No Future for SADC? Perspectives for Regional Integration in Southern Africa after the Mauritius Summit

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1. Introduction

Regional integration in southern Africa, although frequently regarded as a useful and necessary project, seems to have come to a standstill since 1998. After South Africa had joined SADC in 1994, many observers had hoped that the integration project would be seeing rapid progress. When, in August 1996, SADC agreed on the establishment of a free trade area, many observers regarded this as an important step forward (cf. Gibb 1998, p. 303). However, the developments since 1996 are characterised by too few steps forward and too many back. We are witnessing a combination of economic decline and lack of responsible leadership in the region.

In this paper, we shall look at some of the more decisive issues, namely:

- the chances and risks of the integration process in SADC,

- the special role of South Africa, which acts both as a threat as well as an engine to SADC,

- the perspectives of the integration process in SADC after the 1998 SADC Summit in Mauritius.

2. Chances and risks of regional integration in southern Africa

In the age of globalisation, countries in southern Africa followed a trend towards regionalisation that has been evident worldwide since the early 1990s. As elsewhere, the motives for regionalism in southern Africa are both political and economic.1 Policy makers tried to improve the conditions for economic development in the region as well as regain some autonomy that was lost due to the process of globalisation.2 The support for regional integration in southern Africa, whichever form it should eventually have, was based on the assumption that regionalism could be a sensible and practical contribution to economic development (cf. Gibb 1998, p. 289).

Integration in southern Africa suffered, from the day South Africa joined SADC, from an imbalance between the economic and political weight of South Africa compared with the other members of SADC. A brief analysis of the data in tables 1 and 2 will permit a better understanding of the underlying conditions for regional integration in southern Africa,

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1) It is important to note, however, that the original SADCC started with somewhat different motives, as a provisional alliance of so-called frontline states.

2) For a discussion of the motives for regionalisation see Dieter 1998a; also Mistry 1995.
Table 1: Selected socioeconomic data on SADC countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire/Congo</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2,267</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>640a</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>22.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,247</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>169.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>91.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>2,480</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>2,280</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>3,393</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>2,220</td>
<td>5,440</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3,260</td>
<td>8,220</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1,221</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>7,490</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>9,360</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6,880</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and the barriers to successful integration.\textsuperscript{3}

The population data in column 1 of table 1 demonstrate the outstanding position South Africa had before Zaire/Congo joined SADC. Now Zaire/Congo is, in terms of population, the largest SADC country.

The data on per capita GDP are informative for the analysis of the prospects of an integration project. Although it must be remembered that the statistics on economic performance take no account of informal sectors, the data do provide insight into the economic heterogeneity of the region. If one considers per capita output (in dollars), two categories emerge. First the nine poorer SADC countries with an annual per capita GDP of between US$ 90 and US$ 750; second, the five more developed economies, with a per capita GDP of between US$ 1,440 and US$ 3,800.\textsuperscript{4}

These data offer two conclusions. First, from an economic point of view there are few reasons for regional integration including the nine poorer countries. Their level of development is so low that no useful economic exchanges can be expected. With such poorly developed countries foreign trade is not likely to increase competition nor does regional integration contribute to the development of a substantially enlarged internal market.

One of the important goals of regional integration, the rise in opportunities for trade, cannot be achieved if the range of exportable products is limited to a few agricultural products or raw materials. Only the existence of a producing industry worthy of the name, and, under certain circumstances, of cross-border services, can make the expansion of the internal market a useful undertaking. Only in these cases is synergy (development of ancillary industries) or increased competition likely.

Second, given the heterogeneity of the region at the beginning of an integration attempt the gains from integration can be expected to be distributed very unevenly. The more advanced economies, South Africa in particular, are so far ahead of the poorer ones that no mutual augmentation of welfare can be expected. It is more likely that South Africa’s strength, in particular, will lead to an extremely unequal distribution of welfare gains from the integration process. The already apparent imbalance in trade (see below) would grow further as integration proceeds.

\textsuperscript{3} However, when examining developing countries, it must be remembered that such economies are characterised by large informal sectors. The reliability of data is therefore limited. Also figures for trade flows only reflect formal trade. Informal cross-border trade may show a different picture.

\textsuperscript{4} The island economy of the Seychelles is, both in terms of its tiny population (74,000 inhabitants) and its per capita GDP, an exceptional case.
Table 2: Selected macroeconomic data on SADC countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2,028</td>
<td>1,944</td>
<td>-445</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>1,055</td>
<td>5,781</td>
<td>1,192.5</td>
<td>101.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>5,702</td>
<td>6,707</td>
<td>-413</td>
<td>1,372</td>
<td>2,167</td>
<td>7,333</td>
<td>585.2</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>1,238</td>
<td>2,424</td>
<td>-450</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>2,140</td>
<td>499.6</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>3,884</td>
<td>4,051</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1,296</td>
<td>1,258</td>
<td>6,853</td>
<td>528.7</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>7,396</td>
<td>-340</td>
<td>3,167</td>
<td>3,017</td>
<td>11,482</td>
<td>314.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>5,355</td>
<td>8,512</td>
<td>-425</td>
<td>2,344</td>
<td>2,515</td>
<td>4,885</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>10.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>108.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>2,190</td>
<td>3,453</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1,591</td>
<td>1,868</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>4,922</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>2,130</td>
<td>1,907</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>78,744</td>
<td>129,094</td>
<td>-2,033</td>
<td>33,309</td>
<td>32,716</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>1,132</td>
<td>4,151</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2,701</td>
<td>2,767</td>
<td>1,801</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Just how much the SADC is marked by the economic predominance of South Africa is also shown in table 2. South Africa’s output, about $ 130 billion in 1997, far exceeds that of its neighbours. Even when taking estimate figures for Zaire/Congo, Swaziland and the Seychelles into account, the combined GDP of the 14 other countries in 1997 was only US-Dollar 51.2 billion or 39.6 per cent of South Africa’s GDP.\(^5\) The GDP of the second largest economy, Zimbabwe, represents only 6.6 per cent of the South African GDP, and is more recently confronted with a sharp decline due to the political turmoil and economic mismanagement of the late 1990s and during early 2000.

