “Live Democracy!” (“Demokratie leben!”), which is funded by the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth. The German Youth Institute has been evaluating the program since 2015, building on both quantitative data (online surveys) and qualitative data (semi-structured interviews with project staff, group discussions with young people participating in the projects, participant observations of pedagogical measures, document analysis). Although it is not our main research

---

42 As far as the concept of religion is concerned, we understand the term (referring to Gennerich/Kein/Streib 2018) in an open and discursive way (Matthes 1992), but we limit the openness by pinpointing two dimensions of the concept of religion: first an experience of “transcendency” (Luckmann), and second that it relates to issues of “ultimate concern” (cf. Tillichs 1957). Moreover, when we speak about religion in the context of radicalization towards violent Islamism, the term religion will specifically refer to “Islam.”

43 https://www.demokratie-leben.de/en.html
focus, we also examine the role of religion in the pedagogical work for a sample of projects. Following the principles of the documentary method (Bohnsack 2010) we created an early typology consisting of two different types of religious approaches. This is based on four projects in which religion is an important aspect of pedagogical work and which represent characteristic dimensions for this kind of work. These four projects pursue direct pedagogical work with young people in the area of targeted prevention, i.e., projects working with young people because they are facing a higher risk of radicalization or because they are involved in processes of affiliation with violent and antidemocratic Islamist groups or ideas. Therefore, this is only a part of a broader field.

![Figure 1: Types and Projects](image)

**Type 1: Approaches derived from a religious perspective**

The specific trait of the first type is that religious education is a key element of the practical work in the projects. Before elaborating on this point, we will delineate the pedagogical practice of the two projects under consideration.

From the perspective of preventative logic, both projects work in the realm of “indicated prevention”, which means they address young people who are (already) involved with extremist groups or ideologies. Here, both projects provide long-term one-to-one counseling, which involves talking about Islam, politics, and life in general, and also assisting with problems like achieving good grades in school or helping the young people to deal with their court cases.
Another major part of work in these projects is “selective prevention,” which means that the projects address young people who are deemed to be specifically at risk of becoming appealed by extremist groups or ideologies.

Project 1A is a social community initiative started by young Muslims. As an example of their work, they recount that they were informed, that a Jihadist-Salafist, called the “radicalizer,” started to attend prayers in a local mosque and approached young people. Practitioners from the project then attended the mosque and talked and debated with the youngsters there, answering questions on Islam and giving advice on whatever day-to-day issues troubled the young people. In this way, the project intervened to strengthen young people against radicalization.

The other project is carried out by a secular NGO in collaboration with a mosque. Within the mosque, the project invites young people to weekly discussion groups. In the groups, they can talk about Islam, politics, and their daily lives in a religious framing, but it’s also a chance to meet and socialize.

On a more general level, both projects are set in the context of youth work; both apply methods of religious education partially combined with civic education. They aim to foster reflective thinking among the young people and to strengthen their integration in their local community. Building strong relationships with the young people is critical to this work.

There are four major ways in which religion becomes manifest in the pedagogical work of these projects. They either aim to challenge extremist narratives and ideology or to foster Islam against extremism:

The deconstruction of extremist narratives and ideology is a key element of these projects. This is primarily done by evoking reflective thinking through Islam:

Project 1A does so by telling stories. These can be religious stories that are taken form the Qur’an or the Islamic tradition, or they may be stories taken from personal experience. Generally, the stories are framed in a religious manner and relate to issues of “ultimate concern.” These stories are applied strategically to specific extremist narratives when they come up, in the hope that the youngsters will re-evaluate these narratives on the basis of a new perspective.

Project 1B rather guides young people towards reflecting on their own lives from an Islamic perspective. The practitioners give a short presentation that elaborates on Islamic subjects relating to issues in the youngsters’ daily lives. The subsequent discussion intends to guide
participants in reflecting on the way they live and act and to inspire them to try alternatives pathways. The practitioners say that it is about finding your personal theology and reflecting on your biography (1B 2016).  

While both projects talk about Islam to evoke reflective thinking, project 1B guides its participants towards reflecting on their own lives, while project 1A rather guides them to reflect on the Islamic content itself.

A second approach for deconstructing extremist narratives is through religious counterarguments. Both projects collect and teach arguments that are supposed to prove that the extremist interpretations of Islam are wrong, for example by giving evidence from the Qur'an or the Prophet’s traditions. For example, a practitioner of project 1B in an interview tells us about a young man who states that Islam allows violence against non-believers. As a counterargument, the practitioner shows the young man a passage from the Qur'an and says:

“Look here, […] it says ‘if you kill a man’ – and it doesn’t say a Muslim, but a man – “then it’s as if you killed all mankind […]. Now he has to think about it. And this is a really theological approach” (1B 2016: 1570-1580).

In support of such reasoning, sometimes an Imam or other religious authorities are asked to assist.

The other approaches are basically designed to strengthen the “ordinary,” non-extremist Islam. On the one hand, this is done by teaching knowledge about Islam. This can be basic knowledge on rituals and scripture, or it can involve discussing advanced questions that are raised by the young people with whom the practitioners work. This relates to research that shows that a lack of knowledge about Islam is one of the influencing factors that can contribute to make young people more susceptible to radicalization. On the other hand, the approaches respond to the premise that radicalization is about personal searches and disorientation, and that extremist groups are able to provide young people with a tight and meaningful social enclosure. Therefore, the projects provide a religious community as a positive alternative for these young people, either by themselves or by guiding them to a favorable mosque where they can experience Islam in “another way” (cf. 1A 2018: 1973-2063).

In the two Type 1 projects, pedagogical prevention of violent extremism is deeply entangled with Islam. To these practitioners, Islam is a central part of their identity and rationality. Countering radicalization through a religious perspective is their natural way of

---

44 We quote from our interviews with project staff by citing the anonymized name of the project, the year in which the interview was conducted, and, where relevant, the line numbers of the interview transcript.
approaching the issue. As a staff member of project 1A says: “when religion is involved, Islam somehow needs to be part of the solution.” (1A 2018: 1789ff.).

**Type 2: Civic education and social work with a focus on religious topics**

We distinguish a second type of approach, which we describe as civic education with elements of social work where religion is nevertheless an important aspect. This type is based on two projects which are on the border between universal and selective prevention. They work with adolescents who are ascribed a specifically higher risk for Islamist radicalization. The preventive goal is to strengthen the participants against possible extremist groups in their environment.

Project 2A is a collaboration between a mosque and a secular NGO; Project 2B is run by a secular NGO for youth work. They both work with their participants in a long-term group setting, and each established a youth group that meets regularly, generally once a week. In these group settings, the projects combine content-related discussions with leisure activities like sports or trips. The idea behind this is to strengthen group ties as well as the bond between project staff and participants so as to create a foundation for working on the participants’ attitudes.

In contrast to the Type 1 the goals of this type are rather framed by civic education and, partially, social work. Project 2A aims to support the feeling of being a part of the German society through participation. The main goals of project 2B are to support a sense of transculturality, a democratic understanding, and a positive attitude towards diversity.

Despite the focus on civic education, religion is a relevant aspect for both projects. In the first instance, religion is essential for gaining access to the participants: both projects address Muslim adolescents by saying explicitly that they will provide space for questions about their faith. The projects’ main work consists of weekly meetings to discuss political and religious issues. Some of these topics are set by the project practitioners, some by the participants. There is a great variety of topics, such as: political conflicts, like the situation in Turkey or Syria; discrimination experiences and ways of dealing with them; gender roles; homosexuality; questions about the practice of faith; discussion of Islam and democracy but also of issues like the adolescents’ future plans or their choice of subjects at school.

The projects want to establish a space where participants can talk freely without being “othered” as Muslim and without being addressed as representatives for all people of Turkish origin in Germany; these are situations that some of the participants have experienced at school.
On the other hand, a space for open discussion does not imply that problematic statements are not contradicted. In general, these projects aim to differentiate and deconstruct, not telling the participants what is right and what is wrong. Instead, they want to stimulate discussion and foster participants’ skills for matter-of-fact discussion without letting emotions dominate over reasoning or subscribing to conspiracy theories.

Practitioners in Project 2B, for example, describe a group meeting where participants discussed a political conflict in an area of Syria by relating it to the topic of human rights. In a first step, the project staff showed pictures of different actors in this conflict, e.g. of soldiers and civilians. The group analyzed each picture together, talking about the perspectives of different actors in this conflict. In a next step, they talked about consequences of this foreign conflict for their own day-to-day lives in Germany. Different opinions were expressed by the group, also depending on the origin of the participants and their families. The project staff saw their main task as moderating the ensuing discussion, taking care that discussion did not become over-emotionalized and providing participants with the tools and instructions to analyze the different positions in the conflict based on political criteria. While the subject itself was not religious, religious perspectives played an important part in the discussion.

As we know from group discussions with the participants, the opportunity for talking about religious issues and being in a group with other young Muslims is one important reason for taking part in the projects. Participants stress the fun they have in the project and the feelings of belonging to the group. In addition, the participants emphasize the positive meaning of education outside of a school setting; that they undertake activities they otherwise would not become involved in; and that they talk about political issues and gain knowledge.

Even though the projects do not bring religion into the discussion all the time, they do stress the role of religion in civic education and social work in a special way by creating an open and safe space for Muslim adolescents to discuss political and religious issues. At this time, this kind of religion-sensitive pedagogical work is still quite rare in Germany. As we can see, both types provide knowledge about Islam and deconstruct extremist narratives. The difference between the two types lies in the way they broach the issue, which in the case of Type 2 is oriented more around the principles of civic education. Furthermore, the goals of the projects of Type 2 are framed by civic education and social work.

A crucial point in this special kind of work and a special challenge for the projects is to find adequate staff who have the necessary qualifications and who are accepted by all actors in the project, including Muslim communities, secular NGOs, and especially the participants.
Advantages and Challenges

Finally, we would like to summarize the consequences resulting from the religious dimension in pedagogical prevention work on a more general level.

On the one hand, there are certain advantages. In this field of work, it is generally difficult to reach young people (cf. Figlesthahler 2017, p. 178-179), especially when they are actually appealed by or affiliated with extremist groups and ideologies. The projects we presented here, however, manage to engage them in pedagogical processes. In part, the projects succeed because they address young people as Muslim brothers or sisters, or because they share a set of similarities (being young, growing up in the same neighborhood, being perceived as Muslim) and therefore similar experiences. Project 1B, for example, states that practitioners can easily get young people to talk with them about serious and personal issues when they “take them by their religious side” (1B 2017: 1257-1293).

Secondly, these projects—especially Type 1—can provide religious arguments against religious narratives of extremist groups; this is significant because transcendent and ultimate dimensions of religion make arguments particularly hard to verify and thus to contest in pedagogical work. So there is evidence that arguments that are based on the Qur’an and the Islamic tradition may be accepted as convincing if they are brought into the pedagogical process by Imams or social workers who are well versed in Islamic theology.

Finally, the public debate on Islamist radicalization is set in a context of polarized public opinions on Islam. Some central narratives of Islamist extremism are feeding on this polarization, emphasizing any injustice that Muslims suffer. The preventive work may involuntarily nurture these narratives, especially if it is perceived that the majority actors address the Muslim minority as being a threat (cf. Lindekilde 2012). Including Muslim actors as part of the preventive work ensures that their perspective is present in the field as well.

