Amann, Erwin; Leininger, Wolfgang:
Expected Revenue of All-Pay and First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions with Affiliated Signals
1995
In: Journal of Economics, Jg. 61 (1995), Heft 3, S. 273 - 279
Artikel/Aufsatz in Zeitschrift1995Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Titel:
Expected Revenue of All-Pay and First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions with Affiliated Signals
Autor(in):
Amann, ErwinLSF; Leininger, Wolfgang
Erscheinungsjahr
1995
WWW URL
Erschienen in:
Titel:
Journal of Economics
in:
Jg. 61 (1995), Heft 3, S. 273 - 279
ISSN:

Abstract:

In the general symmetric auction framework of Milgrom and Weber (1982) it is shown - as a new manifestation of the linkage principle - that the all-pay sealed-bid auction yields higher expected revenue than the standard first-price sealed-bid auction. This raises the question why sealed-bid auctions of the standard first-price variety are observed in practice whereas the all-pay variety is not.