\(^5\) Zaire/Congo’s GDP is estimated at $ 5.4 billion, that of Swaziland at $ 0.8 billion and the Seychelles are estimated to have a GDP of $ 0.5 billion.
The macroeconomic data in table 1 also reveal the greatly differing economic policies and their differing success. Whereas most SADC countries recorded negative or very modest economic growth between 1985 and 1995, Botswana and Mauritius show that small African economies, too, have potential for successful development (cf. Mistry 1996, p. 168). A comparison of the countries’ GDP in 1980 and in 1997 (table 2) underlines this assessment. Botswana and Mauritius occupy an exceptional position, having increased output within 17 years almost fivefold in the case of Botswana and more than threefold in the case of Mauritius. Also Lesotho was able, for specific reasons, to almost triple its GDP. Other countries recorded either moderately favourable development (Namibia and South Africa), stagnation, or depression. The comparison of inflation rates displays the same picture. Only Mauritius had a single-figure annual inflation rate between 1985 and 1995. Angola, Mozambique and Zambia recorded very high inflation rates.

The significance of these differences should not be underestimated. Basically, these differing economic developments are the consequences of very different economic policies. Although they may also reflect difficulties in the development of some of the countries’ terms of trade, there is no doubt that economic policies in SADC are based on very different grounds. These are unfavourable preconditions for economic integration in southern Africa. Although a very strict co-ordination of macroeconomic policies is not required for a free trade area, empirical evidence supports the argument that a minimum convergence of economic policies as well as a minimum of economic stability is required even for a free trade area.

Most SADC countries are confronted with serious external deficits (see for a recent overview Lindie 1999). Again, Botswana is an exception with a surplus of the current account of almost 8 per cent of GDP. But the poorer SADC countries ran extraordinarily high current account deficits, in particular Mozambique, Malawi and Tanzania. Taking the data on foreign debt in table 2 into consideration, it is clear that the poorer SADC countries are not in a position to bear marked trade or current account deficits for even a short period. The poorer countries of SADC are very heavily indebted. The high debt means, unless debt relief is granted, that those countries should try to achieve a trade surplus in order to be able to service their debt. This has not been the case in any of the poorer countries in 1995 (with the exception of the special case of the war-based Angolan export economy, which is to no benefit to the common population).

These figures underline that in particular
the weaker SADC countries cannot accommodate a further deterioration of the external accounts. In particular when the unbalanced trade flows in the region are taken into consideration, the need for a rapid revision of the current trade policies in the region are obvious (see part 3).

To sum up these findings: The risks for regional integration in southern Africa are very high indeed. The existing external imbalances are already alarming, because they put an unsustainable burden on the smaller economies in the region. South Africa is, by all measures, the economic giant in the region: South Africa has no economic and, as we have seen during the crises of 1997 and 1998, no political counterweight in the region. Zaire/Congo, which could theoretically be a balancing power, is still in such great internal turmoil that both its economic and political weight are insignificant.

Previous integration projects in other parts of the world as well as in Africa have shown that very great imbalances as well as great differences in the level of development are structural obstacles to successful regional integration. In contrast to the assumptions of neo-classical economic theory, the weaker economies will not benefit most from integration, but rather the already stronger economies will gain most. The poles have to gain more than the economies at the fringe. This general trend is strengthened further because in the poorer SADC countries there is virtually no industry that could simply be upgraded to compete with South African companies. It can therefore be expected that South Africa will be by far the greatest beneficiary of improved trade and investment opportunities in southern Africa.

The immediate consequence of this analysis is to demand substantial measures to strengthen the weaker economies in SADC. The continuation of today’s trade flows will make the economically weaker parts of the region even poorer. Although South Africa itself ought to be interested in an improvement of economic conditions in the neighbouring countries, primarily to reduce the flow of migrants into South Africa, no concrete initiatives for a transfer of funds have been undertaken or even agreed upon yet.

The form of those transfers is another matter: There could be direct financial support as well as some other form of assistance, e.g. in the form of substantially increased direct investment from South Africa. At this stage, the simplest and most
elegant form of transfers seems to be a more generalised customs union (less exclusive than the present SACU), in which customs revenue would be distributed according to a per capita formula: The poorer countries would immediately benefit from measures of that kind because of South Africa’s currently still relatively high customs duties, and this mechanism would have an automatic reduction of transfers because of the lowering of tariffs in the medium term (see conclusions).

3. South Africa’s role in SADC

The current South African government has been aware of the difficulties facing southern Africa long before taking office. Nelson Mandela in 1993 described all major problems of southern Africa in an article published in *Foreign Affairs*. He emphasised both the special priority of southern Africa in South Africa’s foreign policy as well as the link between South Africa’s and southern Africa’s future (Mandela 1993, p. 89f). In particular the clear description of the region’s economic structures is interesting:

“The regional economy that emerged under colonialism entrenched the domination of one country (South Africa) and incorporated other countries in subsidiary and dependent roles as labor reserves, markets for South African commodities, suppliers of certain services (such as transport) or providers of cheap and convenient resources (like water, electricity and some raw materials). South Africa’s visible exports to the rest of the region exceed imports by more than five to one. This is a reflection of not just the stronger productive base of the South African economy, but of barriers of various kinds that have kept goods produced in regional states out of the South African market” (Mandela 1993, p. 90).