On the other hand, there are also specific challenges. First of all, projects addressing religion have to deal to a higher degree with significant levels of skepticism. For secular projects, skepticism from Muslim communities or mosques can be an issue; for example, there may be questions on why a secular project is working with “their” Muslim young people on religious topics. Community projects or collaborative projects have to deal with skepticism from both the “inside” and the “outside.” By inside we refer to Muslim communities or mosques who can be skeptical towards projects aiming to prevent radicalization because they perceive them as a general accusation, implying that all Muslim young people are potentially radical.
This is a general challenge for all projects in this field, as “prevention of radicalization” is a very strong label with a high risk of stigmatization. To reduce this risk, projects need to act sensitively towards the people with whom they work, and they should reflect carefully what traits they ascribe to them, especially in the field of selective prevention.

Skepticism from the outside refers to the point that in present-day Germany, there are polarized debates about the role of Islam, sometimes accompanied by a mistrust towards all Muslims, which is fostered by certain media and right-wing populists (Ceylan/Kiefer 2018, p. 33ff.). Muslim organizations engaging in prevention work sometimes have to deal with hostilities that are at least partially nurtured by these debates.45

When looking at the concrete pedagogical work, there are potential tensions between the principles of work. Extra-curricular civic education in Germany is rather oriented at a demand of controversy and the prohibition against overwhelming.46 In religious education, on the contrary, claims of religious truth may occur that may contradict the principles mentioned previously. Based on our findings, we assert that it is important for professional pedagogical prevention work that project practitioners are aware of these tensions, reflect on them, and find suitable ways for dealing with them.

Conclusion

The religious dimension of the prevention of radicalization has barely been the subject of empirical research. The typology we present here is a first attempt at structuring the dimensions that characterize this kind of work. It is supposed to be a starting point for further analysis, and the typology may be revised, complemented, and further differentiated in this process. Moreover, as religious approaches to the prevention of radicalization are a relatively new field of work, they may further evolve and possibly become more established. Their future relevance, however, is to be seen, since those projects heavily depend on the field’s vigorous dynamics, short-term funding, and ongoing public debates.

45 In 2017, for example, there were various media reports after a blogger accused Muslim employees of a non-Muslim NGO which is pursuing prevention work of being linked to Islamist extremists. The two employees were suspended from their work while the case was investigated. Although the accusations were eventually disproved, this debate caused further damage to the public perception of Muslim actors in prevention work, both on the organizational and the personal level (Said/Fouad 2018, p.8).

46 These are two of the three principles of the Beutelsbach Consensus (1976), a pivotal basis for civic education in Germany.
In summary, our findings show, however, that there is no contradiction per se between civic education and religion in this field, and that it is reasonable to establish pedagogical activities that explicitly address religion. Of course, this does not mean that all projects working in this field should do so. Moreover, our research shows that religious perspectives are taken into the field not only by “typical” religious actors, such as Mosques or the entities they are organized in, but also by “secular” NGOs that are driven by a religious Islamic motivation or by a specific sensitivity towards religion.

Islamic perspectives complement and enrich the field with an additional perspective. From a participatory view, this perspective is an essential part in a field that focuses on Muslims as bearers of a problem in a minority/majority context. These projects tend to be a way of successfully approaching some target groups, including among them some actors that may not be reached otherwise. As the causes and motivations for Islamist radicalization are manifold, there need to be manifold pedagogical answers as well.

References


The Role of Religion for Countering Violent Islamist Extremism — The Situation in France

Milena Uhlmann

Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, Germany
milena.uhlmann@bamf.bund.de
http://www.bamf.de/EN/Startseite/startseite-node.html

Keywords

Countering/Preventing Violent Extremism; Islamism; Radicalisation; France

Abbreviations

CVE: Countering Violent Extremism
FTF: Foreign Terrorist Fighters
IS: Islamic State
PVE: Preventing Violent Extremism
Abstract

France has been the target of numerous jihadist-inspired terrorist attacks, especially since the 2015 attacks in Paris. Islamist radicalisation seems to be of a more intense nature in France compared to its neighbouring countries, posing severe challenges to the security and cohesion of French society. This article addresses the question of how this situation came about and how it relates to the debate on preventing and countering violent Islamist extremism (PVE/CVE).

German Synopsis

Frankreich steht im Fadenkreuz dschihadistischer Terrorattentate, vor allem seit den Pariser Anschlägen des Jahres 2015. Im Vergleich zu seinen Nachbarländern scheint islamistische Radikalisierung in Frankreich von intensiverer Natur zu sein. Diese Bedrohungslage stellt die französische Gesellschaft vor ernsthafte Herausforderungen, die sowohl die öffentliche Sicherheit als auch den gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt bereffen. Der vorliegende Artikel befasst sich mit der Frage, wie diese Situation entstanden ist, und in welchem Bezug sie die Debatte zur Prävention und Bekämpfung des islamistischen Extremismus beeinflusst.
The Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher terrorist attacks of January 2015 in Paris marked the beginning of an ongoing series of attacks inspired by jihadism, an extreme version of radical Islamist thought and action which endorses and propagates violence in the name of Islam. Some of these attacks were successful, others failed; some were more sophisticated, some less.

Compared to its neighbouring countries, Islamist radicalisation – understood here as a process of adopting an extremist interpretation of Islam, usually accompanied by a certain set of rigid behavioural rules – seems to be of particularly intense nature in France, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. France has suffered a high number of attacks and experienced a high rate of thwarted ones; it has recorded a record number of individuals reported to have been radicalised and an elevated number of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) who left the country to join jihadist groups in various conflict zones, e.g. in Syria and Iraq. Therefore, France has not only been a particular target for terrorists but has also been catapulted into the limelight of international public interest with regard to how it is handling the challenges posed by jihadist-inspired terrorism, both in terms of threats to the safety of its society as well as to societal cohesion.

A question frequently debated in this context is: how did this situation come about? And, though less often addressed: how does the situation relate to the debate on preventing and countering violent Islamist extremism (PVE/CVE), especially given the laic definition of the French state and society?

Terrorism isn´t new to the country. In its history, France has experienced a significant number of shootings, bombings, hostage takings, vehicle ramplings, arson attacks, and hijackings by right-wing extremists, left-wing extremists, nationalists and, lately, jihadist perpetrators. In 1995, the GIA-affiliated terrorist network of which Khaled Kelkal was part conducted several attacks, as did the Al-Qaida–affiliated gang de Roubaix one year later; but until the murders committed by Mohammed Merah in Toulouse and Montauban in 2012, terrorist attacks were treated as political violence in the context of anti-colonial struggles or connected to other instances of violent conflicts abroad, such as the Bosnian War, rather than being viewed as inspired by religion or connected to social, societal and/or political issues within the country. Terrorist perpetrators and their networks and milieus were counteracted with repressive instruments – a wider angle of analysis, which would have allowed tackling the threat from a more holistic perspective, had not been incorporated into the design of counterterrorism policy.
For almost 30 years, empirical studies have warned of possible future developments which might threaten societal cohesion and ultimately result in different forms of violence. In 1987, Gilles Kepel, in his pioneering study titled *Les banlieues de l’Islam, Naissance d’une religion en France* (‘The suburbs of Islam, Birth of a religion in France’), which was based on fieldwork in the suburbs of Paris, analysed the realities of the everyday lives of the people who live in these suburbs. Acknowledging that most of the immigrants were of Muslim heritage and intended to stay in France permanently, Kepel stressed the importance of changing the concept of ‘Islam in France’ to ‘Islam of France’ – in other words, integration was to be a challenge for and responsibility of both Muslims and non-Muslims. At the same time, he pointed out that a failure to merge successfully French and immigrant/Muslim identities and a failure to enhance the social participation of the inhabitants of the *banlieues* would carry with it the risk that communitarianism would establish itself in the suburbs.

In French public opinion, Islam is widely perceived as inherently violent. The violent conflicts in the context of the French colonies’ struggle for independence politicised public perception of the presence of foreign workers from the colonies, particularly Algerians. In light of violent conflicts within metropolitan France in the context of the Algerian War (1954–1962) and terrorist acts during the 1990s, Algerians were increasingly perceived as posing a threat to national security. This perception strongly influenced the national discourse about immigrants not only from Algeria, and has become part of France’s collective memory. Events such as the *affaire du foulard* (the headscarf controversy), which originated around Muslim schoolgirls wearing their headscarves at school in the Paris *banlieue* of Creil in 1989, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, and the riots in several French *banlieues* in 2005 further strengthened the prevalent opinion in French society that Muslims are not capable of integrating. This, in turn, further entrenched the notion that Islam is a form of communitarianism which imports not only a foreign religion and foreign habits considered alien to French culture but also external conflicts. This view was further reinforced by the French republican ethos, which demands absolute assimilation of all people, native or foreign, into the cultural and social norms prevalent in French society.

In Kepel’s sequel study, *Banlieue de la République: société, politique et religion à Clichy-sous-Bois et Montfermeil* (‘Suburb of the Republic: society, politics and religion in Clichy-sous-Bois and Montfermeil’), which dates from 2011, i.e. six years after the 2005 riots that took place in these two municipalities in the north-east of Paris, his assessment of the situation 24 years after his initial study is grim: unemployment, isolation, and social segregation.
had become persistent structural problems. Billions of euros that were spent on suburban renovation had contributed to improving the cityscape, but not social cohesion. Quite the reverse, in fact: the nicknames of the département in which the two municipalities are located, derived from the first two digits of their post code, quatre-vingt-treize (‘ninety-three’) or, for short, neuf trois (‘nine three’), have become a synonym for failed integration, ghettoisation, and the disintegration of the Republic in general. The département belongs to the French region of Île-de-France, which, together with the south-west of the country (with one of the hotspots being Nice, the scene of truck attack of 14 July 2016), is the part of France most heavily affected by concerns relating to radicalisation.

Factors such as the authorities’ misplaced focus on building concrete structures rather than developing the human aspect (to paraphrase Kepel), their ignorance of the root causes of social and economic exclusion and seclusion, their lack of understanding of how to break the vicious cycle associated with such exclusion, precariousness, and a lack of options for developing cultural capital and social advancement were exacerbated by denial and a lack of sincere interest in the problems of the denizens of the banlieues. This led to poor social policies. Even today, pupil achievement rates in the banlieues are considerably lower than the national average, while the unemployment rate – especially among young people – is higher, providing additional motivations for engaging in crime, violence, and drug dealing. The French model for national integration has failed, as Kepel states repeatedly, while the issues resulting from this failure combined with the resulting structural problems, such as high unemployment, rates seem to paralyse political leaders. Especially in the banlieues, the République fell short of its promise.

At the same time, Islam was increasingly being used and/or propagated as a means for compensating for the shortcomings of the services usually provided by the state, and the influence of strict preachers has steadily been growing. The Tablighi Jamaat movement, which had been proselytising (not only) in the banlieues, has now been replaced with Salafi actors, who are actively reinforcing a Muslim Salafi identity – with sustainable outcomes.

The social and cultural rupture with French society of certain milieux in France, and/or their withdrawal into a closed religious identity as a result of their continued (self-)alienation, outcomes of which Kepel had warned, is obvious to those who have been observing the situation. Among them is Nadia Remadna, a social worker and activist with Algerian roots from Sevran, one of the poorest municipalities in France, located in the notorious neuf trois. Police have been reluctant to penetrate certain parts of Sevran, access to which was temporarily controlled by gang members. Desperate to gain control, and with drug trafficking and violence...
related to gang wars peaking in Sevran in 2011, the commune’s mayor called for UN-peacekeeping–style interventions to pacify the situation.

