Simply, false

In: Analysis, Jg. 69 (2009) ; Nr. 1, S. 69-78
ISSN: 1467-8284, 0003-2638
Zeitschriftenaufsatz / Fach: Philosophie
Fakultät für Geisteswissenschaften » Institut für Philosophie
Abstract:
According to the Simple View (SV) of intentional action famously refuted by Bratman (1984 & 1987), A-ing is intentional only if the agent intended to A. In this paper I show that none of five different objections to Bratman's counter-example – McCann's (1991), Garcia's (1990), Sverdlik's (1996), Stout's (2005), and Adams's (1986) – works. Therefore Bratman's contention that SV is false still stands.