Unfortunately, Nelson Mandela’s analysis is not only a description of the past, but also of the present situation. A look at the trade flows proves this.
Table 3: South Africa’s trade with SADC countries (1994, in US-$ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1,149.2</td>
<td>156.1</td>
<td>993.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1,117.8</td>
<td>389.6</td>
<td>728.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>775.9</td>
<td>316.2</td>
<td>459.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>755.4</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>696.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACU-subtotal</td>
<td><strong>3,798.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>920.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,877.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>81.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>171.6</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>120.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>149.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>144.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>387.5</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>362.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>319.2</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>265.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>677.5</td>
<td>281.4</td>
<td>396.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC total</td>
<td><strong>5,639.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,345.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,294.3</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 4: South Africa’s trade in 1996 and 1997 (in US-$ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>232</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1,239</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>1,379</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>1,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-SACU SADC-countries</td>
<td>3,203</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>2,626</td>
<td>3,420</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorandum item: Africa</td>
<td>3,999</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>3,278</td>
<td>4,516</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>3,632</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The availability of data on trade flows in southern Africa is limited, but sufficient to analyse the current situation.\(^7\) The data for trade flows in 1994 show the disturbing trend Mandela described. South Africa exported goods worth more than $ 5,600 million to the other eleven SADC countries, but only imported a fraction of that amount from the region. In 1996 and 1997 this structure continues unchanged. The trade surplus of South Africa with the Non-SACU countries in SADC widened dramatically from US$ 1,416 Mio (1994) to US$ 2,800 Mio in 1997 (see tables 3 and 4).

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\(^7\) IMF data on trade within SACU are not available in the Directions of Trade Statistics. Also, these figures do not include illegal trade between South Africa and the neighbouring countries, which may be as high as 100 per cent of official trade figures (cf. Mistry 1996, p. 174).
Taken this evidence into account, it seems fair to say that the mercantilist trade policy of South Africa continues unchanged after the end of apartheid. The new South African government continues to benefit from structures that were very clearly understood by the ANC prior to its rise to power. The trade policy of South Africa is the single most important reason for the imbalances in trade flows. Even if the lack of competitiveness of industries may have played a role in some of the region’s economies and their trade performances, this cannot be said about Mauritius. Yet even from that country, a successful exporter to world markets, in 1997 only goods worth US$ 5 Mio found their way into the South African market.  

South Africa not only continues to protect its own market, but also benefits from the changes in trade policy that the neighbouring countries were forced to adopt. Whereas the weaker countries in the region had no alternatives but to accept the neoliberal medicine prescribed by the doctors from the IMF and the World Bank, South Africa has so far been able to avoid that doubtful help. Because of the liberal trade regime the neighbouring countries were forced to adopt, they have lost the tools to protect themselves against the powerful competitors from South Africa. Neither tariffs nor other measures to regulate trade are policy instruments available to them today.

In the few years since the end of apartheid South African companies have significantly increased their presence in the region. South African mining corporations have expanded into Zambia and Congo; South African breweries have bought breweries and bottling plants in Zambia and Zimbabwe (while so far prevented from establishing production units in Namibia due to the government protected local industry there); the government-owned rail company Spoornet is renovating the railway lines in Tanzania; the South African retailer Shoprite Checkers has opened supermarkets in the neighbouring countries and, above all, shops in the region are full of products from South Africa (cf. Taylor 1999). South Africa’s industry is by far the most competitive in the region. In 1994, total manufacturing value added in the SADC region was over US-Dollar 33 billion, with South Africa alone accounting for 82 per cent of that amount (cf. Mistry 1996, p. 226).

Although the South African government has not liberalised the country’s trade regime so far, the country will be forced to liberalise due to the results of the Uruguay

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8) The development of exports from Mauritius shows the success of that country. Between 1980 and 1993, the share of manufactures in Mauritius’ exports rose from 27 to 67%, whilst total exports rose from $ 431 million to $ 1,537 million (World Development Report 1997, p. 243).
Round. South Africa will have to simplify its tariff structure from 10,000 to 6,000 categories and increase the number of tariffs included in the WTO negotiations from 58 to 98 per cent of all tariffs. Also, South Africa will have to reduce the maximum tariff levy from 100 to 30 per cent, with the exception of motor vehicles and textiles. Export subsidies under the general export incentive scheme (GEIS) will also have to be phased out (cf. Gibb 1998, p. 296f; see also Hirsch 1995, p. 51f). These changes have consequences for intra-regional trade, although a dramatic rise of imports can only be expected where companies in the neighbouring countries are sufficiently competitive. Claims of the South African government that under the envisaged SADC trade regime South Africa will open its markets faster than the neighbours are misleading. The rapid lowering of trade barriers are a consequence of the fact that they were higher than elsewhere to start with and that these tariff reductions primarily are a consequence of South Africa’s commitments to the WTO (cf. Financial Times, 20 September 1999, p. V).

The change of trade policy will have dramatic effects on SACU, however. The current trade regime in southern Africa still gives the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) a prominent role. SACU, comprised of South Africa and Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, is the type of customs union that, in the author’s opinion, suits the structure of the region better than a free trade area. SACU, however, has been assessed increasingly critical by the South African government because South Africa’s share of the customs revenue has fallen dramatically. Whereas in 1969/70 South Africa received 97.4 per cent of customs revenue, that share has fallen to 66 per cent by 1992/93. At the same time, customs revenue has become more important for the government budgets in the other countries. In 1995/96, the proportion of central government revenue coming from customs duties was above 50 per cent in Lesotho and Swaziland and still quite high with 30.1 per cent in Namibia and 16.3 per cent in Botswana (cf. Gibb 1998, p. 301). It seems realistic to expect difficulties for the budgets of these countries once tariffs in SACU will be reduced, unless the South African government will provide some form of compensation, which seems highly unlikely in today’s political environment.

The obvious priority of the South African government to negotiate and finally conclude the Free Trade Agreement with the

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9) SACU, founded in 1910, is certainly the oldest and most successful integration project on the African continent (cf. Mills 1995, p. 216).
European Union has already been a clear indication that the country’s trade interests lie outside of the region. The originally rather insensitive way of pursuing the negotiations (without any direct consultations with the other SACU members, not to mention the rest of SADC) did not contribute to an improved understanding of the needs and interests in the region either. As a result, existing reservations and suspicions towards the giant at the Cape were further fuelled and did not enhance any confidence building.