Remadna and others report that inhabitants of Sevran have been increasingly selecting their healthcare provider according to the religious affiliation of the doctors who would treat the patient. And slowly but surely, Islamists have been infiltrating and taking over youth clubs, according to Remadna’s observations over the past couple of years.

In her book titled Comment j’ai sauvé mes enfants (‘How I saved my children’), she states how parental concern for children has changed from a fear that children will become involved with drugs and crime to a fear that children will fall prey to Salafi ‘radicalisers’ and end up as terrorists with the so-called Islamic State (IS). In Remadna’s view, local structures and dynamics have never been properly analysed. As a result, at least some of the money that was made available to fund, for example, youth workers and sports coaches with the aim of keeping vulnerable young people out of trouble has gone to individuals who are using their proximity to their target group of vulnerable young people to exert psychological pressure to behave in ways that ‘will please God’, i.e. not to mix with the other sex, to dress modestly, to pray, etc, and not do drugs.

Remadna accuses local politicians of having tried to buy social peace at the expense of giving up the values of the Republic in general, and giving up on Sevran in particular. She has witnessed for several years how Salafis ‘Islamicised’ not only the public spheres in the banlieues, but also increasingly private lives and homes. She has observed Islamist recruiters emerging who know exactly what they are doing and who are going about their tasks more and more openly. She describes how, during the ‘Salafisation’ of Sevran, radicalisers have been working on taking over cultural hegemony by either bullying or luring young people into displaying certain behaviours and adhering to a specific dress code. Conduct comes first; next, the young people will slowly but surely be groomed into a mindset that at its core relies on the dichotomy of ‘you are Muslim, not French’, with ‘French’ and ‘Muslim’ being constructed as two exclusive, irreconcilable identities. Virulent anti-Semitism and the widespread dissemination of conspiracy theories contribute to the hardening of enemy images.

For some of these young people, adopting ‘radical’ styles of behaviour, Salafi dress codes, and aggressive ways of communicating is simply a way of getting the bullies off their backs. For others, it is a means for channelling their frustration and aggression into avenues that will be acceptable to their peers: namely against ‘the French’, the Republic, and everything it stands for in their minds. This does not necessarily mean that they hate liberté, égalité,
fraternité as such; after all, these youngsters are, at least in part, looking for exactly these qualities when becoming ‘radicals’. Some of the young people do feel exempt from the values that these words are supposed to represent but to them have become simple slogans, void of content and commitment. These young people seek shelter in an ideology of demarcation because égalité does not seem to apply to them; they feel attracted to a Salafist interpretation of Islam. Other young people find it especially appealing to devaluate those whom they themselves exempt from their own, new construct of the fraternité of ‘true Muslims’.

For those who lost the opportunity of living a self-determined life to drug abuse and/or crime, belonging to the Muslim fraternité can feel like they reclaimed control over their lives or can provide an avenue for seeking redemption in the same way that it can provide certainty and meaning to those lacking orientation. Some young people use Salafi ‘radicalism’ to liberate themselves from the authoritarian grip of their parents, or even – as absurd as this may sound – to seek the liberté (or rather, deliverance) from the ‘impertinence’ of postmodern life in order to craft their own futures and create meaning in their lives such that living feels worthwhile; often enough, a lack of access to quality education and attractive jobs (attractive both in terms of the nature of the job and the financial rewards it offers) makes it difficult for young people to take ownership of their lives and to leave the banlieue.

But it is not only in this sense that Paris intra-muros (the term used to refer to the city of Paris without its suburbs, for example on the metro map) is often off-limits for the youngsters of the banlieues. The process of ghettoisation is a physical as much as a mental one, as Remadna points out. Many of the youths of Sevran have never been to Paris, a mere twenty-minute train journey away, not because they cannot go there, but because it never enters their mind; the city and the République seem worlds away.

The formation of a secluded identity predominantly in the banlieues combined with Islamisation, polarisation, and radicalisation processes within the local microcosmos and thus formed a recruiting pool from which extremists draw. Meanwhile, a hardcore, home-grown jihadist movement has materialised.

France is facing a complex and complicated situation. This article aimed to trace its genesis in, admittedly, very broad outlines. To sum up, key factors influencing the current situation and its development seem to be

- historical baggage that relates to a violent past which is rooted within the French colonial context and has become part of France’s collective memory
external events, ranging from the violent colonial conflicts to the conflicts in the Middle East, both past and present

- insufficient options for social and economic participation, including disadvantageous conditions that hinder the accumulation of social capital, e.g. in the banlieues

- communitarism and seclusion, including a withdrawal back into a closed religious identity, and/or into gangs/crime/drugs

- qualitative and/or quantitative lack of adequate means to effectively handle the above-mentioned structural problems

- insufficient means to sustainably develop an inclusive local and/or national identity in a culturally, ethnically, and religiously diverse country

- a very active scene of ‘radicalisers’ who offer social services, leisure activities and empowerment through the devaluation of others as a means to groom persons vulnerable to radicalisation into an extremist interpretation of Islam

- the ‘Salafisation’ of public venues and private lives and homes, resulting in the evolvement of Salafi milieus through cultural hegemony

- hardened enemy images among the radicalized clientele, i.e. persons prone to radicalisation, including anti-Semitism and conspiracy theories

- the development of a hardcore, ideologised home-grown jihadist movement, channeling hate against presumed enemies into violent action

- polarisation of French society

The above (incomplete) list suggests that religion as such is not necessarily the key factor in the development of the situation. Historical, structural, and social constellations play a role as well. Within this complex interplay, religion – or, rather, religious ideology – can probably best be understood as a vector, which in combination with several of the aforementioned factors transforms individual vulnerability to radicalisation into an extremist set of thought- and/or action-related orientations. The interplay of (self-)segregation, extremist interpretations of Islam, and Islamist radicalisation has by now become a central part of the public and political discourse on terrorism and PVE/CVE efforts in France. The role of religion versus ideology within radicalisation processes – with leading scholars theorising on the ‘radicalisation of Islam’ (Gilles Kepel) vs ‘Islamisation of radicalism’ (Olivier Roy) – has become part of a fierce debate. Focal points of the debate have been long-neglected ideological aspects of jihadist radicalisation in the West (Kepel), and the functions which ‘radicalism’ and
Islamist extremism fulfil for individuals at a socio-psychological level in liberal European countries (Roy). Still lacking in this very necessary, but also very polarised debate, is an examination of the roles which the strong emphasis on laic principles and the partly aggressive pursuit of an essentialised republican identity play in the genesis of radicalisation, the analysis of the phenomenon, and the design, implementation, and effect of PVE and CVE measures.

Maybe the question that needs be asked is not so much what the role of religion in French PVE/CVE efforts is – but rather why it is so potent in its function as a radicalising vector within the specific social, societal, and political French context.

References
Notes from fieldwork in Paris, January-December 2015 (participant observations; interviews and informal conversations)
The Jihadist Social Actors in Europe

Farhad Khosrokhavar

Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris (professor emeritus)
Observatoire de la radicalisation in Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris (director)
fcavard@gmail.com

Keywords

jihadism, disaffected youth, inverted multiculturalism, total Muslims, negative hero
Abstract - European Jihadists: Men and Women

With the term jihadism, I refer to a religious and political phenomenon based on a radical version of Islam that claims to be the genuine and unique embodiment of Allah’s religion, all the others being fake. It is based on the primacy of jihad, that is, violence in the name of God, in order to impose on the world its religious norms, which it has reinterpreted in the light of radical Islam.

Since the emergence of Islamic State (IS or ISIS) in 2014, jihadism has brought new agents to the world stage, especially in the West. Its advent multiplied the calls for jihad among Western young people, and particularly among European young people. Among them were adolescents and post-adolescents, but also young people of migrant origin, middle class converts, people with psychological problems (from depression to major psychopathologies), and women. In this article, I choose to deal only with young people of migrant origin, the middle class, and women jihadists.

German Synopsis


1 Of a sample of 1,200 individuals who left Western countries between 2012 and 2015 to join Syria and Iraq, 14% are under 18 years of age; 27% are between 18 and 21 years old; 26% are between 22 and 25 years old; 17% are between 26 and 29 years old; 9% are between 30 and 35 years old; and 7% are 36 years old and over. If the age group of 14- to 25-year-olds is described as “young,” they comprise 67%, or just over two-thirds, of the total sample. See Arie Perliger, Daniel Milton, From Cradle to Grave: The Lifecycle of Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, November 2016.

Three Types of Jihadist Agents

We can distinguish three types of jihadist actors according to their social class:

1. Young people of immigrant origin, living in ghettoized neighborhoods or within poor districts in European cities or in their poor suburbs, where poverty prevails and which show high rates of school dropouts, delinquency, and an important underground economy based on illegal trafficking. Stigmas are strongly felt by the inhabitants of these neighborhoods, as are humiliation and a sense of being treated with contempt by the authorities and society.

2. Young people of immigrant origin who have joined the middle classes and who suffer from the stigmas against them in spite of their economic integration. For these young people, access to middle class status does not put an end to the social prejudices linked to their origin.

3. Middle-class young people of European origin who identify with Muslim suffering in the Middle East and who convert to radical Islam in order to join a “warm community,” as opposed to the “cold communities,” their own national communities, to which they belong.

These three types of young people are distinct in their social and ethnic origin, but they are equally beset by the fear of an uncertain future (for the middle classes, fear of proletarianization and the loss of their middle-class status; among young people of migrant origin, the feeling of hopelessness and “no future”).

Rejection of Politics

Almost all over Europe, a major proportion of second- and third-generation migrant families (in Great Britain, from Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, “Asians” or black Africans; in France, North Africans and those from Black Africa) suffers from non-participation in the economic and political spheres. In 2009, an official report focused on the lack of political commitment by these disaffected young people in the UK. They sometimes found substitutes for political citizenship in radical movements. This disengagement is in and as of itself the result of a mistrust of the political field, a sense of the nonsense of politics, a lack of motivation to

---

participate in politics in all its dimensions (election as well as candidacy). These young people strongly believe that no real change can occur by engaging in the political arena or by voting. This trait is found everywhere in Europe among young people of migrant origin; it is, in fact, the trait that pushes them towards radicalization.\(^4\) A small minority, often from within the middle classes among these immigrant offspring, become members of the political elite, but from then on they are considered traitors by the young people of the poor districts, who reject them as “lackeys of the white man.”

**Disaffected Young People**

Disaffected young people, i.e. those between the ages of 15 and 30, most of whom suffer from a feeling of non-participation in society and a profound sense of stigmatization, form the major part of the “reserve army” of jihadists in Europe. Their adherence to radical Islam bears witness to the crisis of European societies. We can compare Amedy Coulibaly (who killed five people between January 7 and 9, 2015, in Paris), Adel Kermiche (who murdered the catholic priest, Jacques Hamel, on July 26, 2016) and Anders Breivik from Norway (who, on July 22, 2011, killed 77 people and injured 151 in the name of fighting for the Islamization of Europe). In all three cases we find:

- the exaltation of violence, legitimized in the name of “sacred” values;
- an exacerbated narcissism, the “self” being experienced as a repository of sacred values, the realization of whose ideals justifies the recourse to extreme violence;
- the total rejection of the present situation in the name of an exalted and mythical future;
- a focus on the warrior role, which opposes the dominant non-violent values of the global society.

**Inverted Multiculturalism**

Jihadism cannot be solely attributed to disaffected young people of immigrant origin, whether in France, England, Germany or other Western countries; but young Muslims of immigrant origin, from the first to the third generation and living chiefly in ghettoized neighborhoods, are the majority among the jihadists in Europe.

Let’s analyze one specific case. In 2013, Karim, Adil and Rabi were the first to leave Lunel, a town with 27,000 inhabitants in southern France. Since then, more than twenty young

\(^4\)See *Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities, Communities and Local Government*, www.communities.gov.uk, April 2009.
people have followed them. Seven are already dead, including Karim. Hamza lived close to the shop kept by Karim and his brother, Saad, in Lunel. The two friends spent long hours discussing the upheavals in the Middle East, the warning signs of the end of time in Islam, and the ills of French society. “I got a BTS (technician’s diploma) in accountancy, and the result was that all native French student found a job, and the only two Arabs (French citizens of North African origin) of the class, we did not find any […]. In France, the choice is whether the employer likes the look of the customer or not. For the Arab, manual work is normal, not a higher job, even if he is qualified,” said Hamza to the researchers.\(^5\)

The feeling of being a second-class citizen, exposed to social prejudices and not having the same opportunities as other citizens, is widely shared by immigrant young people in Great Britain, Holland, Germany, Denmark, or Belgium, and empirical research by sociologists largely confirms it almost everywhere in Europe.\(^6\)

To get Karim out of his predicament, Hamza activated the network of Johan Juncaj, an Albanian close to Mourad Farès, one of the main recruiters for the jihad in France. Before being formally identified by the intelligence services, Mourad Farès and Johan Juncaj created Facebook pages praising the holy war. For Karim, jihadism was a means to get revenge for the humiliation of having been mistreated by society; the humiliation of seeking and finding a job below his competence, which is shared by other young people with immigrant background in France (due to their North African origins) and England (due to their Bangladeshi or Pakistani origins) as well as elsewhere in Europe.

Jihadism in this sense involves reversing humiliation into a radical counter-humiliation which is inflicted on society as a whole. Humiliating those who humiliated you is the dream that many young people entertain when they feel their life destroyed by the arrogance of a society that considers them sub-human.

In Europe, the vast majority of young people who enlisted under the IS flag (the Islamic State, also called Daesh, and, more rarely, networks like Jabhat al-Nusra which represent al-Qaeda) belong to the group of “disaffected young people.”\(^7\) Their view of society is marked by

\(^6\) To view the French and English cases, among others, see: Claire Adida, David Laitin et Marie-Anne Valfort, Mesurer la discrimination, Apports de l’économie expérimentale, 2013; Marie-Anne Valfort, Musulmans: la réalité des discriminations au travail 09/04/2015, http://www.latribune.fr/opinions/tribunes/musulmans-la-realite-des-discriminations-au-travail-467384.html; Emily Dugan, “Britain’s hidden racism: Workplace inequality has grown in the last decade,” The Independent Online, 03/12/2014; University of Manchester, Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity, Britain’s ethnic minorities are facing barriers to social mobility and job opportunities, 2014; Roger Dobson, “British Muslims face worst job discrimination of any minority group, according to research,” The Independent Online, 30/11/2014.
“hatred” related to their social and “racial” condition: they feel marginalized, excluded, rejected, mistreated, stigmatized as second-class citizens, and reduced to being infrahuman, to being “insects,” as a young man told me in prison. This negative self-image, which is shared by many young men (but not women) living in the poor suburbs in France (or ghettoized neighborhoods throughout Europe), makes mutual understanding in democratic terms impossible.

The overwhelming majority of these young people does not take part in elections because, in their view, no noticeable change in their circumstances will occur regardless of the outcome of the vote. The only viable solution is to “cheat” the system and to get involved in the underground economy (traffic, drugs, theft, robbery). Violence also plays a role in bypassing the long road to economic integration: they refuse to start with underpaid menial jobs and to finish, like their parents, with an insignificant retirement pension, synonymous with indignity in their eyes. They want immediate access to middle-class status. They are in a situation of “neither/nor” that generates rancor and a feeling of double “un-belonging”: they are neither “Arab” nor “French;” in the country of their parents they are called “dirty Frenchmen,” but in France they are “dirty Arabs.” The same holds true for the young people of Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin in Britain: they are “Pakis” in the eyes of British citizens, and “nasty Englishmen” in Pakistan. Delinquency gives them the opportunity to obtain middle-class status symbols, thereby seeming to join the middle classes to which their parents were denied access.

It is also an act of provocation towards a society that treats them as “less than nothing” (moins que rien), as one of them told me in prison. The intense feeling of internalized indignity and the yearning to live in a provocative manner make them seek illegitimate recognition rather than legitimate recognition (which, in their eyes, is inaccessible). They therefore long to become, not “positive heroes” who are admired by others, but “negative heroes,” who are hated by society and yet glorified all the same by the media, who assure them notoriety based on their monstrosity and their superlative violence through jihadism and other avenues.

They hate society: “hatred” (la haine) is an anthropological category used by the very same young people to characterize their attitude towards society. Therefore, they literally accept (and some of them enjoy as a form of revenge) being hated by society in a reciprocal

---

8 The interviews in prison mentioned in this article are the result of empirical fieldwork (2011-2013) in four major prisons in France (Fresnes, Fleury-Méroget, in the suburbs of Paris, Lille-Séquedin, in the vicinity of the city of Lille, and Saint-Maur, a high security prison in central France). The ministry of justice financed the project. For an exhaustive analysis, see Farhad Khosrokhavar, Les prisons de France, Robert Lafont, Paris, 2016.

relationship, this time successful in their eyes, due to the “fame” achieved through terrorist acts that push them to the forefront of the media. The recognition they seek is an inverted one: since they cannot be recognized for good, they must be acknowledged as evil in the eyes of others, inspiring fear instead of admiration, marking through deadly deeds the break with the dominant norm of non-violence.

In France, the poor suburbs (les banlieues) are the venue of illegality for these young boys who learn from a young age to share values of ostentatious consumerism through deviance, through a break from the legal norm: as young boys, they idolize the local “caïds” (chiefs) who “succeed” by showing off their cars, fashion sun glasses, and branded shoes.

Deviance and dropping out of school are part of the culture of these poor districts because the normal way, the route through schooling and studies, leads their young people nowhere given their social and cultural handicaps. Their parents are unable to help them because of their lack of fluency in French or English or German, or even their illiteracy. School fails them; the school environment in these poor districts is not conducive to “healthy” competition in learning, and the fact that a high concentration of pupils hails from anywhere in the world but the host country itself makes acculturation to the host country’s (French, English, German, Dutch) national norms difficult or almost impossible. In these districts, “an inverted multiculturalism” reigns, meaning that a variety of cultures is present with the exception of the most important one, namely the host country’s culture.

This type of multiculturalism creates individuals who lack an understanding of the body language and the daily habits of the larger society in which they live, and who have not learned through contact with other French, German or English individuals the basics of national behavior, in particular as regards polite manners or fluency in the normal daily language. These individuals usually create a subculture of their own, using a mixed language where inverted words (“verlan”)—some Arabic, English and slang—give birth to a vernacular that is almost incomprehensible to the outsider. Black African, North African, Asian, even Chinese cultures are muddled up, with some dominant features of the North African culture in France, Bangladeshi or Pakistani in Great Britain, Moroccan in Belgium.

Being based on a mix from which the major national culture is all too often absent, this subculture creates a generation that has major cultural obstacles to overcome in order to become part of the larger society in terms of cultural understanding of others. This subculture and the sentiment of being excluded generate a body language and verbal expressions that express this explicit fact of separation. This fact then becomes an aspiration, since the chasm between “them” and “us” is regarded as unbridgeable. The words made up of expressions that are
unintelligible to outsiders, and the gestures often considered as threatening and aggressive by the dominant culture, put the non-local citizen ill at ease in front of members of the subculture. While this aggressiveness is real, it is partly exaggerated by attributing an “aggressive nature” to these young men who, for their part, also live in the apprehension of others, namely the “Frenchmen” (the “Englishmen,” the “German”); and who therefore go out to the city center in groups, thereby in turn increasing the levels of apprehension experienced by other citizens, who face a “horde” rather than individuals.

Between these young men and the other citizens stands a wall of misunderstanding, both sides rejecting each other and both characterizing the other in derogatory terms: the non-immigrant Frenchmen call them “Arabs,” “Beurs,” “Bougnoule;” while they call the non-immigrant Frenchman “Garoui” or “Blanc.” This divide of mutually derogatory language exists all over Europe.

Transferring this identity from delinquency to jihadism requires some mutations, but it also preserves constant features like the revenge-seeking character of the individual: he “shines” by squandering money and roaring his car, often stolen, which is then set on fire to make disappear the traces of the theft, but also to underline the pleasure derived from destruction in a kind of modern “Potlatch.” By becoming jihadist, these deviant young people literally stage their own narcissistic tendency to magnify themselves at the expense of the “disbelievers;” they put their pictures on the internet in order to assert their “glory” and their superiority towards a society that has denied them a fair lot. Larossi Abballa, the killer of a French policeman and his companion in Magnanville on June 13, 2016, filmed himself, streaming the video live to Facebook; Mohamed Merah filmed himself murdering the Muslim soldiers and the Jewish father and his children, sending the footage to the channel Aljazeera.

For many stigmatized young people, death becomes a means for becoming recognized for their superiority (whereas in real life they are nobody and suffer from inferiority); their exposure to deadly dangers flatters their “wounded ego” (while they consider as inferior “normal” citizens who are afraid of death and who avoid this kind of exposure). In 2013, in Fresnes, a large nineteenth-century prison close to Paris, this 25-year-old Frenchman of Moroccan descent, jailed for having been involved in drug trafficking, deeply marked by the stigmas of his origins, did not attribute his ideas to himself (for fear that I might denounce him to the prison authorities), but credited his friend for those opinions:

---

Mohammad: My buddy told me, they mistreat us, they put us in a hole in these poor suburbs, separated from the rest of the population, they put us in jail, they look down on us, they think we have no pride, we are like apes. But Islam gives us pride. That frightens them. They are afraid of death—we are not. When we lean on Islam, they are afraid of us; they don’t despise us anymore, they believe we are reckless and violent. We know what we want, and after death we will go directly to paradise while they will go to hell!"\(^{11}\)

Islamization in this context results in recovering the lost pride, becoming somebody that cannot be treated as inferior, pushing towards the holy war in order to overcome the humiliation of being an outsider, a “Frenchman only on paper,” a non-genuine French citizen. Radical Islam rejects citizenship (which was denied to the young people in daily life) and instead promotes violence in order to establish a new order in which those who were superior become inferior, and Muslims will gain the upper hand through the holy war.

Jihadists of the poor districts of Europe make up a tiny minority among European Muslims. Usually, male members opt for deviance if they do not succeed in getting integrated into the normal economy (however, if they do get integrated in the normal economy, they usually try to leave these poor districts to live in middle-class neighborhoods instead). Once they choose Islam as a receptacle for their identity, they might become pietistic Salafists or jihadists (the others have a more or less loose relationship with religion). As jihadists, they transpose their aspirations onto a religious plane which restores to them their lost dignity (they become the knights of the faith) and which satisfies their need for “forced recognition” by the others; since the others refused to acknowledge their dignity and mistreated them as second-class citizens, the young jihadists assert themselves in a lofty manner through sacred violence. In their eyes, they do not seek violence for “selfish” and deviant motives as might have been the case in the past, but they seek violence to dispense a religious sentence for miscreants. Jihadism introduces pride in young people who think that they can only regain dignity by transgressing the existing norms and by espousing a counter-culture of sacred violence that doubly denies legitimacy to society: through religion (whereas in a democratic society the law, not religion, should be paramount), and through violence (whereas legitimate violence should be exerted not by the individual, but by the legal system).