If regional co-operation and integration in southern Africa are to have a future, it will depend on the policies of South Africa. Again it seems useful to look at the blueprint for South Africa’s foreign policy Nelson Mandela suggested in 1993:

“We are sensitive to the fact that any program that promotes greater cooperation and integration in southern Africa must be sensitive to the acute imbalances in existing regional economic relations. ...It is essential therefore that a program to restructure regional economic relations after apartheid be carefully calibrated to avoid exacerbating inequities” (Mandela 1993, p. 93f).

The position of the ANC with regard to the regional policy of South Africa after the end of apartheid has been similar. In a paper on regional policy that was published in March 1994 the ANC identified three principles of regional policy: Firstly, it should emphasise the collective nature of a new regional order. Secondly, an anti-militaristic and development-oriented approach for regional development should be favoured. Thirdly, South Africa should abandon all hegemonic ambitions in the region (cf. Mills 1995, p. 230).

The third point, however, in reality has proven to be quite ambivalent: It is understandable that the ANC, considering the experiences of South Africa’s previous policies, wanted to stress the non-intervention element of the new regional policy. At the same time, however, the ANC abandoned responsibility for the region. This could be seen as quite an unwanted side-effect, since at least for a number of the other SADC countries, responsible leadership in the region could have been beneficial with regard to a number of conflicts emerging in the late 1990s.

The regional policy of South Africa is, however, not only controversial because of its self-seeking economic strategies. The activities of South Africa with regard to the developments in Lesotho also have highlighted the reservations of policy makers in the region.

In May 1998 the governing party in Lesotho had achieved victory in the
elections and had claimed to have won 79 out of 80 seats. The opposition parties questioned these results and demanded that King Letsie III should nullify the elections. In August, South Africa’s Vice-President Thabo Mbeki managed to convince the parties in Lesotho that a SADC Troika, comprised of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, should review the May elections. After a further deterioration of the political stability in Lesotho, expressed by a mutiny in the armed forces, South Africa intervened militarily on 22 September 1998. Nelson Mandela publicly tried to justify the intervention. Despite the offensive, the situation in Lesotho continued to be unstable for months.

By all standards, this activity seems to have violated international law. Neither had the King of Lesotho, the legitimate head of state, approved the operation nor had there been any involvement of the United Nations. There was no decision of the Security Council approving South Africa’s military intervention. Also within the SADC there was no consultation of other governments, obviously not even within the SADC Troika.

It goes without saying that this military intervention will further weaken the SADC process. Not only does it further increase the uncertainty in the region because of internal instability in Lesotho, but it will result in a deterioration of South Africa’s credibility as a peaceful power, both in the region and further afield. Although it is quite early for final judgements, it seems that South Africa’s premature military intervention has both fuelled tension within Lesotho and caused a revival of South Africa’s negative image in the region. Pretoria’s decision to send troops to Lesotho, but not to commit forces to help the beleaguered Congolese regime of Laurent Kabila has confirmed concerns about South Africa’s doubtful regional policy (cf. Financial Times, 20 September 1999, p. V).

Instability, however, not only characterises the situation in Lesotho but also in other parts of SADC. The Democratic Republic of the Congo today is torn by a civil war, which may well continue for the years to come. The outcome cannot be predicted at this stage. Only two years after Congo joined SADC, it is quite obvious that it was a grave mistake to admit Congo to SADC before Kabila’s power was internally consolidated.11 As everywhere, regional integration is not a tool for the solution of internal problems of member states. Although this is a commonplace, it is too often ignored in Africa.12

11) Congo and the Seychelles were admitted in September 1997.

12) Congo’s president Kabila unexpectedly abandoned the southern African summit in Maputo in August 1999 (cf. Financial Times, 18 August 1999, p. 6). This underlines the
SADC itself is deeply divided over the issue of intervention in Congo. As mentioned above, the South African government is unwilling to support the Congo militarily, but Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia have sent troops. The policy vis-à-vis Congo is quite contradictory: On the one hand Congo was quickly accepted as a SADC member, mainly the result of South African intervention, on the other hand SADC in general and South Africa in particular refrain from supporting its established government. This does not seem to be a very coherent strategy.

Beyond Congo, also other member countries of SADC appear significantly less stable in 1999 than in the past. In Angola the more than 40 year old conflict continues, whereas both Zimbabwe and Namibia seem to depend on their political leaders, which makes the future of those countries potentially unstable. Present internal conflicts in Zimbabwe underscore the rapidly deteriorating situation in terms of social stability. Namibia has been confronted with secessionist uprisings in the Caprivi region and is now involved in two wars after joining the allied forces in the Congo in August 1998 and giving away its neutrality with regard to the war in neighbouring Angola. Since offering direct support to the MPLA government forces against UNITA in December 1999, the Kavango region in Namibia has even turned into a low key war zone. At the same time South Africa itself is gradually losing stability: A steadily growing level of violence (also with regard to crime) as well as rising extremist tendencies of different groups in society contribute to an increasingly volatile situation. Some authors have even warned that South Africa might follow the example of Columbia, i.e. that a collapse of government authority is not impossible (cf. von der Ropp 1999).

Furthermore, it has to be noted that South Africa today is confronted with two migration problems. Firstly, since 1994 a substantial number of (predominantly, but by far not exclusively white) South Africans have left the country and have moved to other countries, mainly Australia and Canada. About 500,000 people, or ten per cent of the white population, have left the country (cf. von der Ropp 1999). Secondly, there has been migration from other African countries into South Africa. Since those migration flows have been mainly illegal, the estimates vary greatly, from two to eight million people (cf. Solomon 1998). Needless to say that both types of migration have created further problems for South African policy makers, since the result is a decrease in skilled labour and an increase in unskilled labour, which is

difficulties of negotiating an integration project with countries torn by internal conflict.
already available in abundance.\textsuperscript{13}

4. The perspectives of the integration process in SADC with regard to the implementation of the SADC trade protocol

The SADC trade protocol was agreed upon in 1996. However, it does not come into effect unless three-quarters of the member states will have ratified it. During the 1998 SADC Summit, which was held from 13 to 14 September in Mauritius, the Heads of State or Government expressed concern over the lack of ratification of the SADC Trade Protocol:

"The Summit expressed disappointment that so far, only four countries (Botswana, Mauritius, Tanzania and Zimbabwe) have ratified the Trade Protocol, which is the key to successful regional integration and economic development in Southern Africa. The Summit cautioned that the Organisation could lose its credibility unless Member States moved with speed to decisively address problems impeding ratification of the Trade Protocol. The Summit welcomed the decision to convene a SADC Trade Negotiating Forum in October, and an extra-ordinary meeting of Ministers of Trade and Industry before the end of 1998, to finalise outstanding matters on the Trade Protocol" (Final Communiqué, paragraph 31).

Without any doubt, the Trade Protocol does not make sense without South Africa and SADC does not make sense without the Trade Protocol. Although the South African government continued to express its willingness to sign the Trade Protocol, the absence of action for too long a time suggested either the South African government’s lack of will or its lack of ability to implement. In any case, there was for years a visible lip-service in marked contrast to concrete action actually required towards enhanced regional integration. After dragging its feet for three years, South Africa finally ratified the Trade Protocol in December 1999. This finalised ultimately the legal provisions for creating a common market by 2012.

Domestic issues might play an important role for explaining the South African snail’s pace decried by other countries in the region: The lack of jobs and the fear of South African unions to lose more jobs due to the re-location of industries may be the most critical points. But there can’t be any doubt that other governments in the region also have difficulties to get domestic support for the envisaged trade regime.

The difficulties the South African govern-

\textsuperscript{13} Guelke stresses that the EU has a vital interest in the stabilisation of South Africa also because of potential migration: About one million people in South Africa have access to a British passport, another 600,000 hold a Portuguese passport. Apart from the immediate consequences a massive migration out of South Africa would also signal a breakdown of the South African economy, which in turn would signal the end of trust in a reversal of economic fortunes of the African continent as a whole (cf. Guelke 1995, p. 99).
ment is confronted with cannot be denied. Even several years after the end of apartheid the change is not yet consolidated internally, unemployment is an extremely high 40 per cent, and the expectations of broad sections of the populace that their economic situation would rapidly improve have not been met. The migration of skilled labour is, as mentioned, an enormous problem. Large corporations, e.g. the Anglo American Corporation, are relocating their headquarters from Johannesburg to London. A fact, which - despite opposite claims by the multinational company itself (once a flagship for the economic stronghold at the Cape) has indeed a significant meaning and by all means a psychological impact.

South Africa’s trade unions, whose struggle against the apartheid regime had been supported by neighbouring countries, now vehemently criticise the inflow of labour from the countries across the northern borders as well as denounce regional integration because it could have negative consequences for jobs in South Africa.\textsuperscript{14} The South African government is forced to consolidate the situation within the country while being expected to assume the leadership role in the region.

Even though the internal difficulties cannot be disputed, it nevertheless may be about time to question the regional policy of South Africa. The brother of South Africa’s Vice-President Thabo Mbeki has pointed out that an increasing number of African countries do not wish to see South Africa taking a leading role on the continent (cf. Vale/Maseko 1998, p. 279). However, this might entirely be South Africa’s fault. Leadership in southern Africa cannot result in South Africa exploiting the advantages whilst paying no attention to the negative consequences of its activities. The process of regional integration in southern Africa requires that South Africa plays the role of a benign hegemon, not that of a malign regional superpower. Whereas many observers in the region had hoped that the end of apartheid would result in more harmonious relations in southern Africa, today South Africa’s regional policy is questioned by its neighbours and by observers from further afield. South Africa seems to develop a hostile attitude towards people from other SADC countries, a point

\textsuperscript{14} Alan Hirsch pointed out as early as 1995 that trade unions in South Africa expected the relocation of production sites to other, cheaper locations within SADC should regional integration be successful. Due to that, trade unions expected a deterioration of both wages and working conditions in South Africa (cf. Hirsch 1995, p. 53; see also Leistner 1995, p. 267). These fears, however, ignore the job creation effects of regional integration. Also, other integration processes have shown that the relocation of production facilities will only take place if the right preconditions for an investment are provided, e.g. a skilled workforce, efficient infrastructure and a stable macroeconomic environment. The ability of the other SADC countries to provide the essentials for investment there can at least be questioned.
made by Bischoff:

“South Africa’s preoccupation with halting the influx of illegal migrants, their treatment in detention and deportation to many is indicative of a xenophobic attitude directed at other Africans. The South African state – peopled with civil servants from the apartheid past – is a type of state in which other African states find little to recognise themselves in” (Bischoff 1998, p. 14).

Arguments that at this stage South Africa is not able to play a more constructive role in the region are misleading. It has been proposed that the national ‘Reconstruction and Development Programme’ cannot be successfully implemented at the same time as a regional co-operation project (cf., for example, Leistner 1995, p. 56). This, however, ignores the fact that consecutive implementation – first internal consolidation in South Africa then consolidation in the region – would overtax the strength of the other countries in the region. This logic would mean that the poorer countries of the region would have to continue to cope with the current exploitation by South Africa until, at some date in the future when South Africa has achieved the expected stability, they can start hoping to improve their economic position.