By espousing radical Islam, these young people adopt an attitude of provocation vis-à-vis the secularized societies that host them and of which they are often citizens (although some are residents rather than citizens). As already mentioned, jihadist Islam plays a fundamental role in turning inferiority into superiority: where they were insignificant like “insects” (remark

\(^{11}\) For further discussion, see Farhad Khosrokhavar, *Les prisons de France*, Robert Laffont, 2016.
made by a young man in prison), now they are the self-proclaimed elites of a conquering faith; where they were condemned for offenses or crimes, they now condemn the society that judged them; where they were “sub-citizens” without work, without public recognition, they become “super-believers” who seek to coerce all of humanity into an intolerant version of Islam; where they were anonymous, they become the stars of the jihadosphere and the world media.

The results of psychiatric analysis of a dozen jihadists reveal the following: most had not finished school; none of them had a professional career; their financial situation was precarious; they felt as if attacked by the void; they left for Syria to break free from an unattractive daily life. These traits united the excluded young people without economic and social perspective and dedicated to a life without a future.

Among the marginalized young people in the European poor districts where the families of immigrant origin are in the majority, a tiny minority joined Daesh, but a significant proportion identified with non-violent Salafism. The latter has become a new type of socialization called pietistic or “scientific” Salafism. It fosters a sense of community that is not set against others but in distinction to them. Many pietistic Salafists attempt to separate themselves and their children from the larger society. One pietistic Salafist based in La Reynerie, a poor migrant district of Toulouse, told me in August 2017:

“Karim: My dream is to migrate to a Muslim country with my wife and child so that I can be in a Muslim surrounding where I can perform my daily prayers, avoid women who are without veil and sometimes half-naked, and where I am able to raise my children far from the eyes of the Kuffar (disbelievers, non-Muslims in a pejorative sense). Here in France, public schools (state-funded schools) spreads kufr (disbelief), boys and girls are mixed in a sinful way, they look at each other in an illicit way, they learn that God should not interfere with human politics, that men and women are equal, that polygamy is not allowed, that daily prayer is not tolerated in public. My wish is to go to a Muslim country where these haram (illicit) acts are forbidden. Hegira (migration in conformity to the ideal of the Prophet of Islam who went from Mecca to Medina). This society perverts my daughter, who is mixed up with male children and does not learn what is licit (halal) and what is illicit (haram); my wife has to protect herself against sin every minute when she is out in the street. Their TV, their radio, their media—they all spread sin.”

As a rule, pietistic Salafists are not jihadist, and they often reject physical violence, preferring to build up sectarian types of closed communities.

---

Radical Islam as well as pietistic Salafism both provide a bond built against the society, the first through violence, the second through creating a closed group fostering a countercultural subculture that constructs a world of its own and raises a wall between the group and the others.

Radical Islam imposes a coercive sense of belonging through sacred duties and rejects freedom: “good repression” is by far superior to “bad freedom”, which means freedom period and encompasses all kinds of modern freedom, from sexual to secular (for example, sexual freedom, homosexuality, gender equality in the name of licit mores that submit to the rules of God), is a unique feature of the new generation. Individual freedom has become trivial and sometimes devoid of meaning, with many young jihadists preferring repressive norms that give sense to their lives to a set of freedoms that robs them of sacred norms and limits. The major problem that distinguishes the current, new generation from that of 1960s is that the new generation suffers from the lack of norms, and the “unlimited” freedom to which its members are exposed makes them unhappy. They do not know where to set limits: patriarchal family is dead, nothing seems sacred, and thus the need for limits, sacred norms and transcendent principles gets the upper hand over the transgression of norms that characterized the generation of 1960s and that created the “revolution” of 1968 in France and the social protests in the US against the Vietnam War.

Freedom is more and more of a burden; individuals feel that freedom is a heavy weight on their shoulders rather than a blessing. In many cases, freedom has become synonymous with loneliness and a lack of a sense of solidarity, in particular among those people who are exposed to the new rules of “flexibility” in labor relations, among those who find meaningless the freedom to remain jobless indefinitely, and among those who suffer from being left without protection against the blind forces of the market in the name of freedom.

Family fragility and women’s liberation have contributed to the loss of the sense of identity; there is no longer a bond to provide resistance to the internalized sense of loss among people who suffer from economic fragility as well as anthropological instability within the family. In this social context, freedom can appear to be more of a negative than a positive; it overburdens the individual with the risks of life without providing societal and familiar assistance and solidarity. Jihadism substitutes this cold society with a “warm” (even “hot”) imaginary neo-Ummah, to be built by the new heroic agents who put their lives at stake to construct the city of God in this world, pending the advent of the end of time.

On the other hand, individuation reaches its upper limits insofar as the globalized individual has to assume many areas of his social, emotional, economic and cultural life, which
crush him under their weight. The negative dimensions of freedom push him to despair and depression whereas the positive dimensions (to choose one’s work, to live in economic stability, to take advantage of one’s right to the benefits of the welfare state in order to achieve a sense of freedom in culture and in leisure) are becoming scarce. Self-depreciation, a feeling of deep mental instability, and a sense of being inferior (lack of intelligence for one’s failures in life) are common. Involvement in jihadism contributes to the build-up of renewed self-esteem and to overcoming the sense of instability by leaning on God and by embedding oneself in a new community, namely the Islamic Ummah reshaped by the Caliphate, the IS. Exposure to the test of sacred death in the exaltation of staging the jihad creates a new situation that overcomes the lack of self-esteem and allows access to a laudatory acceptance of oneself in the heroic fight against the infidels.

**Stages of Radicalization among Disaffected Young People**

Jihadism among the disaffected young people of migrant origin follows a series of stages that is different from those of the middle classes.

1. First, life in the ghettoized neighborhoods causes the feeling of being “banned” from society. Ghettoization creates a desire to be recognized as “someone” in a subculture of deviance where “honor” is paramount and its defense is part of the domination strategy. Among jihadists, the rupture is deepened by the total rejection of “the other” as “miscreant.” Deviance frequently results in prison stays and recidivism.

2. Deviant socialization begins early. It is encouraged by the resignation of the father, the supreme authority in the patriarchal family, which has become, after less than half a century, not a “blended” or an egalitarian family in the traditional style of the European middle class, but rather a decapitated patriarchal family in which the figurehead of the father is simultaneously de jure paramount and de facto absent (the father has gone back to his country, there has been a divorce, he is dethroned by his sons) and in which the children are being raised by the overworked and overburdened mother. Despite the central role of the mother, the patriarchal symbolic figure of the father remains essential and, in the absence of the father, the big brother often tries to usurp the role by exerting violence against others, in particular his brothers and sisters. This fatherless patriarchal family is the privileged venue for the crisis of authority. Many suburban jihadis have suffered from this deeply deficient family structure, in which the father figure is simultaneously
paramount and absent. Many of these young jihadists were either placed in a children’s home or they lived in a single-parent family with much higher levels of violence than found in middle class neighborhoods. To give just one example, Mohamed Merah suffered through this type of fatherless family, his big brother claiming to be the highest authority, his attitude often leading to physical violence. He developed a hyper-aggressive character in the home where he was placed by the authorities, combining delinquency and violence. Similarly, Mehdi Nemouche spent time in a children’s home and with foster families before being raised by his grandmother; the Kouachi brothers were orphaned very young, the mother prostituting herself occasionally to provide for the family before committing suicide, after which they were raised in a children’s home. Amedy Coulibaly seems to be an exception, but many other cases highlight this crisis in the family.

3. The third major characteristic is the prison stay resulting from a deviant trajectory. From January 2012 to July 2015, 80% of those who committed terrorist acts had a criminal past, and 60% had spent time in prison. Prison also serves as a place of socialization for these young people, who include it in their life project as a “rational risk” in their deviant attitude. Sometimes in prison, at other times outside, young people have a “revelation” that leads them to radical Islam.

4. Next, armed with their militant faith, the young people often deepen their religion whilst they are in prison by adopting a pre-oriented inclination towards jihadism: they read the radical Suras of the Qur'an which preach an uncompromising attitude towards others, like Tawbah (“Repentance”) or al-Anfāl (“Treasures of War”), rather than those that preach tolerance (such as the Sura Kuffar, for instance). The deepening of their faith in prison (or sometimes outside) consists in overcoming their religious ignorance through their reading inspired by the radical version of Islam.

5. The last stage is the “journey of initiation” that these disaffected young people make to the lands where jihad is raging. The Kouachi brothers made a trip to Yemen (one of them was invited and financed by Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-Yemeni jihadist killed by US drones in 2011); Mehdi Nemouche went to Syria; Mohamed Merah made a trip to Pakistan and Turkey (and probably from there to Syria);

---

Abdelhamid Abaoud, a major figure of the attacks of November 13, 2015, stayed in Syria in the service of the IS, as did Brahim Abdeslam, another member of the group. In addition, these people can be indoctrinated by charismatic figures at home, as was the case with Amedy Coulibaly who did not go to a holy war country but was indoctrinated by Djamel Beghal. The journey of initiation involves military training and encompasses the manufacture and handling of explosives. It generates a denationalization with regard to the society of origin, now considered foreign by the young people: jihadist socialization outside the country of origin creates a new identity which is detached from citizenship and polarized by religious militancy. After the stay in the Islamic country (Syria, Yemen, Pakistan) in the service of the jihadist order, the adept becomes insensitive to extreme forms of cruelty, accepting beheadings of disbelievers or heretics (e.g. Shiites). War in the service of Daesh (or other jihadist organizations, like Jabhat al-Nusra) puts an end to the empathy vis-à-vis the victims. The mujahid (the combatant of the holy war, the jihad) performs the role of the executioner as much as that of the warrior in his utter insensitivity towards the victims.

6. While not necessarily all of the above five characteristics are present among the disaffected young people of migrant origin, at least three or four of them are present when they embrace jihadism.

**Middle-Class Jihadism**

In recent decades, the distinction between the middle classes and the working classes has tended to fade, particularly in the lower middle classes. The fear of social downgrading and proletarianization is no longer a marginal phenomenon but is found in the economy, the employment, and the deterioration of the living conditions of many people who thought themselves to be among the entrenched middle classes. In his work on the gradual downgrading of the middle classes, Louis Chauvel\(^{15}\) highlights the effects of rising taxation, more expensive housing, devalued university degrees, and the increasing instability in employment and remuneration. These factors provoke a feeling of deep insecurity among middle-class young people, who are not certain that their future will hold access to the same living standard as their parents enjoyed. Their desire to leave for Syria is partly linked to their lack of hope for the future: between 2014 and 2015, Daesh seemed invincible; it conquered a territory of the size of

Great Britain (around 300,000 square kilometers), paid a salary of $400 to $1,000 per month, and provided free accommodation (often the houses which had been abandoned by the Syrian middle classes were put at the disposal of the jihadist warriors) as well as a weekly shopping basket, delivered to them for free. For many of these lower middle-class young people, this meant social promotion on top of religious felicity.

One of the reasons for joining Daesh that middle-class young people cited was humanitarian. Indeed, the desperate situation of Syria, where the protest movement against the Assad regime ended in 2012 in a bloodbath by the despotic government, and the intervention of the geopolitical actors of the region (Iran and Russia on the one hand, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, the United States on the other) pushed young Muslims or converts to help victims in Syria by means of legitimate violence. In the first wave of movement of young people towards Syria from 2012 to 2013, the jihadist dimension itself was rather marginal. One can quote this middle-class young convert, who received a suspended sentence in France for his attempt to go to Syria in 2013 and who claimed:

“I was tired of injustice: Muslims were being killed in Syria and nobody cared, never mind the lofty expressions by the government. I wanted to do something, to help these people who got killed and were left alone... Humanitarian assistance in the traditional sense was powerless, these people needed more than doctors or medicines, they needed to be defended against the bloody regime of Assad.”