There are at least two limitations to that approach. Firstly, there is the danger of a continuation of the current regional policy by the South African government. The ANC might, in contrast to its egalitarian rhetoric, continue to exploit the regional hierarchy. After all, who is going to stop them from doing so? It is hard to spot, at this stage, forces within South Africa that continue to press for a more benign regional policy (cf. also Good 1997, p. 573). In a few years, a significant number of people who still have the experience of support by the regional partners of the ANC during the fight against apartheid may have lost their influence. Therefore, relatively soon the internal support for a regional compensation mechanism might be even weaker than today. Secondly, the countries of the region might, both economically and politically, no longer be interested in a regional integration project. If South Africa is not able to prove its ambitions for leadership, based on the principle of equality, within the foreseeable future, the other countries of the region could be tempted to promote other, competing projects.

Certainly SADC cannot be called an irreversible reality yet. South Africa might quickly isolate itself with a continuation of the current policy. The result could be the re-emergence of a regional project without, or rather against South Africa, though such a development is still quite unlikely. The other SADC countries are too weak to create a promising alternative to SADC. But in an age of rapid change, even South Africa’s current (regional) invincibility
should probably not be taken for granted. Even without an auspicious alternative project, the other SADC countries may come to the conclusion that the disadvantages of integration are greater than the disadvantages of non-integration.

With regard to the future of South Africa itself, some observers have started to take quite a pessimistic view. Kenneth Good has identified a growing non-accountability of the executive in South Africa, an increase of intra-élitism as well a declining importance of participatory democracy (cf. Good, pp. 563-571). He observes that the new élite in South Africa is skilfully expanding its power, but seems to be driven primarily by its own interests. However, this system may continue to work for the foreseeable future:

“The new authoritarianism, built on predominance and power-sharing among the élites, backed by corporate power and the ‘patriotic bourgeoisie’, has potentially greater permanency than apartheid” (Good 1997, p. 573).

If Good’s view will prove correct, it will be difficult to envisage South African leadership in the region that is characterised by the principles the ANC set for itself in 1994, i.e. partnership and equality.

Although SADC has continued to emphasise the need for an equal development in the region, on this issue there has been more rhetoric than action. The design of the envisaged free trade area pays no attention to the inequalities in the region, a point also made by Gibb:

“Despite calls for ‘balanced growth’, the creation of a regional market based upon trade liberalisation and free market principles does not confront the problem of size disparities and the threat of deindustrialisation in, for example, Zimbabwe and Zambia” (Gibb 1998, p. 304).

In 1998, we have already experienced the difficulties other SADC countries are confronted with because of South Africa’s export drive into the region. The government in Zimbabwe was forced to tighten its import regime dramatically: Tariffs were raised by between 20 and 100 per cent, a measure aimed to reduce imports from South Africa.

In this context, we have to ask ourselves what the positions of the other SADC countries regarding the further integration process are. The tightening of the import regime in Zimbabwe gives a clear indication: Even if there were the political will to proceed with SADC integration, the economic fundamentals do not enable the other SADC countries to go ahead without South Africa taking the lead. Therefore, it is unlikely that other countries will sign the Trade Protocol unless South Africa does. Today, with the exception of Tanzania, only the more competitive SADC countries have signed the Trade Protocol, which
gives an indication of the difficulties the weaker countries are facing not only because of economic, but also due to political considerations. The pressure to avoid the further deterioration of economic conditions is putting a limit to the ability of those governments to sign the Trade Protocol.

In general, vested interests and the fear of giving up sovereignty are substantial obstacles for integration in all SADC countries. The bureaucracies in all participating countries may fear job losses due to the delegation of tasks to the regional body. In the absence of alternatives, clinging to a task and the job coming with it is quite understandable, yet a problem for integration. Also, the fear to lose sovereignty is a phenomenon quite common in integration processes. However, more successful integration processes seem to have managed to emphasise the ‘pooling of sovereignty’ effect of integration and have therefore created a broad support for the integration process. In southern Africa, such an effort has not been made successfully.

The ambivalent position of the governments in smaller SADC countries is strengthened further due to South Africa’s trade diplomacy. The tendency of the South African government to strengthen bilateral agreements within and beyond SADC is sending out a confusing message. The South African government fails to set priorities and make them clear to its partners in the region. The recent introduction of a new, tougher regime for the collection of value added tax for trade within SACU will further add to the reservations the smaller SADC countries have vis-à-vis South Africa.¹⁵

Regarding the current institutional arrangements, both a revision of the sector-based responsibilities as well as a substantial strengthening of the SADC Secretariat seems overdue. The division of labour between countries has not yielded good results and has only led to minimal integration effects (cf. Gibb 1998, p. 303; see also Mills 1995, p. 224). A centralisation of responsibilities seems to be the only available alternative. Empirical evidence has shown that without a well equipped, both in terms of resources as well as manpower, central body regional integration is likely to fail. Needless to say that a large secretariat is no guarantee for success. But in particular the Asian crisis has shown that too informal regional arrangements, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) and even ASEAN, have great difficulties presenting

¹⁵) South Africa is forcing importers to pay value-added tax at the border, which results in an additional barrier for imports from SACU countries. Furthermore, past experience seems to indicate that the customs administration in South Africa is quite unwilling to honour the obligation to refund the VAT once the products have been sold to the final customers.
solutions in a turbulent situation and therefore have difficulties surviving a crisis.\textsuperscript{16}

However, a rationalisation of the SADC structures fails to attract the necessary political support. During the Mauritius Summit, reform was postponed once again: “The Summit reaffirmed the necessity of continuing with the system of sectoral co-ordination by Member States and the rationalisation of sectors where appropriate” (Final Communiqué, paragraph 28).

Although by now we have sufficient evidence that the current system does not work too well, at the political level, as opposed to the technical level, little support for rationalisation can be found. The absence of a lean, yet centralised organisation will hinder the development of policies aimed at structural reform and might foster the project-oriented approach of the past.