With the advent of Daesh, the process of ideologization began in the second half of 2013 (Daesh was officially created in June 2014, but many months prior to its proclamation as the Caliphate it was already attracting young men from all over the world). From that moment on, the idea that Muslims were being attacked by miscreants became dominant, and the holy war became a pressing religious duty (fard al-Ayn) to be fulfilled; hell would await those who refused to engage in jihad. The aspirations of these young people were manifold. As already mentioned, many no longer had confidence in their future in European societies, where everything had been destabilized (the status of stable work, the family, the welfare state, but also the distinction between man and woman). This is the case for this young man, who was jailed for attempting to go to Syria twice in 2014:

“We live in a country where the future they promise is bullshit ("de la merde"), our future is at best a badly paid job as a petty earner, dreaming of a better life, knowing full well that it is unattainable. My parents had a rather good life with a pension that allows them to enjoy life and holidays; mine will be worse. They had job security, in my case there will be none. I have a

A shabby university diploma that has not opened up the doors to any kind of bright future. I feel cheated, although I have a small job that gives me enough to live on, without high expectations."

Not only are the middle classes in an increasingly precarious situation, but nothing cements society together any longer; there are no common ideals, no utopia. This is what this middle-class professional (computer specialist) of North African origin in his early thirties, whose father fought alongside the French Communist party as a worker within the leftist trade union CGT (Confédération Générale du travail), maintained in an interview in Paris in October 2014:

"Islam makes me feel together with others who submit to Allah. What kind of common bond do I have with the others? My parents were communists, they were Muslims from Algeria, but Islam was their faith, not their tie with the other citizens. Communism was their real bond with France, but also with Algeria and the rest of the world. They believed that they could create a new society where there would be no class, no exploiter, no exploited, and that was the link that tied them together and united them with the labor movement in France. Others were socialists, others still found meaning in republicanism. Today, nothing of the sort is noteworthy, there is no link, people are living in their own exile. Islam, at least, makes sense to me. I feel that I am not alone, that something relates me to those who share this religion with me. Islam provides meaning to me, sacred meaning, something that is lacking in our society. But they hate it, people in France, but also in the West, are fighting against Muslims; Islam has become the whipping boy ("tête de turc"), and racism against it is on the rise. I feel that Palestinians are oppressed, the Arab world is oppressed by the West, and Islam is the new enemy. They push us towards radicalization with their hatred, a girl with a simple scarf is a fundamentalist, whereas the naked Femen16 who desecrates a mosque is regarded with indulgence. Muslims are being rejected, and to me that is the reason why they radicalize."

For his father, Islam was more or less a private matter in accordance with the French principle of laïcité (secularity); it did not mobilize him, contrary to the class struggle ideology. But to him, all those ideals are dead, the only meaning that remains is within Islam.

A second category was “tired” of the peace reigning in Western Europe since the end of the Second World War—the war exalting a “will to life” of Nietzschean nature; they were no longer satisfied with the dull status quo of the everyday life, especially in Europe. A European youth deprived of utopia looked for thrills that would shake up everyday life and introduce animation in the form of warrior exaltation and virile heroism. This young man, who dreamed of leaving France for Syria but was dissuaded by his friends, still entertained the dream of going somewhere to wage holy war in 2015:

---

16 A movement of young women who show their more or less naked body as a sign of protest against religion or other causes that anger them.
“I am bored to death. We have a life with flat pulse, there is no excitement, no calling, nothing noble. The only motive is to get rich, to consume, and to find attractive girls to screw (“baiser”). I need more, something more thrilling and more heroic. I also need to be in a situation out of the ordinary. The war in Syria excited me, I saw the video footage of some young men wearing Ray-Ban glasses, posing in front of their four-by-fours, proudly showing off their submachine guns, defying death and killing the nasty soldiers of the Assad Regime...”

This category included a large proportion of middle-class young people looking for adventure in order to escape boredom and emptiness. The impression prevailed among them that the festive effervescence of the war and the sense of intensification of life would make them forget the vagaries of the future and engender a situation of generalized joviality which would blur the frontiers of life and death, the possible and the impossible, the predictable and the unpredictable. These young people exorcised the anxiety of a risky future without a guaranteed prospect of individual and collective progress.

Some of the middle-class young people engaged in the deathly game in order to join an “effervescent community” and to leave behind the “cold community” of a nation in which the individual was left to himself, insulated, and without any strong feeling of belonging. The imaginary neo-Ummah of the jihadists provided a reinvigorated sense of togetherness to these young people otherwise bereft of hope, fearful for their future, inclined to see their future as devoid of economic and social progress, squeezed between the haves and have-nots. The identity crisis among the middles classes is ever the more acute as Europe has jeopardized the political dimension of nationality by depriving the nation state of many of its former economic prerogatives. This middle class convert expressed his feelings in a rather brutal fashion:

“Robert (Abdullah, his adopted Muslim name): Islam has brought me a sense of genuine life. Before that I was a living dead and my only goal was to become rich. The more I worked, the less I could be rich. What I earned was taken away in taxes and duties and squandered on stupid consumption of alcohol and sexual parties, and I was becoming a cash cow for the government and my occasional buddies and girlfriends. There was no sense of belonging, I was left to myself, the others were indifferent. Islam has given me a sense belonging to the same Ummah; we are ready to sacrifice everything to achieve it. Before, I was a monster of selfishness; now I am ready to give away everything, including my life, to achieve the Islamic ideals. My former friends think I’m crazy, but in secret they envy me and my faith. Islam makes me feel more than a sheer

Robert, aka Abdullah, does not talk about jihad, but his readiness for the ultimate sacrifice might be understood in that sense. He is part of the group of young people who were not radicalized but, due to his former life and disappointments, might still go to the extremes of the holy war.

In many cases, war allows for the positioning of oneself as a hero. Heroism contrasts with the insignificance of the self who, in the peaceful West, must wait indefinitely to find less and less stable jobs while living within families destabilized by half a century of feminism and egalitarianism. The possibility of short-circuiting this long and hopeless wait is provided by the war in which the young man can become an exceptional warrior. Confronting death opens up the prospect of a glorious future—if one survives. In case of death, according to the Islamic tenet taught to him by the Islamic radicals, the young man will be sent to paradise.

The feeling of insignificance is shared by the middle- and the lower-class young people of Muslim origin. Both groups are beset by the feeling of having no calling, no purpose; the middle-classes, because of the lack of utopia and deep anomie in the Durkheimian sense, and the disaffected young people, because of their utter sense of being the no-future underclass.

In 2013, in the largest European prison, Fleury-Mérogis, this Frenchman of Algerian origin expressed his dream of martyrdom in an unambiguous manner:

“Ahmed: You know, those who die as martyrs in the battlefield, they are heroes in this world, but also “friends of Allah” (awliya Allah): they accept to die for God’s sake (in the way of God), they are heroes in this world and eternally redeemed in the other world. Look at my life here: I am in prison for theft and once out, I’ll do the same again. I have no choice, there is no future, I am utterly useless, I am less than nothing, I have no respect for myself. This is what I am up to. Martyrdom, for those who dare, opens the doors of paradise, and it also gives them self-respect.”

The ideas of this disaffected young man and that of the middle-class converts converge in some ways: both find in the holy death a way to leave behind the non-identity, non-dignity, insignificance and loss of purpose of life in cold and impersonal societies where no common ties cement togetherness. In the case of the middle-classes, the anomic and lack of calling is paramount, in the case of the disaffected young people, the lack of self-respect, the stigmas, and the impossible dignity that pushes towards jihad and martyrdom are paramount.

---

18 Interview conducted in July 2014 within a project of middle class Muslims and French society in an eastern Parisian district.
Jihadist Women and the Feminist Question

In the Islamic tradition, the women who fought the enemies are first the Sahabiyyat (companions of the Prophet), including Um ´Umara, Safiya: she cut off the head of one of the Jewish Arab attackers who climbed the wall of the fortress where women and children had taken refuge during the battle of Khandaq in 627. From the ninth to the eleventh century, the Mutarajjulat, women dressed as men, fought and were cursed by the quotations attributed to the Prophet (the Hadith). On the whole, the classic sources of Islam are very reluctant about the role of women in jihad.\textsuperscript{19}

However, a reinterpretation of tradition has been made by some scholars in order to legitimize the intervention of women in jihad.\textsuperscript{20} In particular, reference is made to the classical doctrine of defensive jihad (\textit{jihad al-daf}), stipulating that all Muslims—men, women, children, and slaves—have the obligation to fight (\textit{fard al-Ayn}) to defend their territory and their faith in case of attack by the enemy.

Before the civil war in Syria in 2013 and the advent of Daesh in 2014, very few women were involved in jihad in Europe. There were women converts like Muriel Degauque, or women like Jihadi Jane. From 2013 to 2015, there was a significant increase in the number of women involved in jihadism: they totaled more than 500 (10\%) out of the 5,000 or so people who left Western countries for Syria.\textsuperscript{21} They were often from the (lower) middle classes. Few of them came from the suburbs or from the poor and isolated neighborhoods from which the majority of young men hailed. Many had a proven criminal past;\textsuperscript{22} the cases of Hayat Boumedienne, the campaign of Amedy Coulibaly (one of the terrorists of the Paris attacks of January 2015) or Hasna Aît Boulahcen, Abaoud’s cousin (Abaoud was one of the major terrorists in the Paris attack of November 2015 that killed more than 130 people) were in the majority. They mostly came from families in which the jihadist stance was not the dominant faith, or they were women of neo-traditional families in England who intended to obey the religious injunction of the new Caliphate, who were not from the poor strata, and most whom had no judicial record.

\textsuperscript{21} See Le Nouveau Jihad en Occident, op.cit. for the statistics.
When women participate in jihad in Muslim countries, it is specifically to avenge a family member such as a husband, a cousin, a brother or father, murdered by the police, as was the case for the “black widows” in Chechnya. Or they accompany their husband, as with Sajida al-Rishwai in November 9, 2005, who tried unsuccessfully to detonate her belt in Jordan. In Europe, feminine jihadism occurred in a new fashion, and vengeance was not the major motive for their actions. Rather, it was a new identity based on more than half a century of feminism that paradoxically pushed them towards female jihadism.

Some post-adolescent young people found a way of becoming “adults” through the war that assumed the role of a rite of passage. The sister of a young teenager (15 years of age) who left for Syria told me in an interview in an association in Ile-de-France in 2015:

“Nicole (my sister) was impatient. She had become a woman and engaged in real life. She yearned for children. My mother told her: ‘You are too young, I carried you when I was in my thirties. You have to study, to find a job, to build a future rather than to get married and become pregnant so young.’ But Nicole insisted that she would be a real woman, to be recognized as such. She was ill at ease with her adolescence, she thought that our mother did not understand her urge to be a woman and a mother. She went to Syria, not because she was radicalized, but to achieve her goal of becoming a mother.”

To begin with, some young women intended to restore their image as genuine “women” as opposed to their mothers, who had become “quasi-men” by adopting attitudes that seemed to deny their female identity. These young women opposed the dominant feminist tendency to become pregnant in their thirties by giving birth to “lion cubs” at a much younger age in the service of their new faith. Some had military training in Syria (within the Al-Khansaa Brigade). Those who were not able to join the ranks of jihad nourished a hatred of society and tried to constitute autonomous women cells. This was particularly the case for three young jihadist women in Paris who intended to blow up a car filled with gas cylinders in a tourist district in Paris in September 2016, one of them stabbing a police officer.

The self-assertion of jihadist women poses the question of a new style of feminism that is partially at odds with the leitmotif of traditional feminism based on the rejection of violence. The new logic of action exalts violence in an attitude that derives simultaneously from feminism, post-feminism and anti-feminism. The feminist dimension lies in women’s self-assertion and their ability to act without a man to lead them and provide them with the guarantee of legitimacy. Although Rachid Kassim suggested action through the encrypted messaging application, Telegram, the “patriarchal” vision of Islam could not convince young women to act alone, not unlike Ulrike Meinhoff, a member of the German Baader-Meinhoff group in the
1970s and 1980s, who combined feminism and far-left ideology. In France (not in Syria where this would be impossible), women now assert themselves as autonomous agents of violent jihadist, whereas until now this was the exclusive prerogative and the inalienable privilege of men. The feminist dimension here, so at odds with Western feminism, is to contest the exclusivity of the violent action by men.

**Convergence and Divergence with Men: Feminism and its Avatars**

The factors that attracted girls and women to Syria from 2013 to 2016 bear similarities to the factors that drew men there.

First, women have constituted a significant proportion of workers and employees in Europe for at least two generations, following the gains of feminism, the shaking up of the patriarchal family, and the benefits arising from the legal equality between men and women. As a result, they feel the same job insecurity and fear of the future as men do (if not more, due to their disadvantaged position in the job market). In a society deprived of utopia where the sense of belonging has been weakened in many ways (the fragile family structure, the weakening of the nation state, the loss of job security due to the globalization, and the new “flexibility” in recruitment policies), women lean towards the utopia of radical Islam, attracted by its promise of an effervescent community (in contrast to the “cold” national European communities) and a restored family structure (a reassuring neo-patriarchal family rather than the destabilizing modern family).

Another common point is the sluggishness of everyday life and the boredom experienced in the peaceful European societies since the end of the Second World War. The instability and fragility of the family, even if it is experienced differently by men and women, has the same root: the primary anthropological cell of collective existence is no longer perceived as solid in the face of the uncertainties of life and the multiplication of family models (man and woman, woman and woman, man and man, live-in partnership, the blended family). The “à la carte family” puts the burden on the couple, who must negotiate with each other the forms of their coexistence, the stepfamily being a further place of the dilution of authority, with children bequeathed by stepfathers or mothers. The shared authority between the biological father and the new husband of the biological mother or the mother and the new wife of the father contribute to this growing sense of fragility of authority, which is now subject to endless negotiations between the husband and wife (or the two members of the couple). The dream of marriage with a “knight in shining armor” who might die after a few months was easily internalized by many of these young women who ventured into Syria because in their minds,
the marriage had already been affected in its immutability within their own family and put to the test of a destabilizing modernity.

The pride of being part of the new effervescent Muslim community, even though this was proved to be an illusion upon arrival in Syria, was a strong motivation for young women to depart for Syria. The knight of faith was the counter-model of the “de-idealized” man to whose trivialization both feminism and the loss of his role of an exclusive financial provider for the family had contributed. For a large proportion of these young women, it was the romanticism of love which re-idealized men rather than adherence to the political ideal of an anti-imperialist Islam or the desire to protect Muslims against secularization, both of which prevailed in the motivation of young men to join Syria.

Finally, there was a quest for norms and even discipline among women and men, a need for guidance that would give meaning and direction to their lives. For men, this was particularly the case among those who sought to engage in the police or the army and who, as unsuccessful candidates, turned to jihadism (this was the case for Mohamed Merah, who tried to join the Légion étrangère in France in 2010 before committing the deadly attacks against Muslim military men and Jews in 2012). There were many male examples, but there were also proven instances of similar female examples, like Hasna Aït Bouâlachcen, who dreamed of joining the French army.23

However, while women and men shared some aspirations for their relationship with the new Islamic State, other characteristics separate their motivations.

To begin with, their relationship with death is different in the overwhelming majority of the cases, even though some jihadi women would like to die as martyrs in the same way as some men do. Many girls died in bombings in Syria, but overall the female death rate was much lower than that of men. They were not affected in the same way, and what often awaited women was the death of a husband, a period of mourning (lasting around four months) and then a possible marriage with a second husband.

**The Need for Norms and a Strong and Inclusive Community**

Jihadi women (like their male counterparts) strongly aspired to belong to a community that would give meaning to their lives. The dystopia of Daesh, repressive and regressive but promising strong integration into a close-knit Islamic community (the neo-Ummah), was highly

---

attractive to young men and women living in European societies, where togetherness had become almost meaningless due to the lack of shared utopia (up to the 1980s, the utopia of socialism, communism, and republicanism had been a warrant for a better future and the cement of social togetherness in France). The more restrictive the norms were, the more reassuring they became, at least before jihadist women experienced real life under the aegis of Daesh in Syria. The rigid norms played a reassuring role for the anomic individuals in search of belonging to a “hot” community, as compared to the “cold” societies they lived in.

This is particularly the case for Saïda, born in the early 1980s in a non-practicing North African family to a French mother of Algerian origin and an Algerian father who had seven children.\(^2\) Her parents divorced when she was 13 years old. She blamed her father for not raising her as well as her brothers and sisters. She was more tender towards her mother, and she worried about her because her mother did not perform the daily prayers and therefore risked hell in Saïda’s eyes. In high school, Saïda had difficulty attending classes and turned to Islam, influenced by her friends. She tried to pass the police officer exam in order to fight against pedophiles, drug dealers, and the others law breakers. She did not succeed, despite receiving good grades, because she did not receive a medical certificate of good health. She attributed to Allah the fact that she did not succeed in the exam. Afterwards, she also noted that working in a male environment such as the police would have been illicit from an Islamic viewpoint (\textit{haram}). She married a Tunisian Salafist against the opposition of his parents, learning about Salafism (the “Salafiyya”) on Google. She found answers to her questions on Islamic forums. She had fits of depression that she attributed to the sins she felt she had committed prior to joining the Salafist faith. Not only did she yearn for rigid norms, but she also felt guilty for not having applied them previously. This type of aspiration is as prevalent among the peaceful Salafists (the so-called pietists who aspire to Hegira, leaving Europe for a Muslim country) as it is among a significant proportion of Salafist jihadists (who consider violent jihad the only way to assure their redemption). Both are in search of restrictive norms, absolute certainties, a faith that will frame and give meaning to their existence. Wearing the full veil, Saïda was stopped by the police and, after an altercation, spent a night in prison. For her, the will to build another life with a set of self-imposed restrictive norms was a paramount existential question. The Salafist neo-Ummah filled this void, but stripped the individual of much of his or her free will.

\(^2\) Agnès de Feo, a French journalist doing her doctoral research on the topic of women turning to radical Islam, communicated this case to me.
Women Facing Violence: “Total Muslims” versus “Negative Heroines”

For a new generation in the West, women’s relationships with violence have been progressively evolving at an anthropological level. Violence still remains largely the preserve of men: the female prison population is 4% in France and 6% in Great Britain, and domestic violence has its roots mainly among men (90%), women occupying a marginal place (around 10%). However, women’s imagination, especially of very young women, regarding the subject of violence has been evolving. 10% of jihadists today are women. If we compare this figure with most extremist movements, this proportion is one of the highest, except in far-left movements like the Baader-Meinhoff gang (the proportion of women in this group exceeded 50% and at times reached 60%25) or the Red Brigades in Italy. In the IRA in Northern Ireland, there were 5% women;26 6.4% of the members of the Basques of ETA were women.27 The distribution of Western women who went to Syria is as follows: 70 Germans (including 9 minors); 63 to 70 French; 60 English (20 minors), 30 Dutch, 14 Australian.28 Given how women are treated by Daesh, this proportion reflects their fascination with jihadism as well as that of adolescent girls and post-adolescents.

To begin with, violence is no longer being perceived as the exclusive preserve of men. It must be emphasized that this was already the case in the past; examples include the Algerian women who played a major role in the Algerian war of independence, the Chechen “black widows,” but also the socialist and communist leftist women in Lebanon who took part in the movement against Israeli occupation through kamikaze attacks in the 1980s.

Some of the women who joined Daesh presented particular traits, especially their quest for “de-Westernization” in order to embrace Islam more thoroughly, but also in order to become new women. These young women felt that “occidentality” (Westernness) had stuck to their skin like a straitjacket, preventing them from identifying fully, absolutely, totally with the neo-Ummah that, in their eyes, embodied happiness in this world and bliss in the afterlife. For them, the West was first and foremost a reign of total secularization, the profanation of the sacred in the name of the supremacy of the secular, the annexation of the public sphere being by a non-religious (or anti-religious, in the jihadists’ view) system of reference; becoming a real Muslim

27 Fernano Reinares, “Who are the terrorists? Analyzing changes in sociological profiles among members of ETA,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27, 2004
being impossible in this situation. Leaving Europe was also finding a way of escaping the all-secular public sphere where “naked bodies” (women without veil, sometimes exposing their legs, their forearms) are permitted. Shedding all occidental traits and habits becomes a prerequisite for recovering a “full” Muslim identity.

The brother of this young woman, like herself hailing from a secular French family who converted to Islam, became radicalized under the influence of a local preacher; he sought to become a “total Muslim” and left France for Syria. He was explicit in his opinion:

“She said that everything in France was sinful: in the street, her veil was disturbing to other people, who looked at her askance, which made her furious. But since other women did not wear the hijab and some men had their arms and sometimes their legs exposed, she felt that the entire society was corrupt and perverse. At the family table, wine and even non-halal meat was unacceptable to her. She sometimes told me: I feel ashamed to be a French woman. Not only am I not free to be a proud Muslim, but other people dress and behave in such a way that I am ill at ease all the time. My dream is to migrate to a Muslim country, to forget about France and the entire country, and to embrace my new Muslim identity. I am sincerely ashamed of being French, and even more so of belonging to the Western world. You will all go to hell for this widespread sinful behavior.”

Women and men of this category, whom I qualify as “total Muslims,” want a world in the image of the uniqueness of Allah that would result in the unification of all spheres of existence under the protective wing of God. The secular world seems monstrous to them because it has broken off its ties with God, is bound only by the soft consensus of the citizens who have banished God from their existence and have taken his place. The loss of the old utopias (socialism, communism, republican ideas) and the lack of meaning resulting from the absence of a cement for living together creates a climate of anxiety for some, who strongly feel the need for an encompassing principle in the sense of Karl Jaspers (“das Umgreifende”, the encompassing, which gives sense to the existence and ties the community together); or who long for mystery in the sense of Gabriel Marcel (who opposed the “mystery of being” to the “problem,” understandable and susceptible of finding a solution in this world). For a few years now, Daesh has brought this kind of meaning to the young men and women who entered the fold of Islam and broke with the West, the world of domination, desecration, and opposition to

29 The words of a 28-year-old man of a secular middle-class family, whose 23-year-old sister left France in 2015.
30 Fethi Benslam, in French, speaks of the “surmusulman” (Over-Muslim) to characterize those Muslims who look for more and more restrictions in the name of religion in order to prove to themselves worthy of their genuine Islamic identity. Over-Muslims are different in the sense that it is their quest for “de-Westernization” that characterizes them. See Fethi Benslama, Un furieux désir de sacrifice, le surmusulman, Seuil, 2016.
Islam and all that is sacred and transcendent. They excommunicated a desacralizing and profane Western world by opposing it with an Islam that reintroduces the sacred into life and restores a unified meaning to the world by guaranteeing individuals a happy life after death if they fight the forces of evil incarnated by the agents of secularization in a diabolic West.