In this context, recent lessons from Asian countries ought to be considered. As a consequence of the crisis in Asia, a strengthening of regional bodies, as opposed to regional integration, is not unlikely in Southeast and East Asia. The first step in that direction has been the creation of an ASEAN body to monitor economic developments in Southeast Asia and supply governments with some additional early warning signals. ASEAN has tried to improve the capacity of its Jakarta-based Secretariat throughout the 1990s, but until 1998 the Secretariat was responsible only for trade, not for the supervision of financial flows. The SADC Secretariat could play that role for southern Africa, provided the allocated resources enable it to work seriously.\textsuperscript{17}

5. Policy Options for SADC

Considering the analysis of the forces for and against regional integration in southern Africa, not too many positive remarks about SADC can be made at this stage. The bottom line is that as long as South Africa’s rhetoric doesn’t match its actions, there will be no successful integration in southern Africa.

At the same time, it has to be acknowledged that other integration processes in southern Africa do not represent an alternative to SADC. COMESA, the “Common Market for

\textsuperscript{16) For a discussion of the consequences of the Asian crisis see Dieter 1998b.

\textsuperscript{17) In that context, it has to be stressed that the current Secretariat has some room for improvement. The Executive Secretary’s statement during the Summit in Mauritius, where Kaire Mbuende urged SADC governments to aim for annual growth rates of 8 per cent, could just be an exercise in wishful thinking if he hadn’t added that this were an achievable goal. To his credit, he didn’t say when, but against the background of an average growth of 2.2 per cent in 1997 such statements don’t increase the standing of a regional body.
Eastern and Southern Africa”, is an even more unstable situation than SADC. Most of those COMESA countries that are not members of SADC are either characterised by internal conflict or are very small: Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Somalia are in permanent internal conflict. The Comoros and Djibouti have a very small population. Only three countries could make a meaningful contribution to an integration scheme: Kenya, Uganda and to a lesser degree Madagascar, which is also a member of the Indian Ocean Commission. Kenya and Uganda in turn are trying to implement their own integration project: Together with Tanzania they work on the revitalisation of the East African Community (EAC). Whereas some observers initially expected a complementarity between SADC and COMESA, it is now very clear that these projects compete with each other and that SADC, for the time being, is more successful (cf. Mistry 1996, p. 171).

What could be done at this stage? If SADC shall not follow the example of other integration processes in Africa, i.e. either collapse or become irrelevant, the Trade Protocol has to be implemented as a first step without further delay. Even this might not be sufficient: It could be argued that the Trade Protocol is too limited in scope anyway and that the planned implementation period is already too slow. The experience of successful integration projects in other parts of the world has shown that free trade areas are too difficult to administer, in particular in the developing world. The need to have certificates of origin, which are necessary to safeguard the ability of member states to continue having their own external tariff regime, is putting an undue burden on the customs administrations. Given that certificates of origin tend to be complex, they are quite likely to harm trade rather than encourage it.

In other parts of the world, customs unions generally have fared far better than free trade areas. Not only did the European Union start as a customs union, but also today the success of the Mercosur, an (incomplete) customs union, supports the argument that a customs union is the better concept than a free trade area. Although a customs union requires a greater degree of commitment to an integration process, it both is easier to administer and offers a very elegant way of redistribution within an integration project. Of course, one could argue that SADC will not be able to agree on a customs union. This may well be true, but if SADC can only agree on the lowest common denominator then the outlook for the organisation is bleak anyway. In such a scenario, it might be advisable to develop other alternatives.

Mistry has suggested that the harmonisation of procedures could make a contribu-
tion to the facilitation of trade, even without the implementation of a free trade area or a customs union:

“Much could be gained by contemplating the coordination of customs and revenue administration throughout the region especially by employing common taxation codes, training practices, standards, principles of information sharing, as well as engendering higher levels of probity throughout the region where revenue administration is concerned” (Mistry 1996, p. 196).

Western donors in general and the European Union in particular might have to reconsider their activities with regard to the support of SADC. At this stage the integration process is not very promising, mainly because of South Africa’s lack of leadership for the region.

In this context, it should be noted that the recent creation of a free trade area between the EU and South Africa is counterproductive. After more than three years of negotiations, the EU and South Africa have agreed on a free trade area. This will permit South Africa to export about 99 per cent of its industrial products, but only 75 per cent of its agricultural produce duty free into the EU. In return, the EU gets duty free access to the South African markets for about 86 per cent of industrial products. The main exception are cars and textiles. The agreement has an implementation period of 12 years (cf. Financial Times, 26 March 1999, p. 3; for a discussion of the consequences of the agreement see Jachia/Teljeur 1998).

The agreement was reached just hours before Nelson Mandela gave his final speech to the South African parliament. Perhaps it was good news for South Africa. For the other countries of the region, however, it was not. A free trade area with the EU enables South Africa to cut itself off from the region. It is no longer necessary for South Africa to have the development of the region as a priority of economic policy. It will be much more tempting to export to the competitive, but also lucrative European market than to develop southern Africa together with the regional partners. Considering the experience of the first years of post-apartheid regional policy, it seems more likely that South Africa will follow a two-tiered approach: Regional development would have a clear disadvantage compared to the strengthening of South Africa-EU ties. At the same time, the European Union has missed the opportunity to provide a solution for the region’s problems. The granting of trade preferences for South Africa should have been combined with the demand for a less self-seeking policy of South Africa in the region.

18) The South African Minister for trade and industry, Alec Erwin, consequently has labelled the EU-South Africa trade agreement as "the most comprehensive economic agreement between South Africa and any other partner" (cf. Financial Times, 26.3.1999, p. 3).
Although this does not seem to be a likely prospect, the most appropriate solution for the current inequalities in trade flows still would be a SADC customs union that would distribute the revenue on a per capita basis. The poorer countries would gain most, whilst South Africa would contribute most. However, such a scheme would have an in-built reduction of transfer payments: As South Africa (or SACU to be precise) has to lower its tariffs anyway, also the revenue from tariffs will decline quickly. A SADC customs union would, however, provide the poorer countries in the region with time to adjust to the changed circumstances, i.e. the rapid growth of imports from South Africa.

Sadly, the opportunity to create such a scheme has passed and forces that would push South Africa into such a scheme are nowhere to be seen. As a result, the region is much more likely to continue on its current path, which leaves little hope both for the development of the poorer countries of southern Africa and for SADC’s own development.

In the current situation, calls for an even deeper integration project do not seem to have any prospect for realisation. However, in theory substantial benefits can be expected from such schemes. Mistry has suggested the creation of a Rand-Zone in southern Africa, i.e. eventually a currency union between the SADC countries. The South African Rand would, in Mistry’s proposal, be the key currency. Some of the potential advantages are:

- A currency union requires the commitment of member countries to monetary, fiscal and price stability which might be difficult to achieve unilaterally, in particular for the smaller countries of the region.
- The pooling of international reserves could generate savings.
- Intra-regional exchange rate stability could foster intra-regional trade because transaction costs could be lowered.
- Intra-regional investment flows could be triggered and sustained.
- Bank supervision could be made easier and more effective.
- The region would be more attractive to foreign investors, who would benefit from the enhanced monetary stability in the entire region (cf. Mistry 1996, p. 202).

This proposition obviously has a number of flaws. Like in all strict monetary arrangements, it would reduce the flexibility of monetary policy in the participating countries. A correction of the exchange rate to improve the competitive position of local companies would no longer be possible. Also, the implementation seems difficult: Without the creation of a full currency union, the only plausible alternative is the creation of currency boards by the smaller SADC countries. They would link their currencies to the South African Rand at a fixed rate and their central banks would back that rate with reserves in
foreign currency equal to the money supply in local currency. Taking the level of reserves as well as the technical expertise of some of the smaller central banks in southern Africa into consideration, this does not appear to be a convincing strategy.

A more promising avenue for further integration might be the creation of a regional energy network. In the past, governments in the region have been preoccupied with the concept of autarky in the energy sector (the latest evidence to this is the gigantic project of the Epupa dam pushed by the Namibian government). Today, however, financial constraints are much more of a problem than the availability of energy. Energy is not short in supply, and energy as well as water supply is one of the few sectors where the interest of South Africa and its neighbours seem to converge.

A regional electricity net could serve various purposes:

- It could help the northern SADC countries to reduce their trade deficits with South Africa.
- A regional electricity net could contribute to an overall reduction of electricity prices.
- The cost for providing reserve capacity could be lowered.
- Finally, the reliability of electricity supply could be improved.

Although such a scheme would only make a modest contribution to the integration process in southern Africa, it would nevertheless enable the participating countries to improve their ability to cooperate with each other. Needless to say that such a sector-based integration is neither a substitute for the creation of a trade regime nor is it a strategy without risks. The countries buying the electricity, would need guarantees that supply will not be interrupted for political reasons. But if such guarantees are not possible, the questions whether any meaningful integration in southern Africa is possible could be raised.
6. Conclusions:

Is there a bright future for SADC? From today’s point of view, this seems unlikely. Gibb asserts a policy vacuum in the region:

“Indeed, a policy vacuum appears to be emerging over the issue of regionalism, in part as a result of the unwillingness of South Africa, and the inability of other states of southern Africa, to assume primary responsibility for the region’s economy” (Gibb 1998, p. 306).

And another, more recent stock taking exercise suggests:

“SADC has a long way to go before its many potential benefits are realised. In the case of the many regional protocols, for example, signature by the head of states at a SADC summit does not in itself initiate regional co-operation. Rather, the protocols must be ratified by the Parliaments of two-thirds of SADC members before they obtain legal force. In almost every case, ratification has proceeded extremely slowly, resulting in a situation where SADC presides over a collection of statements of intent, but has no basis of translating those intentions into action. ... Even if the various protocols were all ratified, it is not clear what immediate effect they would have. Most of the protocols ... are vaguely-worded agreements of co-operation with little detail or substance. No doubt their ratification would be a useful step forward towards a regional integration, but they will not necessarily bring about meaningful cross-border co-operation in and of themselves” (Hastings 2000, p. 195f; cf. also Thompson 2000, p. 55).

Despite this rather sceptical outlook and notwithstanding the problems for regional integration in southern Africa that have been discussed in this paper, recent developments have added some more positive dimensions notwithstanding the setbacks in terms of security issues related mainly to the conflicts in Congo and Angola. SADC efforts might therefore well be qualified less negatively as “regional integration in ferment”, as done by two more critical observers recently (Simon/Johnston 1999).

There are some signs that the South African government is finally willing to alter its policies and to play a more constructive role in the region. Together with various SADC governments, Pretoria has proposed a number of ambitious infrastructure projects termed “spatial development initiatives” (SDIs). These SDIs, created around agriculture, tourism and mining projects, are supposed to link southern African countries through a solid infrastructure network (cf. Financial Times, 20 September 1999, p. V). It remains to be seen, however, if these projects, when implemented, are entirely geared to the needs of South African companies. If that were the case, the support for this type of regional project would perhaps quickly evaporate.

Furthermore, even from today’s point of view doubts remain as to whether the conclusion of bilateral schemes between South Africa and its neighbours is indeed a
good strategy for regional development: Bilateral agreements could quickly be regarded as a substitute for regional integration. Also, these arrangements between hub (South Africa) and spokes ensure that the hierarchical, asymmetrical economic and political structures in the region are conserved. They would only strengthen the pole of the region.

The European Union could have played a far more constructive role in the process of regional integration in southern Africa. Beyond the provision of technical expertise the EU could have insisted on a more benign role of South Africa in the region. The fact that measures of that kind were not implemented underlines the lack of coherence in the policy of the EU with regard to southern Africa.
References