While living in the West, some women, like Umm Raeesa, tried to break away from the Western identity which had “infected” them by identifying themselves with the cohesive Islamist identity, and the more restrictive it was, the more it seemed to them to be genuine. This new identity gave them certainty beyond doubt and anxiety. But then suspicion was cast on the authenticity of their religious beliefs: if they were true fervent followers of the new faith, why would they stay in the West instead of migrating to Syria? Umm Raeesa responded: “We are neither adapted to this side (the West), nor to the other (Daesh).” She was skeptical about the ability of the jihadist movements to ensure the conditions of a truly Islamic life while rejecting the irreligious Western world where they lived.

The West, the venue of feminism that has managed to desecrate the patriarchal family, to bring man and woman dangerously close in their respective social roles, and to make inaudible the desire to be a woman and to feel the body during precious childbirth, was experienced as alienating, as making impossible the self-assertion as a genuine mother-woman. Admittedly, the desire for early motherhood among young women or adolescent girls could not reproduce the model of the past, being the product of the imagination of young people. It was the reaction to many generations of feminists and the yearning for recovering a sense of womanhood rather than the desire to become a woman in the historic, traditional sense. This romanticized world of theirs would become totally destroyed after few months in Syria, the inferiority of men to women and the destiny of women under the Islamic State being unbearable to many of these young women. But in Europe, prior their journeys to Syria, many of these young girls and women looked for an exotic life, romanticized and estranged from the daily life.

Another step was taken in jihadism with the figurehead of “the negative heroine” who went beyond the “total Muslim woman” in terms of her radicalization. She was the feminine counterpart of the male “negative hero.” Her mindset was an explosive mix of feminism, anti-feminism and post-feminism: her will to act hid her tormented character. The jihadist heroine sought to embody the counter-values of society, beginning with violence, acting for ISIS, mostly in the West. The more violent she became, the more she legitimized herself in her own eyes, inversely proportional to her de-legitimization in Western societies. She sought to punish the West through violent action. She also intended to attract new female adepts to strengthen
IS. The number of these negative heroines was rather marginal. In contrast to the majority of the young female jihadists who intended to marry a knight of faith, their yearning was to take arms and to fight against the miscreants (the entire West) in order to defend radical Islam.

In Syria, except in rare exceptional cases, the “mujahideen” could not intervene in the battlefield during the reign of the IS. In Europe, some of the women who were prevented from going to Syria turned their anger against their society and became negative heroines. This was the case for the young women who tried to blow up a car in the tourist district of Notre-Dame de Paris in September 2016. One of them, Ines Madani, attacked a police officer with a knife and wounded him. She planned to play the role of a combatant sensu stricto. She had pledged allegiance to IS on the internet.

Women thus oscillated between the dream of love, the desire to break with a morose daily life, the yearning for building up a family beyond the fragility of the modern one, and the aspiration to recover their female identity by reinforcing their identity as being different from men. A tiny minority intended to act as combatants in the battlefield or to attack their own country through terrorist action.

**Jihadist Converts and the Mythical Restoration of a Lost Unity**

Among the 10% of women among jihadists, a significant minority is made up of converts (in January 2016, roughly a third of jihadist women\(^3\)). European female converts have a number of characteristics that distinguish them from the Muslim women or girls who left or were about to leave for Syria.

To begin with, a principle of active individuation underpinned their motivations: they felt called to an “individual duty” (*fard al-Ayn*) that encompassed men and women.\(^3\) The distress of Muslim societies morally compelled some women to go to Syria to defend the dignity and the territory of Islam. Some English women took the initiative to go to Syria. To the overwhelming majority of them, being a woman no longer meant escaping this obligation which, in the past, applied only to men, if not de jure, then at least de facto. During the period from 2013 to 2017, when Islamic State claimed the status of the Caliphate, individual awareness created a sense of obligation and responsibility towards the Muslim community that pushed

---

\(^3\) 220 French women were present in Syria within Daesh in January 2016, one third of them converts. See Elodie Guéguen, “Les femmes dans le jihad,” *France Inter* 08/01/2016.

individuals towards action. Sitting by idly promoted feelings of guilt for men and women alike. Engaging on the side of Daesh meant fulfilling their religious duty as Muslims.

The notions of the afterlife, divine justice, the last judgment, hell and its pangs, as well as paradise and its delights, preoccupied women as much as men. Secularization had apparently rendered obsolete those religious notions, which were thought to be strictly reserved for the private life of the citizens.

Their behavior called into question the separation between public and private life: they questioned the relegation of religion to the private sphere; moreover, they wanted to annex the public life and put an end to the separation of politics and religion. In the perspective of these young people, the belief in the hereafter was rooted in an eternal reality that extended to the entirety of the individual’s life (and in particular his or her life in the public sphere) and brought an ethical-religious sense encompassing the private and the public spheres that, in European societies, belonged solely to the private sphere. This demand for “religion” by converted women and girls who questioned the dichotomy of private vs public spheres could be explained by the exhaustion of secular utopias throughout Europe and the emergence of new “dystopias” that attempted to coalesce the fragmented lives of individuals by insisting on the totality of their existence, private and public spheres at the same time.

The late modernity diversifies the sectors of life and tends to compartmentalize social relations without a link between them. The new regressive utopias such as jihadism attempted to unify all spheres of existence by denying the principle of differentiation and diversification in the name of a transparency based on the mythical unity of Islam. In an opaque and fragmented complexity devoid of unity, Daesh opposed a transparent simplicity in which violence against the disbelievers gave a monolithic unity to the life of the believer. Women were particularly exposed to the seductive powers of this notion because they no longer knew how to draw a boundary between “womanhood” and “manhood,” feminism having transformed women into “quasi-men,” the dialectic of gender equality having created an anguishing indistinctness with regard to their femininity. Radical Islamism reassured these women by re-inscribing the difference of the sexes into a sacred register where to be man or to be woman had an absolute meaning, reintroducing a mythical transparency which appeased the modern anguish of gender indistinctiveness. One can mention an afterlife in paradise that would soothe the anguish caused by the uncertainties of the present time through the assurance of eternal bliss.

Before their departure to Syria, the fascination among young European teenage girls with the “Daesh-type family” was rooted in the quest for a counter-model to the stepfamily (blended family) in which they lived, which was often marked by instability, a lack of unified
authority (the difficult sharing of authority between the father, the mother, the stepfather, the stepmother), the disappearance of patriarchy without a new substitutive frame of reference, and the agonizing dilution of the distinction between man and woman. The converted girls wanted to find a spouse who was the antithesis of the clichés of men in their present daily lives, marked by the loss of the former superiority (and the Islamic hero would re-idealize the man’s role), an equalization that “de-idealized” men, and an egalitarian culture that rendered men “effeminate” or robbed them of their manhood (and the Islamic warrior image would restore the man’s virility). What they were looking for was an exceptional man who could be trusted, who would not be intimidated by danger, who would adorn himself with the insignia of the knight of faith: the machine gun, the SUV, the Ray-Ban sunglasses, and the proud air of the one who would kill or get killed without flinching. His heroic nature would reassure the young woman, anxious to idealize her future husband.

Identifying herself with an effervescent neo-Ummah in which she would assume the eminent role of the mother (Ummah and Umm (mother) stem from the same linguistic root in Arabic), she would no longer feel insecure. She would find someone whom she could totally trust: someone who accepts the need to die for his ideals would also back her in the vicissitudes of married life. The “extraordinary” man would guarantee the couple an intensified marital life which would also be protected from the monotony and boredom which assail many modern couples after the first few months of marriage. Of course, the couple could be shaken by the death of the husband as a martyr, but boredom would not besiege them.

For hours, girls looked on the internet to find a suitable young man who would become their husband and who would often come from Europe, while men used social networks to go in search of women once they had arrived in Syria and subsequently tried to seduce them by courting them according to “Islamic norms.” Women journalists contacted young European jihadists in Syria, pretending to be a young woman ready to migrate in order to see how young jihadists tried to seduce young girls.33

In addition, young women also want to become a celebrity to raise themselves above their insignificance and give meaning to their lives: they build a new ego by making a new skin. The jihadi star-system needs feminine figures who stand out for the quality of their propaganda on the internet and for their striking, even cruel, character. This is the case for Samantha Louise Lewthwaite, Maria Giulia Sergio, and Emilie König, who all have made a name for themselves on the global jihadist network and attracted young girls in whose eyes they were stars.

33 See, for instance, Anna Erelle, Dans la peau d’une jihadiste, Robert Laffont, 2015.
Finally, the spectacle of a Syrian society plagued by death and destruction has induced an attitude of compassion that can create a humanitarian goal of a new kind: to help the Muslims of Syria against the heretical regime of Assad, legitimizing the use of violence which is perceived as legitimate and bypassing non-violent options in the name of the higher values of Islam. This argument is confirmed by the stories of a dozen American women, who might easily have been Europeans, arrested before they left for Syria, exemplified by Shannon Conley, a 19-year-old woman from Colorado who was sentenced to four years in prison for trying to help Daesh.34

### Conclusion

Under the reign of Daesh, many men and women, mostly from Europe, went to Syria, driven by a fascination with the perspective of the new Caliphate. Their imaginary view of Islam and their grievances towards society as well as their sense of exoticism and romanticism played a major part in their readiness to identify with the new Islamic State. The latter acted swiftly through social media to heighten young men’s perceptions of the exceptional knights of Islam that would await them in Syria, and to increase young women’s desire to become adult women, willing and able to build up new family ties through marriage and motherhood in an exotic setting, all in the name of an imaginary Islam. The twists and turns of their subjectivity have to be understood in order to grasp their fascination for Daesh.

### References


Bazex Hélène, Mensat Jean-Yves, *Qui sont les jihadistes français? Analyse de 12 cas pour contribuer à l’élaboration de profils et à l’évaluation du risque de passage à l’acte*, Annales Médico-psychologiques, revue psychiatrique, 10/03/2016


34 Trevor Hughes, “Teenage jihad suspect sentenced to 4 years”, USA TODAY, January 23, 2015.


Claire Adida, David Laitin et Marie-Anne Valfort, Mesurer la discrimination, Apports de l'économie expérimentale, 2013;


Dobson, Roger “British Muslims face worst job discrimination of any minority group, according to research,” The Independent Online, 30/11/2014.

Dugan, Emily “Britain’s hidden racism: Workplace inequality has grown in the last decade,” The Independent Online, 03/12/2014; University of Manchester, Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity, Britain's ethnic minorities are facing barriers to social mobility and job opportunities, 2014.

Erelle Anna, Dans la peau d’une jihadiste, Robert Laffont, 2015.


Reinares Fernando, “Who are the terrorists? Analyzing changes in sociological profiles among members of ETA,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27, 2004


Thematic Papers Based on the Conference: "Migration, Social Transformation, and Education for Democratic Citizenship"

Eds.: Prof. Dr. Eveline Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Prof. Dr. Hermann J. Abs, Paulena Müller

This text is provided by DuEPublico, the central repository of the University Duisburg-Essen. This version of the e-publication may differ from a potential published print or online version.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.17185/duepublico/47633
Link: https://duepublico.uni-duisburg-essen.de:443/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=47633

License: This work may be used under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.